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Executive summary 
Working Futures: Long-run labour market and skills 
projections for the UK   
Working Futures 2017-2027 is the latest in a series of quantitative assessments of the 
employment prospects in the UK labour market over a 10-year horizon. It presents 
historical trends and future prospects by sector for the UK and its constituent nations and 
the English regions. The prime focus of Working Futures is on the demand for skills as 
measured by employment by occupation and qualification, although the supply side is 
also considered. Its prime objective is to provide useful labour market information that 
can help to inform policy development and strategy around skills, careers and 
employment, for both policy makers and a much wider audience. The results are 
intended to provide a sound statistical foundation for reflection and debate among all 
those with an interest in the demand for and supply of skills. This includes individuals, 
employers, education and training providers, as well as the various agencies and 
departments of government.  
Sectoral change is one of the key drivers of the changing demand for skills. The main 
analysis focuses on broad sectors, but this is built up from a much more detailed picture 
of change by industry. The projections are based on the use of a multi-sectoral, regional 
macroeconomic model, combined with occupational, replacement demand and 
qualification modules. The results take account of the latest official data published by the 
Office for National Statistics. These data are used to paint a comprehensive and detailed 
picture of the changing face of the UK economy and labour market. A separate Technical 
Report (Wilson et al., 20191) provides full details of sources and methods used to 
produce the results, including information about even more detailed sub-national / sub-
regional results. 
The future cannot be predicted with precision or certainty. However, all the participants in 
the labour market make plans for the future. The rationale behind Working Futures is that 
a comprehensive, systematic, consistent and transparent set of projections can help to 
inform everyone about the world they are likely to face. 
The Working Futures projections are grounded in a forecast of the future macroeconomic 
and labour market context. This is especially difficult at the present time with all the 
uncertainties associated with Brexit. The forecast is therefore subject to a number of risks 
and uncertainties. Most notable among them is the impact of Brexit on barriers to trade 
and the movement of people. 
 
1 Wilson, R. A., M. May-Gillings, S. Patel and H Bui, (2019). Working Futures 2017-2027: Technical report 
on sources and methods. Department for Education. 
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The literature on the possible range of impacts of Brexit on the UK economy suggest a 
large range of possible scenarios. These depend upon two main factors:  
i. the future trading relationship between the UK and the EU and possible 
impacts on investment patterns (varying across sectors, and dependent on 
the nature of the transition arrangements and final deal negotiated with the 
EU); and  
ii. migration flows (ranging from a relaxed approach to EU migration to a 
points-based approach).  
At one end of the spectrum, some studies suggest that a possible ‘European Economic 
Area’ scenario could result in the UK’s GDP being between 1.25% and 11% lower than 
was expected before the 2016 referendum by 2027.2 At the other end of the spectrum, 
studies that looked at “no deal” scenarios (reverting to World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
rules) found that the UK’s GDP could be between 2.7% and 18.5% lower than was 
expected before the 2016 referendum, with one outlier suggesting that UK GDP could be 
4% higher in the longer term.  
It is important to emphasise that the view presented here is not the only possible future. It 
represents a benchmark for debate and reflection that can be used to inform policy 
development and other choices and decisions. The detailed projections present a 
carefully considered view of what the future might look like, assuming that past patterns 
of behaviour and performance are continued over the longer term. The results should be 
regarded as indicative of general trends and orders of magnitude and are not intended to 
be prescriptive. If policies and patterns of behaviour are changed then alternative futures 
can result.  
Key findings 
Working Futures 2017-2027 provides a comprehensive and detailed picture of the UK 
labour market, focusing on employment prospects for up to 75 industries, 369 
occupations, 6 broad qualification levels, gender and employment status. 
The latest results indicate: 
• Significant increases in the size of the working age population and the 
economically active workforce but with a slight decline in overall labour market 
participation rates, reflecting the ageing of the population; 
• The labour force (those economically active aged 16+) is set to increase from 32.5 
million in 2017 to 34.25 million by 2027 reflecting increases in the size of the 
population as a whole;  
 
2 Or thereabouts, different studies have different end dates for the scenarios explored, but most are looking 
around 10 years ahead. 
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• There is a very slight decline in overall labour market participation rates (of age 
16+) from 61.9% to 61.4%, reflecting the ageing of the population;  
• Slow but steady output growth, combined with increases in labour productivity, 
resulting in a modest 0.3% p.a. increase in employment over the 2017-2027 
period; 
• the total number of jobs is projected to rise by just under a million over the next 
decade (this net increase is referred to as “expansion demands”);  
• “Replacement demands” (arising from the need to replace workers leaving the 
labour force for retirement and other reasons) mean that the total number of new 
job openings (also referred to as “total requirements” will be substantially higher 
(by a factor of over 11 times) than this “expansion demand”;  
• Some rebalancing of the economy is expected as a direct consequence of fiscal 
retrenchment, with a shift away from employment in public sector activities, and a 
projected decline in total employment in public administration, health and 
education between 2017 and 2027; 
• The UK and European Union will face continuing political and economic 
uncertainty around the impacts of Brexit, but in the short to medium term, it is 
anticipated that the UK leaving the European Union will have relatively modest 
impacts on trade, investment and migration patterns;  
• Agricultural output is expected to grow modestly, driven by changing consumer 
patterns. However, productivity improvements are expected to result in a fall in 
employment; 
• The Manufacturing sector is projected to experience a further decline in its share 
of total employment as well as its overall level; 
• Employment and GVA growth in Construction are expected to slow notably 
compared to the previous 20 years, partly driven by the skills shortage facing the 
sector;3 
• Output in Trade, accommodation and transport is forecast to grow in line with the 
economy as a whole, whilst employment in the sector is expected to grow much 
more slowly than employment in the UK as a whole, driven by a shift in consumer 
patterns towards online shopping; 
• The Business and other services sector is forecast to see a moderation in its rate 
of growth in output and employment compared with the previous decade, although 
it is expected that it will still outpace growth in the wider economy as a whole; 
 
3 City & Guilds Group and The Work Foundation (2018). Constructing the future: How the skills needed for 
success in the workplace are changing. London: City & Guilds. Available from: 
http://www.theworkfoundation.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CG_Constructing-the-
future_A4_32pp_LR_no-crops.pdf 
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• The Public administration, health and education sector is expected to see some of 
the strongest growth in both employment and GVA compared with the other broad 
sectors, supported largely by increased demand for health services as the size of 
the population increases and it ages; 
• The main increases in employment levels are expected to continue to be focused 
in the private (marketed) parts of the service sector such as Business and other 
services; 
• Around 59% (20.7 million) of all jobs in the UK in 2017 were full-time, while around 
28% (9.6 million) were part-time and the remaining 13% (4.5 million) were self-
employed;  
• Employment status projections show the percentage of workers who are expected 
to be part-time, full-time, or self-employed by gender is expected to remain broadly 
stable over the decade to 2027. These patterns are driven principally by the mix of 
industry sectors in which jobs are forecast to be created or lost; 
• While full-time jobs account for about 60% of all jobs going forward, it is expected 
that most of the newly created jobs will be in part-time roles. Part-time jobs 
account for just under 30% of all jobs by 2027;  
• Following the recovery of the economy after the 2008 financial crisis, self-
employment is also expected to fall slightly over the forecast period across most 
broad sectors, with self-employment accounting for just over 10% of all jobs by 
2027; 
• Focusing on skills, as measured by occupation and formal qualifications held, the 
results suggest a continued trend in favour of more highly skilled, white-collar 
occupations, but with some growth in employment for a number of less skilled 
occupations too; 
• Again, it is important not to focus just on projected changes in employment levels, 
even in occupations where employment is expected to decline there will often be 
many new job openings and a need to recruit and train new entrants to replace 
those leaving the workforce for retirement or other reasons; 
• Focusing on the other key measure of skills used in Working Futures, the supply 
of people holding higher-level qualifications such as degrees is projected to grow 
steadily to 2027;  
• The proportion of the labour force remaining unqualified is expected to represent 
only a small minority by 2027; 
• Measuring the demand for formal qualifications is more difficult, but the number of 
jobs in occupations typically requiring a high-level qualification is expected to 
continue to grow, albeit more slowly than over the previous decade;  
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• It is projected that the supply of highly qualified people will grow more quickly than 
demand for such qualifications, as implied by projections of the patterns of 
employment by qualification level within industries and occupations; 
• This results in an increase in qualification intensity within most occupations, 
especially those that have not previously employed many people with higher-level 
qualifications (there is greatest scope for increases in such areas (rather than in 
those occupations in which the workforce is already highly qualified, such as 
professionals));  
• This does not necessarily indicate an excess supply of such qualifications; in 
many occupations, the nature of jobs is changing, making higher qualifications a 
necessary requirement for those jobs. 
The overall outlook for changing employment levels and patterns by sector, occupation, 
qualification and geographical area show many similarities to those set out in the 
previous set of Working Futures projections. Thus despite the uncertainties associated 
with Brexit many of the underlying trends regarding skills remain unchanged. 
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1. Introduction and background 
1.1. Background  
Since the previous Working Futures report (Wilson et al., 2016a4), the UK has voted to 
leave the EU following the EU referendum in June 2016. The official withdrawal process 
began when Article 50 was triggered on 29 March 2017. The impact on the UK economy 
of the vote to leave the EU is likely to be substantial although the magnitude of these 
effects remains inherently uncertain. They depend on the eventual form of the 
relationship of the UK with the EU post-Brexit. This will affect various aspects of the UK 
economic environment across a range of dimensions such as trade, migration, and 
regulation. 
The report focuses on three main questions: 
• Where will the jobs of the future be concentrated in the UK? 
 
4 Ibid. 
Key messages 
Working Futures 2017-2027 is the 7th in series of assessments of UK labour market 
prospects carried out every 2-3 years since 2002.  
The rationale for carrying out such work is to inform participants in the UK labour 
market about the world they may face and to stimulate reflection and debate. 
The approach to developing a quantitative view of the future labour market involves the 
use of a detailed multi-sectoral, multiregional econometric model, based on official 
data. 
The results paint a comprehensive, consistent and very detailed picture of employment 
prospects in the UK, covering industries, occupations, qualifications, gender and 
employment status, including results for the devolved nations and the English regions. 
The results presented provide a benchmark for debate and thinking about the future. 
They should not be regarded as precise forecasts of what will necessarily happen. 
Rather, they indicate a likely future, given a continuation of past patterns of behaviour 
and performance. The results should be used in conjunction with a variety of other 
sources of labour market information. 
The forecast is subject to a number of risks and uncertainties. Most notable among 
them is the impact of Brexit on barriers to trade and the movement of people. An 
orderly transition is assumed. 
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• What are the implications of this for skill demand, as measured by occupation and 
qualification?  
• How does this compare with developments on the supply of skills? 
Section 2 explores the remaining uncertainties and sets out the assumptions underlying 
this new set of projections for the UK.  
Section 3 focuses on prospects for the different sectors within the UK economy, 
considering the contributions they are likely to make in generating growth and 
employment, and the extent Brexit might affect this. It also considers the supply side, 
developing projections of labour supply by age and gender, taking into consideration the 
impact Brexit could have on prospects for inward migration, particularly from the EU. 
Section 4 focuses on the changing occupational structure of the UK labour market, which 
are driven by long-term trends, including changing sectoral employment patterns and 
technological and organisational trends influencing the patterns of occupational demand 
within sectors. Replacement demands are also examined. These indicate that there will 
be significant numbers of job opportunities even in areas where employment is projected 
to fall. 
Section 5 examines the implications of sectoral and occupational changes for 
qualifications in terms of demand and supply. Formal qualification is a key way in which 
skills are defined and measured in Working Futures.   
The projections take account of the latest official employment data, including the results 
from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The stance of government policy is taken into 
account by factoring in the consequences of the various government public spending 
measures and other official policy statements, including the UK’s decision to leave the 
EU.  
The projections are based on the Cambridge Econometrics (CE) macroeconomic 
forecasts, (produced using MDM - CE’s detailed multi-sectoral dynamic macroeconomic 
model (MDM-E3), MDM C182 (revision 13406), conducted in November 2018). Based on 
this analysis, the projections indicate what may happen to the structure of employment in 
the UK – disaggregated by sector, gender, occupation, etc. Labour market prospects are 
driven by the macroeconomic scenario and prospects for detailed sectors in different 
parts of the country. The prospects for sectoral output are independent of those produced 
by any other forecasters. They are based on CE’s own models, judgements and 
assumptions as set out in section 2.   
1.2. Rationale for the Working Futures projections 
The case for a regular and systematic assessment of future skills needs has been set out 
in previous Working Futures reports and is summarised next. This also draws upon 
various international and other reviews. 
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The results presented provide a benchmark for debate and thinking about the future. 
They should not be regarded as precise forecasts of what will necessarily happen. 
Rather, they indicate a likely future, given a continuation of past patterns of behaviour 
and performance.5 If policies and patterns of behaviour are changed then alternative 
futures might be achieved. The present results provide a consistent and systematic 
benchmark view across the whole economy and labour market. They are indicative of 
general trends and orders of magnitude, given the assumptions made, which are 
summarised below. The forecast is subject to a number of risks and uncertainties. Most 
notable among them is the impact of Brexit on barriers to trade and the movement of 
people. When developing the UK macroeconomic forecast (in the autumn of 2018), 
assumptions were made based on announcements and published reports by think-tanks, 
non-profit organisations and the stance of the UK government at that time. 
The forecasts are not necessarily a substitute for projections produced by/for individual 
sectors or other interest groups (defined by say spatial area or occupational group). 
However, the Working Futures results show how the more detailed results for particular 
sectors, occupations or regions fit into a broader macroeconomic context, covering all 
these in a consistent, systematic and comparable manner.  The results should be 
regarded as a robust benchmark for debate and used in conjunction with a variety of 
other sources of labour market information.  
1.3. Reviews of the need for skills forecasts 
Since the last Working Futures projections were produced there have been a number of 
new reviews of Skills Anticipation and Forecasting.  This has included projects supported 
by the Business, Industry and Science Department (BIS)6 and the Department of 
Education (DfE) in the UK, as well as a number of international exercises. These have 
confirmed the cases for carrying out such exercises on a regular basis in order to better 
inform labour market participants, education and training providers and policy makers 
more generally about the labour market they may face over the next decade or so. 
For example, in 2017 DfE organised an Academic Workshop to discuss the need for 
regular employment projections in the UK.  Papers presented, such as that by Dickerson 
and Wilson (20177), concluded that such work was an essential component of a modern 
labour market information system. Similar conclusions were reached in a review 
conducted as part of the Foresight Future of skills and lifelong learning project, 
sponsored by BIS8. 
 
5 For more detailed discussion see the various references Section 1.3.  
6 In 2016, BIS was merged with the Department for Energy and Climate Change to become the 
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS). 
7 Dickerson, A., and Wilson, R. A. (2017). How Should We Consider Future Skills Demand? Skills Demand 
Workshop 2017, Convened by the U.K. Department for Education, 18 July 2017, Church House 
Conference Centre, London.  
8 For the reports see: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/future-of-skills-and-lifelong-learning  
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A number of similar reviews have been conducted at international level. In 2016, the 
European Council concluded that "Anticipating and matching labour market needs” is a 
key responsibility of Member States. Comprehensive assessments of future skills 
requirements can make a key contribution to the identification of labour market trends 
and skills shortages, helping to contribute to a better matching between labour market 
needs and skills supply developments. More recent reviews, such as those by van 
Breugel (20179) and Wilson (201810) reach similar conclusions. More effective 
anticipation and matching of labour market needs, it is argued, can contribute to the 
promotion of better labour utilisation and higher labour productivity, and therefore to 
growth and jobs, helping to reduce both frictional and structural unemployment. The 
Working Futures series is a key element in the UK’s response to this request. 
There is on-going interest amongst policy makers to ensure that the UK has the 
appropriate skills base to sustain economic growth and compete internationally. 
However, such information is potentially of interest not just to policy makers but also for 
all those having to make decisions about education and training, including individuals 
making careers choices, as well as education and training providers.  
The main rationale for producing these kinds of projections is no longer that policy 
makers will engage in any kind of detailed, top down, planning (or anticipation) of the 
labour market. It is more about providing information to allow individual actors throughout 
the system (individuals making career choices, educational and training establishments 
and employers generally) to make better-informed decisions (Kriechel, Rašovec and 
Wilson, 201611). Of course, nobody can predict the future with certainty. Most people can 
and do make plans and try to prepare for it. In doing so they adopt assumptions about 
what the future might be like, even if it is simply that the future will be the same as the 
past. There are also advantages of providing such projections centrally, as a public good, 
rather than relying on organisations and individuals to develop their own views 
independently. These advantages include the fact that this approach can provide a 
comprehensive, methodical, consistent and transparent set of results. It also benefits 
from economies of scale. 
A key advantage of the Working Futures forecasts is that they provide a common and 
consistent economy wide overview of skill needs, allowing detailed comparisons across 
sectors. This is based on a transparent, specific set of macroeconomic assumptions and 
economic relationships, affecting the whole economy and its structure. As such, the 
analysis is grounded in an understanding of the key drivers impinging upon the economy. 
 
9 van Breugel, G. (2017). Identification and anticipation of skill requirements: Instruments used by 
international institutions and developed countries. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) 
(Spanish acronym is CEPAL). Date Issued: 2017-10, Serie: Documentos de Proyectos, 110 p.  United 
Nations UN symbol: LC/TS.2017/85.  
10 Wilson, R. A., (2018). Skills Forecasts in a Rapidly Changing World: Through a Glass Darkly. In 
McGrath, S., Mulder, M., Papier, J., and Suart, R. (eds.) Handbook of Vocational Education and Training 
Developments in the Changing World of Work. Springer. Available from: 
https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-319-49789-1_74-1 
11 Kriechel, B., Rašovec, T., and Wilson, R. A. (2016). ''Skills Forecasts."  Part B of the ETF, ILO and 
Cedefop Guide on Skills Foresights, Scenarios and Forecasts. CEDEFOP/ETF/ILO: Turin 
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It serves to act as an objective, economy-wide, explanatory tool to facilitate the 
examination of the changing pattern of skills demand. 
1.4. Aims and objectives of the Working Futures projections 
Government policy has placed increasing emphasis on the need for labour market 
information to be made freely available at a more detailed spatial and sectoral level to 
assist in policy and planning for the provision of education and training, as well as helping 
to guide individual career choices and decisions. Working Futures 2017-2027 addresses 
these requirements, exploiting available official information in such a manner as to 
produce a more detailed, comprehensive and consistent picture of employment patterns 
than is available from any other source, while recognising the technical challenges that 
this imposes, and setting out transparently how these have been addressed.  
The historical database and the related projections focus on employment by occupation, 
cross-classified by sector and a spatial dimension down to individual countries within the 
UK, and regions within England. Summary results for employment are reported by: 
• gender; 
• employment status (full-time/part-time/self-employed); 
• occupation (one, two and four digit occupational groups); 
• expansion and replacement demand, as well as net requirements; and  
• qualifications (6 broad Regulated Qualifications Framework (RQF) levels). 
The analysis also considers the labour and skills supply. Consistent projections of labour 
supply have been generated by: 
• gender; and 
• age (7 broad age groups: 0-15, 16-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-59,60-64, 65+). 
The labour supply projections are also developed distinguishing the highest qualifications 
held by the working age population and those economically active. These are consistent 
with results produced by Bosworth (2015a, b and c12) and Bosworth and Leach (201513). 
By making assumptions about the distribution of unemployment between qualification 
 
12 Bosworth, D. (2015a). UK Qualifications Projections – Time Series Model: Technical Report, 2013. 
Report for UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Institute for Employment 
Research, University of Warwick: Coventry. 
Bosworth, D. (2015b). National Qualifications Projections – Apportionment Model: Technical Report. 
Report for UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Institute for Employment 
Research, University of Warwick: Coventry. 
Bosworth, D., (2015c) Regional Qualifications Projections – Apportionment Model: Technical Report, 
Report for UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Institute for Employment 
Research, University of Warwick: Coventry. 
13 Bosworth, D., and Leach, A. (2015). UK Skill Levels and International Competitiveness. Report for UK 
Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Warwick Institute for Employment Research, 
University of Warwick: Coventry. 
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categories, projections of employment by highest qualification held have also been 
developed.  
1.5. General methodological approach and data sources 
The general methodological approach to developing the Working Futures projections has 
been discussed in previous reports (Wilson et al., 2016a14) and is set out in detail in the 
accompanying Technical Report (Wilson et al., 201915). It focuses on sectoral and 
occupational employment structures, qualifications, and general workforce trends 
(including replacement demand). The approach exploits existing official data, including 
the LFS, generating more detailed estimates than are available from official sources. The 
results also include a full set of SOC 2010 4-digit occupational categories that are used in 
the LMI for All data portal.16  
The complete Working Futures database presents a range of historical data and 
projections that meet the needs of the DfE (and those of its partners) for detailed 
information and intelligence on likely sectoral developments and their implications for skill 
requirements. The approach involves the detailed examination of sectoral as well as 
occupational employment change and their implications for skill requirements at both a 
micro and macro level. This is based upon the use of a variety of research methods, 
ranging from complex econometric modelling, to other more qualitative approaches, 
depending upon the objectives of the work and the nature of the basic data available. For 
example, the analysis of trends in occupational structure is based on more qualitative 
approaches in contrast to the more sophisticated econometric analysis possible in other 
parts of the model where better time series data are available.  
At the heart of the projections is the latest CE multi-sectoral multi-regional 
macroeconomic forecast. This is used to produce detailed 75 industry projections, for the 
period 2017-2027, covering all the English regions and the devolved nations of the UK 
(as well as custom results for Wales in separate workbooks). The 75 industries are 
classified using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC2007). Official ONS data on 
output and various other economic indicators as well as employment are used. The 
prospects for sectors / industries is the key driver of changes in employment by 
occupation. 
Data from the LFS and other sources are used to develop historical measures of the 
occupational and qualification structure of employment within industries. A combination of 
simple econometric methods and judgement is then used to generate projections of 
 
14 Wilson, R. A., May-Gillings, M., Pirie, J. and Beaven, R. (2016a). Working Futures 2014-2024: Main 
Report. UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. 
15 Wilson, R. A., M. May-Gillings, S. Patel and H Bui, (2019). Working Futures 2017-2027: Technical report 
on sources and methods. Department for Education. 
16 LMI for All is an online data portal, which connects and standardises existing sources of high quality, 
reliable labour market information (LMI) with the aim of informing careers decisions. This data is made 
freely available via an Application Programming Interface (API) for use in websites and applications. The 
service is funded by the Department for Education. For more information see: http://www.lmiforall.org.uk/  
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these patterns forward to 2027. This is done using the Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC2010). Analysis of labour supply by age and gender is carried out 
using econometric methods. These are then further disaggregated by formal 
qualifications held to obtain measures of the supply of skills by highest qualification held 
as defined by the Regulated Qualifications Framework, RQF (formerly the Qualifications 
and Credit Framework). 
1.6. Outline and structure of the report  
Section 2 presents an overview of macroeconomic prospects for the global and UK 
economies, and the prospects for the UK labour market.17 Section 3 assesses the 
prospects for broad sectors in more detail. Section 4 draws out the implications for 
occupations, including replacement demands. Section 5 considers the implications for 
qualifications, covering both supply and demand. Separate annexes provide technical 
information about sources and methods, describing how the projections have been 
produced, as well as how these new projections compare to previous ones. These 
Annexes also cover the development of the 4-digit occupational results and the spatial 
results for the devolved nations of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, and the nine 
English regions. A separate Technical Report (Wilson et al., 201918) provides full details 
on the methodological approach and data sources, as well as their limitations. This 
includes a detailed description of the macroeconomic and other models used to generate 
the projected demand for skills as well as the treatment of skills supply. A brief summary, 
providing details of the main data sources and methods, econometric analysis and model 
structure and content is included as one of the annexes to this Main Report. 
 
17 Results have also been produced for the devolved nations and the regions of England that together 
make up the UK.  
18 Wilson, R. A., M. May-Gillings, S. Patel and H Bui, (2019). Working Futures 2017-2027: Technical report 
on sources and methods. Department for Education. 
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2. Macroeconomic and general labour market context 
2.1. Introduction 
The macroeconomic prospects for the UK provide the context for the detailed forecasts of 
employment and the labour market examined in more detail in subsequent sections of 
this report. The analyses of the prospects for individual sectors in Section 3 can be seen 
in the context of the general projections for the UK economy as a whole outlined in this 
section. These projections are produced using CE’s detailed multi-sectoral dynamic 
macroeconomic model (MDM-E3). 
Section 2.2 begins with a brief overview of the key exogenous assumptions underlying 
the projections. This includes a detailed overview of the trade, investment and migration 
assumptions related to Brexit. The current situation is assessed in Section 2.3, drawing 
out general macroeconomic prospects for the UK over the next 5-10 years. The general 
prospects for the labour market are then summarised in Section 2.4. The sensitivity of the 
results to key assumptions, and the macroeconomic uncertainties, are discussed in 
Section 2.5. Comparisons with the previous set of Working Futures results are presented 
in the separate Annex B. 
2.2. Global prospects 
Global growth prospects have improved in recent years since the financial crisis, but 
remain uncertain in light of rising political uncertainty in western nations, such as the UK, 
Key messages 
Following the referendum on Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union in 2016, UK 
GDP is not expected to keep pace with its initial post ‘Great Recession’ growth rate. In 
the near term, GDP growth is expected to slow significantly, to an average of around 
1.1% each year over the next decade. 
Overall, the number of jobs in the UK is projected to rise by around 1 million over the 
next decade – more of these jobs are expected to be taken by female workers (0.8m) 
than male (0.3m). The unemployment rate is expected to rise slightly from its current 
rate of 4.4% to 4.6% over the next decade, with a temporary rise in the intervening 
period. 
The expansion of the UK's labour supply is forecast to slow over the next decade, 
curbed by slower population growth (than during 2007-2017) and an ageing population. 
The female labour force is expected to increase faster than the male labour force, 
reflecting the increasing participation of women in the labour market and the gradually 
increasing pension age for women. 
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US and Italy. World GDP is estimated to grow by around 3.4% in 2018, and is set to 
accelerate over 2018-2022 to reach 3.8% p.a., and then remain steady for the rest of the 
forecast period. Global growth is expected to be driven by emerging economies. China 
and India are expected to grow by 5-8% p.a. Growth in the US is expected to stabilise at 
around 2.5% p.a, and while growth in the Eurozone economies is expected to continue, it 
is expected to grow at slower rates than before the 2008 recession.19 
In the US, growth is expected to temporarily slow from 2.5% in 2018 to 2.1% in 2019 
before picking back up to 2.4% in 2020, amid growing household consumption, 
increasing private investment and falling unemployment rates. Short-term growth has 
been revised down compared to the previous Working Futures projections, partly due to 
the instability the economy has experienced following the election of President Trump. 
The US holds an advantage over other developed economies in its demographic profile, 
which is favourable towards long-term growth. However, for such growth to be achieved 
the US will have to solve problems related to productivity and competitiveness. These 
might see a relative improvement due to rising wages in China and other developing 
economies. They are expected to be accompanied by low labour force participation rates 
and rising inequality. 
China is undergoing a significant transition as growth slows from the relatively high rates 
of growth of the 2000s. Nonetheless, emerging economies are expected to be the driving 
force of global economic growth over the forecast period. In China, the effects of an 
ageing population are likely to weigh down on growth over 2017-2027, with the repeal of 
the one child law not expected to have an impact on the supply of labour until the late 
2030s. Nonetheless, it is assumed that China will experience stable and robust growth 
over the long term, at around 5.5% p.a. up to 2027. Meanwhile, India’s economic growth 
rate is expected to average 6.2% p.a. over 2017-2027, with Mexico and Brazil also 
growing strongly amongst other emerging economies. A range of factors, such as 
favourable demographics, competitive currencies, growing disposable incomes and their 
move up the global value chain, make these economies well positioned to fuel global 
growth over the long term. 
2.3. Uncertainties related to Brexit 
The Eurozone continues to face uncertainty over the long-term effects of Brexit. Despite 
a recent upturn, growth in the Eurozone has been sluggish in recent years, with many 
countries facing persistent high unemployment and low productivity, which has impacted 
on wage growth and household spending. This has been further exacerbated following 
the 2016 EU referendum and the UK’s decision to leave the EU. The associated 
uncertainty has dampened business investment in the short-term and is likely to play an 
important factor in people’s employment decisions. Separately, in the face of increasing 
competition from developing economies, a key long-term challenge will be to lift 
 
19 World GDP assumptions are based on CE estimates, informed by historical data from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF): http://data.imf.org 
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productivity, especially in the southern members of the Eurozone, and boost 
competitiveness. The Eurozone also faces the challenge of an ageing population. 
Achieving higher productivity and sustained economic growth will depend on the 
Eurozone’s ability to widen its labour force by increasing participation among women and 
the elderly. 
A detailed discussion of the uncertainties related to Brexit for the UK economy itself is 
contained in Section 2.5 below. This includes an overview of the trade, investment and 
migration assumptions explored in other literature. 
2.4. UK macroeconomic prospects  
Since 2012, the UK has experienced steady GVA growth (1.9-2.2% p.a.) and a declining 
unemployment rate from about 8% in 2012 to 4% in 2018. However, the UK’s impending 
withdrawal from the EU and the surrounding uncertainty is expected to dampen UK 
growth in the short and medium term, to about 1% p.a. (see Table 2.1). Brexit is likely to 
increase the barriers to trade for companies based in the UK, resulting in lower future 
GVA and employment growth than would otherwise be expected (at least over the 
medium term). 
The Bank of England raised the Bank Rate from the historical low of 0.25% to 0.5% in 
November 2017, the first rate rise in 10 years (Bank of England, 201820). Since then 
there has been another rise to 0.75%, with indications that there could be further rate 
rises if the inflation rate stays above the target rate of 2%. This is dependent on the UK’s 
future relationship with the EU and the resulting changes in consumer patterns. On the 
one hand, rates could be lowered to help stimulate domestic investment in the wake of 
falling investment following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU to boost domestic demand. 
On the other hand, the Bank Rate could be raised to stem inflation that increased barriers 
to trade have the potential to cause. 
A large increase in inflation in 2016-2017 (3.5%) was coupled with a 0.5% fall in 
household expenditure, a considerable drop compared to the previous year, when 
household expenditure grew by 3.5% (see Table 2.1, based on Cambridge 
Econometrics, MDM revision 13406). Household expenditure is expected to bounce back 
in the long run to grow by 1.7-2% p.a. as the economy recovers from the uncertainty it 
currently faces. Whilst absolute household expenditure is unlikely to decrease, an 
increase in trade barriers could result in households facing higher prices for some goods 
and services. 
 
20 The Bank of England (2018). EU withdrawal scenarios and monetary and financial stability. Available 
from: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/report/2018/eu-withdrawal-scenarios-and-
monetary-and-financial-stability.pdf?la=en&hash=B5F6EDCDF90DCC10286FC0BC599D94CAB8735DFB. 
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Table 2.1: Macroeconomic Indicators for the UK 
 Historical trends Recent trends Projections 
  2007-2012 2012-2017 2015-2016 2016-2017 2017-2018 2017-2022 2022-2027 
GVA at Basic Prices (% pa) 0.0 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 
 excl. Extra-Regio (% pa) 0.1 2.2 1.8 1.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 
GVA per capita (% pa) 0.0 0.4 -0.3 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8 
 Manufacturing Output (% pa) -1.9 0.3 -0.4 2.1 0.6 1.0 0.9 
 Household Expenditure (% pa) -0.5 1.9 3.8 -0.5 3.5 2.0 1.7 
Employment (jobs, millions) 32.0 35.0 34.5 35.0 35.1 35.4 36.0 
Unemployment (claimants, millions) 1.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 
CPI Inflation (% pa) 3.3 1.6 0.7 3.5 2.8 2.3 2.3 
BP/GDP (%) -4.2 -1.9 -5.9 -1.9 -3.0 -2.4 -2.0 
PSNCR/GDP (%) -1.5 5.4 5.0 5.4 5.4 4.3 4.0 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Notes:  
GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
GVA = Gross Value Added 
CPI = Consumer Price Index 
The balance of payment (BP) and the public sector net cash requirement (PSNCR) are expressed as a % of GDP at current prices. 
Employment, unemployment, CPI, BP/GDP and PSNCR/GDP refer to the last year of the period concerned. 
Employment is total workplace employment (jobs) and includes HM Forces. 
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Following the results of the 2016 EU referendum and the depreciation of the pound, net 
trade has been buoyed in recent years, improving the price competitiveness of UK 
exports in international markets.  This effect is likely to wear off in the long run, as the 
future UK-EU relationship becomes more certain and as the UK might face increases in 
trade barriers following Brexit. 
 
2.5. Macroeconomic uncertainties 
There are a number of risks and uncertainties surrounding the baseline macroeconomic 
forecast presented above; these are discussed below. 
2.5.1. Emerging markets 
While the outlook for developing economies looks strong, some uncertainties remain. 
China’s future is highly uncertain, as the economy is transitioning from an export-led 
growth model to a consumption-led growth model. China’s long-term success depends 
on whether it can achieve a ‘soft landing’ – an adjustment to lower but sustainable rates 
of growth without causing a crisis of expectations and a subsequent economic slowdown. 
A ‘hard landing’ is the major risk for the Chinese and global economies. More generally, 
there is some concern over the level of corporate debt that has built up in emerging 
markets since the global economic crisis. This has occurred largely due to recent low 
bond yields in developed markets, which led investors to look further afield in search of 
higher investment returns. With many emerging markets facing current difficulties from 
factors including low commodity prices and a strong dollar, there is uncertainty over the 
implications of such high debt levels for emerging markets and the wider global economy. 
The risk is that developing countries’ positions turn sour and growth falters, weighing 
down on demand for UK exports and, more generally, global growth. This would curb 
jobs growth in UK manufacturing and traded services, and investment-related sectors 
(such as construction) if household and business sentiment were severely dampened. 
2.5.2. The strength of the Eurozone recovery 
Though growth in the Eurozone has picked up in recent years, it has been relatively weak 
and it is still uncertain whether the Eurozone is on a sustainable long-term growth path. If 
longer-term growth in the Eurozone is more sluggish than expected, this would result in 
lower demand from the Eurozone for UK exports while the sustained weakness of the 
euro would undermine the competitiveness of UK exports to the Eurozone, thereby 
denting UK growth prospects and curbing jobs growth in UK traded goods and services 
sectors.  
In addition, the Eurozone faces political and economic uncertainty around the future 
impacts of Brexit. In the short to medium term, it is anticipated that the effects of the UK 
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leaving the European Union is likely to affect trading, investment and migration patterns 
across the Eurozone, though the extent of the impacts are unclear. 
2.5.3. Macroeconomic uncertainties associated with Brexit 
General assessments of the possible impact of Brexit 
The UK economy faces uncertainties related to Brexit.  The range of possible scenarios 
are explored in more detail in Boxes 2.1-2.3. This includes an overview of the trade, 
investment and migration assumptions explored in other literature related to Brexit in Box 
2.1. Box 2.2 explores the various macroeconomic scenarios that other analysts have 
published regarding possible Brexit outcomes. Box 2.3 draws out some possible 
implications for particular sectors and skills. 
The macroeconomic assumptions on the impacts of Brexit developed for Working 
Futures 2017-2027 are based on what the authors thought most likely to happen at the 
time of preparing the forecasts, given announcements and published reports by think-
tanks, non-profit organisations and the UK government. In very general terms, it 
assumed that the UK agrees a withdrawal deal with the EU (which it has) and there is an 
orderly transition. The following political assumptions were adopted: 
• there is no “cliff-edge” moment, as the UK obtains a transitional deal with the EU; 
• the UK agrees a bespoke deal with the EU;  
• the UK secures an ability to reduce EU migration;  
• the UK can remain in the single market for goods but not services (so there is no 
longer financial services passporting); and 
• there are likely to be some continued payments for access to the EU from the UK. 
Box 2.2 provides a more detailed discussion of the potential different impacts of Brexit, 
based on an analysis of other macro studies. Such studies suggest a wide range of 
possible impacts on the UK economy.  
At one end of the spectrum, such studies have found that a possible ‘European 
Economic Area’ scenario could result in the UK’s GDP being between 1.25% and 11% 
lower by around 2027 than was expected before the referendum.21 While at the other end 
of the spectrum, studies that looked at WTO/no deal scenarios found that the UK’s GDP 
could be between 2.7% and 18.5% lower than was expected before the referendum, with 
one outlier suggesting that UK GDP could be 4% higher by 2027.22  
Employment is also likely to be impacted in line with the GDP impacts. Some sectors, 
however, could face additional negative employment impacts, driven by a fall in 
 
21 Different studies have different end dates for the scenarios explored, but most are looking around 10 
years ahead. 
22 Or thereabouts, see previous footnote. 
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productivity if the skills level of the UK labour force is affected by a change in migration or 
investment patterns. The discussion below also provides a more detailed assessment of 
possible sectoral impacts (see Box 2.3). The effect on the demand for skills will be 
dependent on the fortunes of particular sectors. Skills supply for some sectors could be 
adversely affected if inward migration and use of EU labour is restricted as a result of 
tighter controls on the movement of labour with Europe. 
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Box 2.1:  Trade, investment and migration assumptions in the Brexit literature 
Trade 
The recent (i.e. at the time of producing the forecasts) literature on Brexit covers a 
range of scenarios regarding the trading relationship between the UK and the EU. 
Under the scenarios where the UK negotiates a favourable deal, it is assumed that the 
UK would obtain EEA membership to give it access to the Single Market, or at least it 
negotiates a trade agreement that is as favourable as EEA membership. 
At the other end of the spectrum, it is assumed that the UK would trade with the EU 
under WTO rules. All studies assume that the UK would enter a trade agreement that 
allows it to access the Single Market3, some under more restrictive provisions than 
others, at a relatively low cost (with respect to tariffs).  
In terms of sectoral variations, it is generally the case that production or export-
intensive sectors (including food & drinks, motor vehicles and electronics) would be 
most affected by an increase in trade costs (tariffs or non-tariff barriers) as a result of 
Brexit, which generates knock-on impacts further down the supply chain in transport 
and distribution. Finance & insurance is expected to see the largest impact from 
changes in non-tariff barriers such as passporting rights and regulations, but the 
distribution is unlikely to be even across different sub-sectors. For example, banking is 
likely to be more affected than insurance, private equity and hedge funds, as it is more 
closely connected to the EU (KPMG, 201723). 
Investment 
There have been limited assumptions directly related to the investment impact in the 
literature, as it is inherently difficult to model and is related to corporate strategy, which 
is something that larger-scale macro models don’t account for very well. 
Most of the discussion about investment in the context of Brexit has centred on inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI). It finds that FDI would be lower in any scenario 
compared to the baseline of the UK remaining in the EU. 
The various studies reviewed suggest that the impacts on investment would be 
negative and not uniform across sectors. Those sectors mentioned in the literature 
most likely to be affected by Brexit are financial & insurance, manufacturing, 
construction and research & development. 
In addition to long-term effects on investment, in October 2018 the CBI reported24 on a 
survey it had conducted which revealed that 80% of firms had already had investment 
decisions negatively affected by the uncertainty created by the Brexit process. 
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2.5.4. Analyses of the Macroeconomic uncertainties associated with 
Brexit  
A number of model-based studies have been published looking at the expected 
macroeconomic impacts of Brexit on the UK economy and those produced at the time the 
macroeconomic forecast was produced are summarised in Box 2.2.  Notwithstanding the 
difficulties in comparing models with different priors, assumptions, time frames and 
baseline comparators, we look briefly at where the Working Futures 2017-2027 UK 
forecast sits within the range of possible outcomes reported thus far. This is not a 
detailed attempt to disentangle these reported outcomes from the various factors 
inputting into the models, but rather a brief summary of the background to a selection of 
other results to allow it to be put in a limited context for comparability. 
 
23 KPMG LLP (2017). Labour migration in the hospitality sector. A KPMG report for the British Hospitality 
Association. KPMG Available from: https://www.bha.org.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/BHA-
EU-migration-final-report-170518-public-vSTC.pdf 
24 See http://www.cbi.org.uk/news/8-out-of-10-businesses-say-brexit-hits-investment-as-speed-of-talks-
outpaced-by-reality-firms-face-on-ground/  
25 Portesy, J., and Fortez, G. (2016). The Economic Impact of Brexit-induced Reductions in Migration. 
NIESR: London. 
26 Migration Watch (2016). UK immigration policy outside the EU. Available from:  
https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/pdfs/European-Union-MW371.pdf. 
27 Global Futures (2017). Beyond the Highly Skilled: The Needs of Other Stakeholders from Economic 
Migration. Our Global Future: London.  
Box 2.1 (continued):  Trade, investment and migration assumptions in the Brexit 
literature 
Migration 
Few of the studies consider assumptions directly related to population, migration and 
the labour market. Those that do, only offer a qualitative discussion, but envision a 
Brexit in which the UK would not continue to have free movement of labour and would 
implement control of EU migration, particularly for work purposes. On one end of the 
spectrum, the current visa system could be maintained with a relaxed approach to EU 
migration, not too dissimilar to the current freedom of movement of people. On the 
other end of the spectrum, a points-based approach could be taken to EU migration, 
regulating it in the same way as for migrants from outside the EEA. 
The impact of Brexit on migration is more often presented as the result of an estimation 
or a modelling exercise, rather than assumptions feeding into the analysis. A number of 
studies estimate that in the absence of free movement of labour, the level of net EU 
migration will be between 62,000 and 100,000 people lower each year than the pre-
referendum current figure of about 189,000 (Portesy and Fortez, 201625; Migration 
Watch, 201626; Global Futures, 201727). 
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28 The Bank of England (2018). EU withdrawal scenarios and monetary and financial stability. Available 
from: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/report/2018/eu-withdrawal-scenarios-and-
monetary-and-financial-stability.pdf?la=en&hash=B5F6EDCDF90DCC10286FC0BC599D94CAB8735DFB. 
29 RAND (2017). After Brexit. Alternative forms of Brexit and their implications for the United Kingdom, the 
European Union and the United States. RAND: London. PwC: London 
30 Dhingra, S., Ottaviano, G., Sampson, T., and Van Reenen, J. (2016). The consequences of Brexit for UK 
trade and living standards. Centre for Economic Performance Brexit Analysis, No. 2, Available from: 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit02.pdf. 
 
Box 2.2: Model-based studies on the expected macroeconomic impacts of Brexit 
The Bank of England (November 201828) 
The Bank’s suite of macroeconomic models were used to model short-term scenarios 
(i.e. for the next five years) relative to both the path the economy is currently on and 
the path the economy was on prior to the EU referendum. Two scenarios were 
modelled: Economic Partnership under the Withdrawal Agreement and Political 
Declaration; and a no deal and no transition outcome. The scenarios are based on 
gravity models and makes assumptions for trading relationships and trade barriers, 
with subsequent impacts on investment and productivity captured by empirical 
relationships. Net migration is assumed to decline in 2021 to a level consistent with 
annual net migration of 100,000, in line with the upper bound of the Government’s 
stated migration policy, with additional impacts from a change in the UK’s relative 
attractiveness captured by empirical relationships. Assumptions are also made for 
preparedness for new trading arrangements, macroeconomic policy (monetary and 
fiscal policy), financial conditions and macroeconomic uncertainty. 
RAND Europe (December 201729) 
RAND use a mix of modelling and game theory analytics to report on the following five 
Brexit scenarios (WTO, a UK-EU free trade agreement (FTA), a UK-US-EU FTA, a UK-
US FTA, and a transition period during which non-tariff barriers start to apply), as well 
as more orderly Brexit scenarios (EEA membership, bilateral arrangements, and 
remaining in the Customs Union). The model used is the same as that in the Dhingra 
and colleagues (201630) study, with further analysis undertaken for FDI and for the 
additional scenarios, which take into account existing EU trade deals that could affect 
UK trade costs. 
RaboBank (October 201731) 
Three scenarios are assessed: a Brexit where only non-tariff barriers are introduced as 
the UK remains part of the Single Market and Customs Union, a Free Trade Agreement 
with larger non-tariff barriers and no freedom of movement of services, and a no deal 
Brexit using WTO rules. These are compared against a baseline scenario of the UK 
remaining in the EU. As with all other studies being compared, no transition period is 
assumed. The National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) is used, alongside 
additional in-house work to model and adjust total factor productivity, which creates a 
distinctly more negative outlook for the UK economy 
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31 RaboBank (2017). Assessing the economic impact of Brexit: background report. London. Available from: 
https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2017/october/assessing-economic-impact-brexit-background-
report/.   
32 For discussions see: https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/publications/  
33 For example, see http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/08/23/economists-for-brexit-predictions-are-
inconsistent-with-basic-facts-of-international-trade/  
34 PwC (2016b). Leaving the EU: Implications for the UK economy, March 2016. PwC: London. Available 
from: https://www.pwc.co.uk/economic-services/assets/leaving-the-eu-implications-for-the-uk-economy.pdf. 
35 CGE models are large numerical models that combine economic theory with real economic data in order 
to derive computationally the impacts of policies or shocks in the economy. 
36 CPB (2016). Brexit Costs for the Netherlands Arise from Reduced Trade. CPB Policy Brief 2016/07. 
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impacts of Brexit 
 
Minford and colleagues (December 2015, and further July 201732) 
One of the earliest publications modelling the effects of Brexit, the Minford and 
colleagues study (also published under the banner ‘Economists for Free Trade’) also 
stands out for producing a marked gain in GDP for the UK leaving the EU. The premise 
is that the UK would be better off by removing all tariffs with the outside world, so that 
consumers can benefit from the lower prices that result. The huge structural 
implications of such a shift (e.g. for agriculture and manufacturing) are seen as a short-
run price worth paying, as increased competition (with lower-price international 
competitors) fosters improved productivity. However, the modelling approach and the 
assumptions used by Minford and colleagues have been questioned by economists at 
the LSE,33 and is thus seen as an outlier among model-based studies. 
PwC (March 2016b34) 
Published ahead of the EU referendum in March 2016, PwC were commissioned by 
the CBI and ran two scenarios: a free trade agreement with limited uncertainty, and 
WTO rules with protracted negotiations and difficulties. These scenarios were 
assessed against a baseline assuming that the UK remained part of the EU. The study 
uses a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model35 and includes adjustment for 
trade effects and additional assumptions for migration, FDI/investment and fiscal 
contributions. 
CPB (July 201636) 
The CPB study focuses more on the Netherlands, which as an important European 
trading partner of the UK stands to lose out more than many other EU Member States 
from barriers imposed under different Brexit systems. Two main scenarios are 
considered: trading under WTO rules (assuming no agreement is reached) and a FTA 
agreement, which would avoid tariff barriers, but would impose some degree of non-
tariff barrier restrictions. Central estimates are presented with relatively large ranges 
which reflect the uncertainty being generated by how the knock-on effects of reduced 
trade will impact on investment, innovation, and productivity. 
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Summary of previous studies findings of macroeconomic impact of Brexit 
The different scenario results of the various studies (summarised in Box 2.2) are 
presented in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1. They present the long-run GDP outcomes of the 
above-mentioned studies (as measured by the percentage difference in GDP level from 
baseline in the final year of the forecast). Although the studies were produced at different 
points in times, all seem to have taken account of any effects which might have already 
been apparent in historic data (over 2016-2017) and can be compared without this issue 
being a concern. 
 
37 International Monetary Fund (2016). ‘United Kingdom – Selected Issues’, IMF Country Report No. 
16/169, June 2016. Available from:  https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16169.pdf. 
38 Ebell, M., and Warren, J. (2016). The Long-Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU. National Institute 
Economic Review No. 236, May 2016.  
39 HM Government (2016). HM Treasury analysis: the long-term economic impact of EU membership and 
the alternatives. HM Treasury: London. 
40 OECD (2016). The Economic Consequences of Brexit – A Taxing Decision. OECD Economic Policy 
Papers. OECD Publications: Paris. 
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impacts of Brexit 
 
IMF (June 201637) 
The IMF used a range of tools (historical evidence, structural model simulations, 
econometric relationships) to consider two alternative regimes. These were: a limited 
uncertainty world which is broadly consistent with EEA membership and is less 
disruptive to firms and consumers as trading relationships do not change substantially; 
and an adverse view of the world, whereby the UK trades on WTO rules (i.e. no 
agreement is reached on a middle ground). Interestingly, in both cases the long-run 
growth rate of GDP is not affected, and eventually returns to trend, it is the long-run 
level of GDP that remains lower. 
NIESR (Ebell and Warren, May 201638), also HM Government (April 201639) and 
OECD (April 201640) 
The National Institute (NIESR) make use of their own NiGEM model for analysing 
Brexit impacts, as do the OECD and HM Treasury (hence why they are grouped 
together). The NiGEM model is able to capture assumptions for trade and FDI as well 
as the UK’s fiscal contribution to the EU. Three scenarios are considered: the Norway 
model of EEA membership, the Swiss model of bilateral agreements but no free trade 
in services, and the default (no agreement) WTO membership option. All sets of results 
have a central estimate and a range (upper and lower bound). NIESR also comments 
on the variation of results found between themselves, HM Government and the OECD 
(using the same model) by attributing the differences to additional productivity 
adjustments made due to changes in regulation and openness to trade. 
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For many of the results analysed, the spread of results across the studies (as noted by 
NIESR41) are usually due to how the models deal with the additional effects on 
productivity caused by changes to FDI, openness to trade, degree of regulation, 
innovation, and other factors that are not directly captured by the main model structure. 
This leaves open a wide area of interpretation (and off-model techniques), which then 
feed through to the GDP outcomes.  
While one-for-one comparisons cannot be made with Table 2.2, the Working Futures 
2017-2027 macro forecast is at the conservative end of the spectrum when it comes to 
the magnitude of GDP impacts following Brexit, as seen by the slowdown in growth 
prospects between Working Futures 2014-2024 and Working Futures 2017-2027. 
Only one central scenario is modelled as part of Working Futures 2017-2027, so it is not 
possible to make a similar comparison of GDP differences from a baseline, as done in 
the other studies. Nonetheless, we can compare the UK growth prospects in Working 
Futures 2017-2027 with Working Futures 2014-2024 (which was published before the 
2016 EU Referendum) to provide some comparison. UK GDP was expected to grow by 
2.3% p.a. over 2019-2024 in Working Futures 2014-2024, compared to 1.5% p.a. in 
Working Futures 2017-2027. This is a slowdown of just under 1% point per annum. The 
slowdown in expected GDP growth is due to a number of reasons, including the potential 
impacts of Brexit. 
  
 
 
41 Ebell, M., and Warren, J. (2016). The Long-Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU. National Institute 
Economic Review No. 236, May 2016. 
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Table 2.2: Percentage difference in GDP level from baseline 
Study EEA Scenario FTA Scenario 
WTO/No Deal 
Scenario 
Minford et al   +4.0 
NIESR -1.8 (-1.5 to -2.1) -2.1 (-1.9 to -2.3) -3.2 (-2.7 to -3.7) 
PWC  -1.2 -3.5 
CPB  -3.4 (-2.0 to -5.9) -4.1 (-2.7 to -8.7) 
IMF -1.5  -4.5 
RAND*   -4.9 
OECD**  -5.1 (-2.7 to -7.7)  
HM Government -3.8 (-3.4 to -4.3) -6.2 (-4.6 to -7.8) -7.5 (-5.4 to -9.5) 
Bank of 
England*** 
-1.25—3.75  -7.75—10.5 
RaboBank  -10 (-8.4 to -11) -12.5 (-11.3 to -13.7) -18 to -18.5 
Note: Other than where indicated, most of the studies presented in this table look at the impacts to 2030. 
* Only 10-year cumulative effects are reported, whereas most other studies tend to use 2030 as the 
comparison period. Other scenarios are difficult to assess as they are reported as relative to the WTO 
scenario. 
** It is not entirely clear what the OECD assumptions are regarding a particular version of Brexit, hence it is 
assumed to fall somewhere in the FTA/WTO models, as also reported in NIESR (201642). 
**** Scenarios are modelled to 2023 (short-term 5 year forecasts). 
Figure 2.1: Comparison of the impact of Brexit (WTO scenario / No Deal) 
 
 
42 Ebell, M., and Warren, J. (2016). The Long-Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU. National Institute 
Economic Review No. 236, May 2016. 
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The macroeconomic impact studies reviewed suggest a wide range of possible effects of 
Brexit on the UK economy. This depends on the precise form of Brexit being analysed 
(but also on the assumptions made by the different organisations doing the analysis).  At 
one end of the spectrum, studies have found that a possible ‘European Economic Area’ 
scenario could result in the UK’s GDP being between 1.25% and 11% lower by 2027 
than was expected before the referendum in 2016. While at the other end of the 
spectrum, most studies that looked at WTO/No Deal scenarios found that the UK’s GDP 
could be between 2.7% and 18.5% lower than was expected before the referendum. 
However, one outlier suggests that in the long run UK GDP could be 4% higher.  
While it is difficult to make direct one-for-one comparisons with the Working Futures 
2017-2027 macro forecast, it is probably at the more conservative end of the spectrum in 
terms of the negative magnitude of GDP impacts following Brexit. This is demonstrated 
by the predicted slowdown in growth prospects between the forecast in Working Futures 
2014-2024 and the forecast in Working Futures 2017-2027. 
The possible impacts on sectors and skills of alternative Brexit scenarios are discussed 
in more detail in Box 2.3. 
2.5.5. Possible sectoral impacts of Brexit 
This section explores the issues that certain UK sectors might face following Brexit, in 
terms of trade, investment and productivity. Box 2.3 presents the discussion by sector. 
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43 See The Food and Drink Federation, http://www.fdf.org.uk/home.aspx  
44 The Society of Motor Manufacturers & Traders (SMMT) (2017). Delivering UK automotive Brexit priorities 
SMMT discussion paper – 7 July 2017, London: SMMT. Available from: https://www.smmt.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/SMMT-discussion-paper-Delivering-UK-automotive-Brexit-priorities_July-2017.pdf 
45 The Society of Motor Manufacturers & Traders (SMMT)(2018). SMMT Motor Industry Facts. London: 
SMMT. Available from: https://www.smmt.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/SMMT-Motor-Industry-Facts-
June-2018.pdf  
46 The Society of Motor Manufacturers & Traders (SMMT)(2019). UK Automotive on red alert as ‘no deal’ 
threat sees manufacturing and investment plummet, SMMT News UK Manufacturing (31 January 2019). 
Available from: https://www.smmt.co.uk/2019/01/uk-automotive-on-red-alert-as-no-deal-threat-sees-
manufacturing-and-investment-plummet/  
Box 2.3: Discussion by sector 
Food and drink manufacturing 
The food and drink sector is likely to see one of the largest trade impacts. The UK 
currently imports more than 50% of its food. Around 70% of food and non-alcoholic 
drink imports are from the EU, and more than 60% of food and drink exports are to the 
EU.43 This exposes the sector to potentially large increases in trading costs from an 
introduction of EU tariffs depending on the future UK-EU relationship. This could cause 
further supply chain disruptions. The sector also has a large share of EU workers 
amongst manufacturing businesses, making it exposed to supply-side constraints if 
immigration from the EU is controlled more tightly following Brexit. In addition, major 
food companies may reconsider locating in the UK or reducing their operations in the 
UK and redirect investment to elsewhere in the EU, where they can benefit from the 
freedom of movement in goods and people. 
Motor vehicles 
The motor vehicles sector relies heavily on EU trade, with the Single Market being its 
largest trading partner. Trade within the Single Market is not only essential for the 
import and export of vehicles themselves, but also for the trade in components 
throughout the supply-chain that are essential for the production of vehicles and other 
automotive products in the UK. According to the Society of Motor Manufacturers and 
Traders (SMMT), EU tariffs on cars alone could add at least an annual £2.7 billion to 
the cost of imports and £1.8 billion to the cost of exports, resulting in a likely increase in 
the prices consumers face (SMMT, 201744). In addition, at least 10% of employment in 
automotive manufacturing in the UK is from the rest of the EU (SMMT, 201845), and 
any restrictions to migration may put further strain on the sector’s already struggling 
supply of skilled labour. Uncertainty around Brexit has also had a negative impact on 
investment, with investment in the UK car industry falling by 50% in 2018 (SMMT, 
201946). With some of the UK’s regional economies heavily reliant on a few large car 
manufacturers, any risk to future investment and jobs in those companies is likely to 
have a disproportional impact in the local economy, and possibly exacerbate existing 
downward pressures the industry already faces from existing overcapacity in the EU 
market, changes in consumer patterns and the move to electric and hybrid vehicles. 
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47 Frenk, C., Hunt, T., Partridge, L., Thornton, J. and Wyatt, T. (2015). UK research and the European 
Union The role of the EU in funding UK research. The Royal Society: London. Available from: 
https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/eu-uk-funding/uk-membership-of-eu.pdf  
Box 2.3 (continued) : Discussion by sector 
Construction 
One of the major issues currently facing the construction sector is the shortage of 
skills. The sector currently relies heavily on a foreign migrant labour force. Following 
Brexit, skills shortage could get worse, if the new agreements do not allow for free 
movement of people. This could, for example, reduce firms’ capacity to deliver new 
houses to meet the government's housing targets, and further deepen the housing 
crisis. The sector is also likely to be affected by trade impacts. If the UK faces a 
reduction in access to the EU market following Brexit, construction firms could 
experience an increase in their costs or a shortage of building materials, as they face 
an increase in tariffs or limits on quantities imported. In addition, the UK construction 
sector currently benefits from having access to the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
and the European Investment Fund (EIF). A loss of these financial aids could 
significantly impact the ability of firms to deliver big infrastructure projects. 
Financial and professional services 
The sector is a major provider of high value and high productivity jobs across the 
country, and London, in particular, is considered one of the most important financial 
regions in the world and the financial centre of Europe. One of the largest threats to the 
sector is the potential loss of passporting rights for firms based in the UK that provide 
financial services to the EU. If the UK fails to negotiate full access to the EU market 
following Brexit, trade costs could rise and the UK could suffer from a fall in trade in 
this sector. The sector could also suffer from the introduction of the need for EU 
workers to obtain visas and work permits if the UK tightens its migration policy, 
reducing the UK’s access to high-skilled labour from the EU. Over time, if the UK loses 
its full access to the EU market and its high-skilled labour force, it may lose its 
competitive advantage as the EU financial hub. This could deter valuable investment 
and redirect it to other European financial centres. 
Science and technology 
The main issue facing the science and technology sector in the UK after Brexit is its 
access to future funds. The UK receives more science and technology funding from the 
European Research Council (ERC) than the contribution it makes to the overall EU 
budget (Frenk et al., 201547). Consequently, the sector could face a loss of investment 
after Brexit when it no longer has access to these funds. In addition, the UK science 
and technology sector benefits from collaboration and skills from the rest of the EU.  
Depending on the agreements made after Brexit, sectors such as pharmaceuticals, for 
example, could experience less benefits from access to research groups and the skills 
and collaboration opportunities provided by the rest of the EU. 
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2.5.6. Persistent low productivity  
UK productivity has stalled since the recession, puzzling economists and policymakers. 
Productivity is crucial for future economic growth; particularly as the UK employment and 
unemployment rates reach pre-recession levels. Output per worker fell by 0.3% in 2016, 
before picking back up by 0.6% in 2017. It is uncertain to what extent productivity will 
continue to improve in the future, particularly as there is little consensus on why 
productivity growth has been so weak since the recession. The Working Futures baseline 
forecast is of a modest recovery in productivity; faster than anticipated productivity 
growth could support a faster pick-up of average earnings growth with potential boosts to 
labour supply and to household incomes and spending.  
2.5.7. UK deficit reduction measures 
The government has indicated that the period of financial austerity is over, indicating that 
public spending is expected to increase after Brexit whilst the aim will be to continue to 
reduce the national debt. However, there is still uncertainty concerning planned UK deficit 
reduction measures that are still to come into effect and the impact that these will have 
on the post-Brexit economy, which could hit confidence and increase unemployment. 
2.5.8. UK house prices 
Following the uncertainties around the outcome of Brexit, UK house price inflation has 
been slowing since 2016, falling to 2.8% in the year to November 2018, the lowest 
growth rate since 2013. The slowdown in the housing market has mainly been driven by 
 
48 KPMG LLP (2017). Labour migration in the hospitality sector. A KPMG report for the British Hospitality 
Association. KPMG Available from: https://www.bha.org.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/BHA-
EU-migration-final-report-170518-public-vSTC.pdf  
Box 2.3 (continued) : Discussion by sector 
 
Hospitality 
The hospitality sector is heavily reliant on foreign workers, with nearly a quarter of all 
jobs in the sector in the UK carried out by people from the rest of the EU (KPMG, 
201748), highlighting the scale of potential negative supply-side impacts the sector 
could face if immigration from the EU is controlled more tightly following Brexit. 
However, demand from tourists for accommodation and food services continue to be 
strong, as international visitors to the UK face reduced travel costs following the 
depreciation of sterling against most currencies, and Britons substitute going abroad on 
holiday with staying within the UK on domestic holidays, which are relatively cheaper. 
Following Brexit, this could reverse if the pound recovers and the UK becomes a less 
attractive tourist destination. 
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a slowdown in the South and East of England and will have had a dampening effect on 
GDP growth. The lowest annual growth in house prices has been in London, where 
prices fell by 0.7% over the year to November 2018, continuing the monthly fall in house 
prices in the region since July 2018, as the area continues to be disproportionately 
affected by regulatory and tax changes. The strongest growth has been in the West 
Midlands (4.6% in the year to November 2018). The issue of a lack of affordable housing 
continues to prevail and has the risk of causing long-term structural problems for the UK 
economy, for example, by restricting the mobility of labour to high-priced areas. 
2.6. UK labour market prospects 
2.6.1. Population and the labour force 
Over the period 2007-2017, the UK total resident population increased by 4.7 million 
(7.7%) to 66 million (see Figure 2.2). This was reflected in an 8.2% increase in the labour 
force, which rose by 2.5m to 33.4 million by 2017. 
Over 2017-2027, the UK population is expected to grow by 0.5% per annum, a slightly 
slower increase compared to 2007-2017 (0.7% per annum). The population aged over 16 
is also expected to grow at a slower rate over 2017-2027 than over 2007-2017 (see 
Table 2.3). The ageing population means that the working age population (16-64 years) 
is expected to increase by only around 780,000 (1.9%) over 2017-2027 (see Figure 2.2).  
The number of children (aged less than 16 years) in the population rose during 2007-
2017, alongside a continuing steady rise in the number of pensioners. Growth in the child 
population is expected to slow down over 2017-2027, with the number of children starting 
to fall from 2025. By 2027 the number of children is projected to be around 4.4% (around 
550,000) higher than the 2017 level. 
27 
 
Figure 2.2: UK Population, labour force and unemployment profiles, 2000-2027 (000s) 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 1340612956. 
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Table 2.3: Population and labour force in the UK 
   % change over period 
  2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 2007-2012 2012-2017 2017-2022 2022-2027 
Male 
Population 30,028 31,315 32582 33,660 34,527 4.3 4.0 3.3 2.6 
Population 16+ 24,051 25,180 26,174 26,972 27,836 4.7 3.9 3.0 3.2 
Labour Force 16,689 17,174 17,760 18,097 18,296 2.9 3.4 1.9 1.1 
Activity Rate 69 68 68 67 66 -1.7 -0.5 -1.1 -2.0 
ILO Unemployment 901 1,432 804 1,029 1,034 59.0 -43.9 28.0 0.5 
Employment (headcount) 15,788 15,742 16,956 17,068 17,261 -0.3 7.7 0.7 1.1 
Labour Market Residual (2) 1,177 1,166 1,417 1,349 1,281     
Jobs = headcount + residual 16,965 16,908 18,373 18,417 18,542 -0.3 8.7 0.2 0.7 
Female 
Population 31,291 32,390 33,458 34,390 35,162 3.5 3.3 2.8 2.2 
Population 16+ 25,590 26,541 27,361 28,025 28,795 3.7 3.1 2.4 2.7 
Labour Force 14,175 14,807 15,641 16,073 16,359 4.5 5.6 2.8 1.8 
Activity Rate 55 56 57 57 57 0.7 2.5 0.3 -0.9 
ILO Unemployment 692 1,085 660 729 563 56.9 -39.2 10.5 -22.7 
Employment (headcount) 13,483 13,722 14,981 15,344 15,796 1.8 9.2 2.4 2.9 
Labour Market Residual (2) 1539 1,356 1,650 1,639 1,628     
Jobs = headcount + residual 15,022 15,078 16,631 16,983 17,424 0.4 10.3 2.1 2.6 
Total 
Population 61,319 63,705 66,040 68,050 69,689 3.9 3.7 3.0 2.4 
Population 16+ 49,642 51,721 53,535 54,997 56,631 4.2 3.5 2.7 3.0 
Labour Force 30,864 31,980 33,400 34,170 34,655 3.6 4.4 2.3 1.4 
Activity Rate 62 62 62 62 61 -0.5 0.9 -0.4 -1.5 
ILO Unemployment 1,592 2,517 1,464 1,758 1,598 58.1 -41.9 20.1 -9.1 
Employment (headcount) 29,272 29,463 31,937 32,412 33,058 0.7 8.4 1.5 2.0 
Labour Market Residual (2) 2,716 2,523 3,067 2,988 2,908     
Jobs = headcount + residual 31,987 31,986 35,004 35,400 35,966 0.0 9.4 1.1 1.6 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Notes:  (1) Levels are in thousands except for the activity rate, which is in %. Changes are % difference over the period except for the activity rate, which are % 
points. (2) Labour Market Residual is the difference between workplace employment (number of jobs) and head count employment. 
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Overall, labour market participation, or activity rates, over the decade to 2017 increased 
slightly, but this was the result of a rising activity rate for women (by around 1.8% points) 
and a falling activity rate for men (by 1.5% points). However, by 2017 the activity rate for 
women was still about 11% points lower than the activity rate for men. Overall 
participation rates, which are affected by the age and gender profile of the population, are 
expected to decrease slightly over 2017-2027, such that the rate in 2027 will be 1% point 
lower than the rate in 2014. 
Figure 2.3: Changes in key labour market indicators for the UK, 2017-2027 (000s) 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Total population is forecast to rise faster for males than for females, but the labour force 
for females is expected to increase faster than the male labour force (continuing recent 
trends). This reflects the increasing participation of women in the labour market and, over 
the period 2017-2027, the gradually increasing pension age for women to 66.  
The economically active labour force depends on the size of the population and the 
labour market participation rate. The latter varies considerably by age and gender. 
Women are still not as likely to take part in the formal economy as males, although trends 
in participation rates for women are rising, with many more females working in part-time 
jobs than is the case for males. This trend is projected to continue in the short-run, with 
the female activity rate increasing slightly by 0.2% points over 2017-2022, before starting 
to fall by 0.6% points over 2022-2027. 
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2.6.2. Employment 
Employment can be defined and measured in a variety of ways (see Box 2.4 for details): 
• numbers of jobs; 
• numbers of people in employment (heads); 
• by area of workplace; and 
• by area of residence. 
In most of Working Futures 2017-2027, the term employment is used to refer to the 
number of jobs located in a particular area (generally, where the workplace is located). 
Box 2.4 provides the alternative definitions of employment and other labour market 
indicators. Unless indicated otherwise, data on employment in tables and charts show the 
number of workplace jobs rather than numbers of people or place of residence. 
 
  
 
 
Box 2.4: Definitions of employment and related labour market indicators  
Alternative definitions 
There are various ways of looking at employment. For example, a distinction can be 
made between the number of people in employment (head count) and the number of 
jobs. These two concepts represent different things, as one person may hold more than 
one job. In addition, a further distinction can be made between area of residence and 
area of workplace. 
Similarly, there are various different definitions of unemployment, the labour force, 
workforce and population. In Working Futures 2017-2027 the following definitions are 
used: 
Residence basis: measured at place of residence, as in the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS). 
Workplace basis: measured at place of work, as in the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) 
and Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES).  
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Workplace employment (number of jobs): these are typically estimated using 
surveys of employers, such as the ABI and BRES, focusing upon the numbers of jobs 
in their establishments. In this report references to employment relate to the number of 
jobs unless otherwise stated. 
Box 2.4 (continued): Definitions of employment and related labour market 
indicators 
Employed residents (head count): the number of people in employment. These 
estimates are based primarily on data collected in household surveys, e.g. the LFS. 
People are classified according to their main job. Some have more than one job. 
ILO unemployment: covers people who are out of work, want a job, have actively 
sought work in the previous four weeks and are available to start work within the next 
fortnight (or out of work and have accepted a job that they are waiting to start in the 
next fortnight).ox 2.4 (continued): Definitions of employment and related labour 
market indicators 
Claimant Unemployed: measures people claiming Job Seeker’s Allowance benefits. 
This is also referred to as the “claimant count”. 
Workforce: the size of the workforce is obtained by summing workplace employment 
(employee jobs and self-employment jobs), HM Forces, government-supported 
trainees and claimant unemployment. 
Labour Force: economically active (employed residents plus ILO unemployed) age 
16+. 
Labour market participation or Economic activity rate: the number of people who 
are in employment or (ILO) unemployed as a % of the total population aged 16 and 
over. Labour Market Accounts Residual: workplace employment minus Residence 
employment. The main cause of the residual at national level is “double jobbing”. At a 
more disaggregated spatial level, net commuting across geographical boundaries is 
also very significant. The difference will also reflect data errors and other minor 
differences in data collection methods in the various sources. 
Total Population: the total number of people resident in an area (residence basis). 
Population 16+: the total number of people aged 16 and above (residence basis). 
Working-age Population: the total number of people aged 16-64, (residence basis). 
The State Pension age of females was increased from 60 years in 2011 to 65 years in 
2018. From 2019, the State Pension age for all (both males and females) will increase 
to 66 years by October 2020. The definition of working-age population is fixed at 16-64 
years old for all periods in this study. 
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2.6.3. Employment by gender and employment status 
In 2017, employment (workplace jobs) in the UK increased by just over 1.3%, supported 
by growth in female employment (see Figures 2.4 - 2.7). Female self-employment 
increased by 2.6% in 2017, whilst male self-employment decreased by 0.5%. There was 
also growth of around 1.8-2.2% in both male and female full-time employment. Male part-
time employment also grew strongly in 2017 at 2.2%, while female part-time employment 
fell by about 0.4%. 
The result is that around 59% (20.7 million) of all jobs in the UK in 2017 were full-time, 
while around 28% (9.6 million) were part-time. The remaining 13% (4.5 million) were self-
employed (see Table 2.4). 
Among men, full-time employee (jobs) was the dominant employment status, accounting 
for around 69% (12.7 million) of all jobs held by men. Around 2.6 million jobs held by men 
were part-time, representing 15% of all jobs held by men. Self-employment accounted for 
around 16% of jobs held by men. Amongst women, full-time employment accounted for 
just 48% of all jobs held by women in the UK in 2017, while around 42% were part-time 
jobs. 
At 0.2% in 2018, employment growth is estimated to have been much weaker than it was 
in 2017, and this is expected to continue in 2019. The weaker growth applies generally 
across gender and employment type. After the strong growth in female self-employment 
in 2017, female self-employment is estimated to grow by only 0.4% in 2018 before a very 
slight decline. 
The greatest increase is expected to be in part-time employment, driven by an increase 
in male part-time employment of 1.4%. Growth in full-time employment is expected to be 
very slow, while self-employment is expected to fall very slightly. 
Overall, the number of jobs in the UK is projected to rise by around 962,000 over the next 
decade, which is an average annual growth of around 0.3%. More of these jobs are 
expected to be taken by female workers (791,000) than male (182,000). Female full-time 
employment is projected to grow at a faster pace (0.5% p.a.) than male full-time 
employment (-0.1% p.a.). Male part-time employment is projected to see the fastest 
growth (1.5% p.a.). These patterns are driven principally by the mix of industry sectors in 
which jobs are forecast to be created or lost (see Section 3). In addition, the expansion of 
self-employment (indicative of under-employment) seen in the earlier 2010s is not 
expected to be sustained over the longer term so that male self-employment is projected 
to fall slightly (-0.4% p.a.) and female self-employment to remain fairly static (-0.1% p.a.). 
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Table 2.4: Employment status, 2017-2027 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Level       000s 
2017         
Employment by Gender Full-time Part-time Self-employed Total 
Male 12,811 2,651 2,912 18,373 
Female 8,022 6,973 1,636 16,631 
Total 20,833 9,624 4,548 35,004 
2022     
Employment by Gender Full-time Part-time Self-employed Total 
Male 12,711 2,856 2,850 18,417 
Female 8,192 7,160 1,631 16,983 
Total 20,903 10,016 4,481 35,400 
2027     
Employment by Gender Full-time Part-time Self-employed Total 
Male 12,662 3,086 2,794 18,542 
Female 8,403 7,400 1,621 17,424 
Total 21,065 10,486 4,415 35,966 
% of total    % 
2017     
Employment by Gender Full-time Part-time Self-employed Total 
Male 36.6 7.6 8.3 52.5 
Female 22.9 19.9 4.7 47.5 
Total 59.5 27.5 13.0 100.0 
2022     
Employment by Gender Full-time Part-time Self-employed Total 
Male 35.9 8.1 8.1 52.0 
Female 23.1 20.2 4.6 48.0 
Total 59.0 28.3 12.7 100.0 
2027     
Employment by Gender Full-time Part-time Self-employed Total 
Male 35.2 8.6 7.8 51.6 
Female 23.4 20.6 4.5 48.4 
Total 58.6 29.2 12.3 100.0 
Change    000s 
2017-2022     
Employment by Gender Full-time Part-time Self-employed Total 
Male -99.6 205.2 -61.7 43.9 
Female 170.4 186.9 -4.9 352.4 
Total 70.8 392.1 -66.6 396.3 
2022-2027     
Employment by Gender Full-time Part-time Self-employed Total 
Male -49.3 230.0 -55.9 124.8 
Female 211.2 240.1 -10.5 440.8 
Total 161.9 470.1 -66.4 565.6 
2017-2027     
Employment by Gender  Full-time  Part-time Self-employed Total 
Male -148.9 435.2 -117.6 168.7 
Female 381.6 427.0 -15.4 793.2 
Total 232.7 862.2 -133.0 961.9 
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Figure 2.4: Employment status in the UK, 2017 (000s) 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Figure 2.5: UK Employment profiles by gender and employment status 1981-2027 (000s) 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
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Figure 2.6: Changes in employment in the UK by employment status, 2017-2027 (000s) 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Figure 2.7: Employment status in the UK, 2017 (% shares) 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
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2.6.4. Claimant Count and ILO Unemployment 
There are two commonly used measures of unemployment (see Table 2.4): the count of 
claimants and the ILO definition based on those actively searching for work. Again, Box 
2.4 provides more detailed definitions of the terms. 
The claimant count has recorded an increasing trend in unemployment since February 
2016 from 0.76m to 1.1m in March 2019, its highest level since June 2014. It is worth 
noting that this is a less accurate measure of unemployment than the ILO definition, since 
it only counts people who claim jobseeker's allowance (JSA). Not everybody who is 
unemployed claims this benefit. Nevertheless, it is a clear signal that the labour market is 
worsening. The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) has developed alternative 
measures of the unemployment rate.67  
The LFS measure of unemployment, which is consistent with the ILO’s definition, 
however, records the unemployment rate at around 4.2% in 2018Q3, the lowest since the 
recession.68  
While in previous years we have seen a shift away from employment in the public sector 
to employment in the private sector, due to the government attempt to decrease its fiscal 
deficit by reducing the number of public sector jobs, the LFS reveals that employment in 
both the public and private sector has increased recently. Between 2017Q3 and 2018Q3, 
the number employed in the public sector increased by 140,000 while the number 
employed in the private sector increased by 218,000. 
ILO unemployment is forecast to rise slightly from 1.6 million in 2018 to 1.8 million in 
2022, as the expansion of the labour force is outpaced by growth of employment. By 
2027 unemployment is expected to start falling back to around 1.6 million. Over 2017-22, 
continued growth of activity rates among females will mean that the female labour force 
will grow slightly faster than employment. Consequently, there will be a rise in 
unemployment over 2017-22 for females. Over the same period, male unemployment is 
also expected to rise. During 2022-2027, the growth of female employment is forecast to 
remain fairly strong, in part because of the end to cuts in spending on public services, 
which typically employ a larger proportion of female workers. Consequently, female 
unemployment is forecast to fall once again to 2027. 
 
67 The ONS advises that due to the impact of Universal Credit (UC), the claimant count is not a reliable 
labour market/economic indicator – because UC covers a broader range of claimants, so the claimant 
count will rise over time irrespective of economic/labour market conditions.  DWP’s ‘alternative claimant 
count’ adjusts for this issue, and provides a consistent time series. 
68 According to the DWP’s alternative measure unemployment did not rise over 2017/2018:  Their 
unemployment rate (16+) shows a downward trend since September-November 2011. -Between Q1 2017 
(Jan-Mar) and Q4 2018 (Oct-Dec) the unemployment rate fell 0.6 % points. -Between Q1 2017 (Jan-Mar) 
and Q1 2019 the unemployment rate fell 0.8 % points to 3.8%, the lowest rate since the 1970s. 
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3. Sectoral output and employment prospects 
Key messages 
This section presents the projections for six broad sectors, defined using the 
Standard Industrial Classification [divisions] as follows:  
• Primary sector & utilities [01-09,35-39] 
• Manufacturing [10-33] 
• Construction [41-43] 
• Trade, accommodation & transport [45-56] 
• Business & other services [58-82,90-99] 
• Public administration, education & health (or non-marketed services) [84-
88] 
Modest output growth is forecast over 2017 and 2027: with the exception of 
construction and business & other services, all broad sectors are forecast to grow 
faster per annum than in the ten years leading up to 2017, the period which 
included the global recession.  
The sectors for which output is forecast to grow the fastest are business & other 
services, which despite slower growth than in the previous decade, will continue as 
a leading contributor to economy-wide growth; and public administration, 
education & health as the period of austerity after the recession comes to an end. 
Consistent with current trends, manufacturing’s share of UK output is expected to 
decline, driven by increasing competition from overseas manufacturers and as the 
UK continues to move towards a service-orientated economy. However, 
manufacturing output is still forecast to grow, albeit at a slightly slower pace than 
the economy as a whole. 
Employment will mostly reflect the trends observed in output across the six broad 
sectors; strongest growth is forecast in business & other services, and public 
administration, education & health.  
Employment is anticipated to decrease in primary sector & utilities and 
manufacturing, in line with only modest output growth and anticipated productivity 
growth. 
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3.1. General prospects 
This section focuses on the output and employment prospects for six broad sectors: 
primary sector & utilities; manufacturing; construction; trade, accommodation & transport; 
business & other services; and public administration, education & health (or collectively 
referred to as non-market services).69  
3.1.1. Output 
An overview of the main output results across the six broad sectors is presented in the 
figures below. Figure 3.1 provides a graphical presentation of historical and forecast 
profiles of output70 by sector. Figure 3.2 provides a breakdown of historical growth rates, 
as well as the average forecast growth rates across the six sectors. 
Figure 3.1: UK Output profiles by broad sector, 1990-2027 (£ millions) 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Notes: 2016 prices   
 
 
69 This sector comprises services that are principally provide by the public administration, education & 
health sectors (also collectively referred to as non-marketed services although some elements of may be 
provided by the private sector). 
70 Output is measured by GVA – gross value added. 
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Figure 3.2: UK Output growth by broad sector, 2007-2027 (% per annum) 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406.
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Table 3.1: Output by broad sector, 2007-2027 
GVA levels (£2016 millions) 
  2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 
Primary sector & utilities 86,190  75,100  78,018  79,946  79,360  
Manufacturing 194,881  177,119  179,756  188,679  196,895  
Construction 99,998  87,305  111,877  116,519  121,219  
Trade, accomm. & transport 289,956  272,507  16,266  332,293   353,476  
Business & other services 509,813  539,446  615,240  662,317  700,150  
Non-marketed services 296,664  310,216  317,601  334,822  360,438  
Total 1,603,812  1,602,991  1,789,422  1,893,937  2,004,190  
GVA share (% of total) 
  2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 
Primary sector & utilities 5.4 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.0 
Manufacturing 12.2 11.0 10.0 10.0 9.8 
Construction 6.2 5.4 6.3 6.2 6.0 
Trade, accomm. & transport 18.1 17.0 17.7 17.5 17.6 
Business & other services 31.8 33.7 34.4 35.0 34.9 
Non-marketed services 18.5 19.4 17.7 17.7 18.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
GVA growth (% per annum) 
  2007-2012 2012-2017  2017-2022  2022-2027  2017-2027 
Primary sector & utilities -2.7 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.2 
Manufacturing -1.9 0.3 1.0 0.9 0.9 
Construction -2.7 5.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Trade, accomm. & transport -1.2 3.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 
Business & other services 1.1 2.7 1.5 1.1 1.3 
Non-marketed services 0.9 0.5 1.1 1.5 1.3 
Total 0.0 2.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 
GVA growth (%)  
  2007-2012 2012-2017  2017-2022  2022-2027  2017-2027 
Primary sector & utilities -12.9 3.9 2.5 -0.7 1.7 
Manufacturing -9.1 1.5 5.0 4.4 9.5 
Construction -12.7 28.1 4.1 4.0 8.3 
Trade, accomm. & transport -6.0 16.1 5.1 6.4 11.8 
Business & other services 5.8 14.1 7.7 5.7 13.8 
Non-marketed services 4.6 2.4 5.4 7.7 13.5 
Total -0.1 11.6 5.8 5.8 12.0 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Notes:  The six broad sectors are defined in the technical annexes and in the separate Technical Report. 
Total output of the six broad sectors differs from total GVA; the latter includes ownership of dwellings. 
 
Table 3.1 shows the past and forecast patterns of output by broad sector.71 The top two 
panels show how the structure of the economy changes: the top panel shows the levels 
of output; and the second panel shows the (output) shares of each sector in the overall 
 
71 The GVA forecasts are independent forecasts produced using CE’s MDM-E3 model. They will therefore 
be different to the Office for Budget Responsibility’s (OBR) forecasts, as they have been developed using 
different models and assumptions. 
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economy. The bottom two panels show historical and forecast patterns of growth; the 
third panel presents annual growth rates, while the last panel shows the total % change 
over the period covered. 
Over the decade 2017-2027, steady economic growth is expected, with total UK output 
forecast to grow at an average of 1.1% p.a. With the exception of construction and 
business & other services, all sectors are forecast to grow faster on average than during 
the ten years up to 2017, the period that included the global recession. The fastest 
growth is forecast in business & other services and public administration, education & 
health. Trade, accommodation & transport is forecast to grow at a similar pace to the 
economy average, whilst growth will be below average in primary sectors & utilities, 
manufacturing and construction. 
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU and the surrounding uncertainty is expected to dampen 
UK growth in the short and medium term, leading to a continuation of the slower GVA 
growth rates seen after the recession. Depending on the future UK-EU relationship, a 
change in migration and demographic trends could impact demand, particularly in 
infrastructure and public administration, education & health. The composition of the UK 
economy split by the broad six sectors is expected to remain largely stable over the long 
term. One exception is primary sectors & utilities; consistent with historical trends, its 
share of total activity is expected to decline. Manufacturing is also following a similar 
trend, although the decline in the share of total activity is slower.  
3.1.2. Employment 
An overview of the main results for employment across the six broad sectors is presented 
in the charts below. Figure 3.3 provides a graphical representation of historical and 
forecast profiles of employment by sector, whilst Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 provide a 
breakdown of historical and forecast employment growth across the six sectors, as 
average percentage change per annum (Figure 3.4) and as changes in levels (Figure 
3.5). 
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Figure 3.3: UK Employment profiles by broad sector, 1990-2027 (000s) 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
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Figure 3.4: UK Employment growth by broad sector, 2007-2027 (% per annum) 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Figure 3.5: UK Employment growth by broad sector, 2007-2027 (000s) 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406.
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Table 3.2 shows the past and forecast patterns of employment by broad sector. The top 
two panels show how the structure of the economy changes: the top panel shows the 
levels of employment; and the second panel shows the (employment) shares of each 
sector in the overall economy. The bottom two panels show historical and forecast 
patterns of growth; the third panel presents annual growth rates, while the last panel 
shows the change in the numbers of jobs over the period covered. 
Employment is forecast to grow modestly, at an average of 0.3% (or 96,000 jobs) p.a. 
over the forecast horizon. Total employment growth is likely to be lower than historical 
averages, and most notably, employment is expected to decrease at an average of 
around 0.2% p.a. in primary sectors & utilities and 1% in manufacturing over the forecast 
horizon. Cost pressures and technology improvements will likely decrease labour 
demand in traditional roles within these sectors.  
The number of jobs in primary sectors & utilities is expected to decrease by just under 
16,000 between 2017 and 2027, whilst the number of jobs in manufacturing is expected 
to decrease by around 257,000 over the same period. The number of jobs in public 
administration, education & health is expected to increase by 0.3% p.a. over 2017-2022, 
picking up to 0.6% p.a. by 2027, as austerity measures relax further. 
Economy-wide employment growth over 2017-2027 is expected to be driven mainly by 
relatively stronger growth in jobs in business & other services and public administration, 
education & health, growing on average at 0.6% and 0.5% p.a. respectively. The modest 
growth rates reflect the uncertainty around Brexit, as businesses delay and deter 
investment decisions in the short-to-medium term. 
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Table 3.2: Employment by broad sector, 2007-2027 
Employment levels (000s) 
  2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 
Primary sector & utilities 686 815 858 845 842 
Manufacturing 2,977 2,600 2,672 2,535 2,415 
Construction 2,301 2,056 2,286 2,307 2,336 
Trade, accomm. & transport 8,529 8,403 9,218 9,164 9,323 
Business & other services 9,537 9,787 11,176 11,609 11,838 
Non-marketed services 7,957 8,326 8,793 8,940 9,212 
Total 31,987 31,986 35,004 35,400 35,966 
Employment share (% of total) 
  2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 
Primary sector & utilities 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 
Manufacturing 9.3 8.1 7.6 7.2 6.7 
Construction 7.2 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Trade, accomm. & transport 26.7 26.3 26.3 25.9 25.9 
Business & other services 29.8 30.6 31.9 32.8 32.9 
Non-marketed services 24.9 26.0 25.1 25.3 25.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Employment growth (% per annum) 
 2007-2012 2012-2017  2017-2022  2022-2027  2017-2027 
Primary sector & utilities 3.5 1.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 
Manufacturing -2.7 0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
Construction -2.2 2.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Trade, accomm. & transport -0.3 1.9 -0.1 0.3 0.1 
Business & other services 0.5 2.7 0.8 0.4 0.6 
Non-marketed services 0.9 1.1 0.3 0.6 0.5 
Total 0.0 1.8 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Employment change (000s) 
 2007-2012 2012-2017  2017-2022  2022-2027  2017-2027 
Primary sector & utilities 129.0 43.0 -13.0 -2.9 -15.9 
Manufacturing -377.1 72.2 -136.8 -120.8 -257.6 
Construction -244.9 229.9 20.6 29.4 50.0 
Trade, accomm. & transport -126.4 815.7 -54.7 159.6 104.9 
Business & other services 249.8 1,389.5 433.1 229.0 662.1 
Non-marketed services 368.6 467.7 146.8 271.4 418.2 
Total -1.0 3,018.0 396.1 565.6 961.7 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Notes: The six broad sectors are defined in the Technical Report. Total employment and employment in 
public administration, education & health includes H. M. Forces. Numbers may appear not to sum due to 
rounding. 
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3.2. Prospects by broad sector 
3.2.1. Primary sector and utilities 
Sub-sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Mining and quarrying 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
Water supply, sewerage, waste management 
 
Table 3.3: Industry profile – Primary sector and utilities 
  
GVA 
(£2016m) 
Share 
of UK 
GVA 
(%) 
Employment 
(000s) 
Share of 
total 
employment 
(%) 
GVA 
shares 
(%) 
Female 
employ
ment 
(%) 
Self-
employ
ment 
(%) 
2017 78,018 4.4 858 2.5 4.4 25.6 24.5 
2027 79,360 4.0 842 2.3 4.0 26.9 22.0 
 
Table 3.4: Trends in output and employment 2017-2027 – Primary sector and utilities 
2017-2027 
Replacement 
demand 
(000s) 
Change in 
employment 
(000s) 
Change in 
employment 
(%) 
GVA 
growth 
(% p.a.) 
Productivity 
growth (% 
p.a.) 
Primary 
sector & 
utilities 
269 -16 -1.9 0.2 
0.4 
UK average 11,581 962 2.7 1.1 0.9 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Notes:  
The six broad sectors are defined in the technical annexes and in the separate Technical Report. 
Total output of the six broad sectors differs from total GVA; the latter includes ownership of dwellings. 
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Figure 3.6: Sector shares in Primary sector and utilities, 1997-2027 
 
 
Key facts 
• The primary sector and utilities consists of three distinctly different types of 
industry: agriculture, mining and quarrying and utilities services. 
• Agricultural output is expected to grow modestly, driven by changing consumer 
patterns. However, productivity improvements are expected to result in a fall in 
employment. 
• Energy policies and environmental legislation are likely to grow in importance, 
creating long-term opportunities and challenges for the sector. 
• Coal, oil and gas production is expected to fall due to dwindling domestic reserves 
and high costs of extraction relative to imports. 
• Utilities output is forecast to grow modestly, driven partly by an anticipated 
increase in household demand. 
• Employment levels in utilities are expected to grow at a slower rate as efficiency 
measures are expected to reduce the demand for labour. 
Primary sector and utilities output is expected to grow modestly, as production responds 
to increasing global and national demand. However, rising cost pressures will encourage 
long-term efficiency savings, dampening employment growth. Anticipated productivity 
improvements will also decrease future labour demand. Overall, the primary sector is 
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expected to grow at an average of 0.2% p.a. from 2017 to 2027, with employment levels 
on average decreasing slightly over the same period.  
As noted above, the sector comprises many different sub-sectors all of which have 
varying growth prospects. Because of structural differences, the prospects for these 
industries vary greatly, as reported below.  
Growth in the UK’s agricultural output is expected to be modest, to meet changing 
domestic demand for food. Changes in consumption patterns are likely to be an 
important driver of changing demand for agricultural outputs, as changes in food and 
beverage purchases will affect food production’s demands for agricultural products. The 
UK remains a net importer of food and beverages, and this is expected to continue in the 
future, even as domestic products are substituted for imported foods in some markets 
(e.g. the move towards sourcing ‘local produce’). On balance, therefore, modest growth 
in agricultural and fishery activity is expected to increase demand for domestically 
produced foods and drinks, stimulating activity in agriculture and fishing industries. 
Depending on the outcome of Brexit, changes in the structure of subsidies or the level of 
subsidies in the agriculture sector could have either positive or negative impacts on food 
prices and UK agricultural production and imports. 
Long-term increases in national demand for water and electricity are anticipated to 
stimulate utilities output. Energy policies and environmental legislation are likely to grow 
in importance for some of the primary & utilities sectors. In particular, pursuit of low-
carbon energy alternatives, and waste reduction in water and minerals use may provide 
long-term opportunities and challenges for the sectors. Mining and quarrying activity will 
likely be dampened as a result of global carbon emission reduction targets, as demand 
for coal, oil and gas reduce. On the other hand, efforts to develop alternative energy-
generating processes are likely to increase, generating increased demand for activity. 
Other drivers will likely further harm the long-term prospects of mining and quarrying 
activities. Domestic resource depletion will be an important consideration. Consistent with 
current trends, lower extraction costs in other countries will increase demand for imports 
over domestic production.  
Generally, improved productivity and efficiency savings will reduce traditional labour 
demand in the primary sectors. Investment, for example, into agricultural technology 
(“agri-tech”) within the UK will likely improve productivity. Cost pressures and competition 
from imports will encourage efficiency savings, reducing labour demand in the mining 
and quarrying industry. In the aggregate, employment levels in the Primary sector and 
utilities are expected to fall in the long-term.  
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3.2.2. Manufacturing 
Sub-sectors 
Food, drink and tobacco 
Textiles and clothing 
Wood and paper products 
Printing and recording 
Coke and petroleum 
Chemicals and chemical products 
Rubber and plastic products and other non-metallic mineral products 
Pharmaceuticals 
Metals and metal products 
Electronics 
Electrical equipment 
Machinery 
Motor vehicles 
Other transport equipment 
Other manufacturing and repair 
 
Table 3.5: Industry profile – Manufacturing 
  
GVA 
(£2016m) 
Share 
of UK 
GVA 
(%) 
Employment 
(000s) 
Share of 
total 
employment 
(%) 
GVA 
shares 
(%) 
Female 
employ
ment 
(%) 
Self-
employ
ment 
(%) 
2017 179,756 10.0 2,672 7.6 10.0 24.3 7.4 
2027 196,895 9.8 2,415 6.7 9.8 25.9 7.6 
 
Table 3.6: Trends in output and employment 2017-2027 – Manufacturing 
2017-2027 
Replacement 
demand 
(000s) 
Change in 
employment 
(000s) 
Change in 
employment 
(%) 
GVA 
growth (% 
p.a.) 
Productivity 
growth (% 
p.a.) 
Manufacturing 734 -258 -9.6 0.9 1.9 
UK average 11,581 962 2.7 1.1 0.9 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Notes:  
The six broad sectors are defined in the technical annexes and in the separate Technical Report. 
Total output of the six broad sectors differs from total GVA; the latter includes ownership of dwellings. 
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Figure 3.7: Sector shares in Manufacturing, 1997-2027 
 
Key facts 
• Future output growth is likely to be constrained by increasing competition from 
overseas manufacturers.  
• Global growth in advanced manufacturing demand is expected to drive an 
increase in domestic activity, especially for industries in which the UK has 
specialised such as aerospace, pharmaceuticals and other technology-intensive 
industries (such as automotive manufacturing, see Box 2.3 for more discussion). 
• Processes and techniques such as 3D printing, additive and composite 
manufacturing and plastic electronics are changing the shape of production within 
the sector. 
• The availability of skilled labour will be an important consideration for the 
economic outlook in the long-term. 
• Global population growth, as well as a rising proportion of individuals with middle-
class incomes, are expected to increase the global consumption of manufactured 
goods.  
• Employment is expected to fall despite the growth in output, driven especially by 
continuing  automation in the sector. 
Prospects for the manufacturing sector are mixed, as international forces provide both 
opportunities and competition in the long-term. Consistent with current trends, UK 
manufacturing is likely to grow, albeit at a slower rate than the whole economy. 
Manufacturing growth is forecast to average about 1% p.a. from 2017 to 2027, with the 
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number of jobs expected to fall by around 1% p.a. over the same period. Domestic 
drivers, such as long-term investment and specialisation, are expected to change the 
composition of manufacturing in the UK. Manufacturing as a share of total UK economic 
activity, therefore, is projected to decline. 
International competitive forces are likely to weaken the growth in the UK manufacturing 
sector. Manufacturing industries activities within lower-income economies have been 
expanding in recent years, and this trend is likely to continue. Many emerging economies 
are also entering high-technology sectors54, areas in which the UK has specialised in 
recent years. Domestic firms are anticipated to continue offshoring and outsourcing the 
manufacturing process, diverting production and employment away from the UK. 
Nevertheless, UK manufacturing output is still anticipated to grow, albeit modestly. Global 
demand for manufacturing exports is anticipated to increase, driven by growing 
population levels and increasing income per capita. The anticipated rise of the middle 
classes in developing countries will generate higher demand for goods and services. 
Global demand for UK manufacturing goods will be an important driver of increased 
manufacturing output, although the future trading relationships with the main markets to 
which UK exports (the European Union) are uncertain following the UK’s decision to 
leave the EU. 
It is likely that manufacturing growth will be driven by advanced (high-technology) 
manufacturing in the future. Current trends indicate that manufacturing civil and defence 
aerospace components, machinery and equipment, and electronic goods are leaders or 
emerging leaders within manufacturing. It is anticipated that advanced manufacturing 
sectors such as these will show the strongest output growth within manufacturing. 
The availability of skilled labour will be an essential determinant of activity. Current trends 
suggest that skill shortages are a sizeable concern55, and will be an important factor in 
the long-term, as UK manufacturers will require greater human capital to meet the growth 
in demand. 
Innovation will play a major role in shaping the prospects of manufacturing. Innovation, 
especially in the high-tech industries that dominate the UK manufacturing sector such as 
aerospace component parts, pharmaceuticals, and green technologies, will be a crucial 
driver of productivity growth and competitiveness. However, whilst technological progress 
will improve production efficiency in the sector, it may also reduce the number of jobs in 
the long-term. Anticipated future technologies in manufacturing activities such as sensors 
technology, advanced and autonomous robotics, and big data and knowledge-based 
automation, will increase automation and improve production processes. These changes 
 
54 Adopting the definitions of Eurostat, high-tech manufacturing encompasses manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations; Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical 
products; and manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery. 
55 The British Chambers of Commerce’s quarterly economic survey: 
https://www.britishchambers.org.uk/news/2019/01/bcc-quarterly-economic-survey-big-squeeze-on-firms-
from-recruitment-prices-and-cash-flow 
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can lead to lower demand for traditional roles in the production process, which is 
anticipated to contribute to the ongoing decline of employment in manufacturing.  
3.2.3. Construction 
Sub-sectors 
Construction of buildings 
Civil engineering 
Specialised construction activities e.g. demolition, installation, building completion 
activities 
Table 3.7: Industry profile – Construction 
  
GVA 
(£2016m) 
Share of 
UK GVA 
(%) 
Employment 
(000s) 
Share of 
total 
employment 
(%) 
GVA 
shares 
(%) 
Female 
employ
ment 
(%) 
Self-
employ
ment 
(%) 
2017 111,877 6.3 2,286 6.5 6.3 14.3 38.2 
2027 121,219 6.0 2,336 6.5 6.0 14.7 36.0 
 
Table 3.8: Trends in output and employment 2017-2027 – Construction 
2017-2027 
Replacement 
demand 
(000s) 
Change in 
employment 
(000s) 
Change in 
employment 
(%) 
GVA growth 
(% p.a.) 
Productivity 
growth (% 
p.a.) 
Construction 660 50 2.2 0.8 0.6 
UK average 11,581 962 2.7 1.1 0.9 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Notes:  
The six broad sectors are defined in the technical annexes and in the separate Technical Report. 
Total output of the six broad sectors differs from total GVA; the latter includes ownership of dwellings. 
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Figure 3.8: Sector Shares in Construction, 1997-2027 
 
Key facts 
• The sector continues to be faced with skill shortages, and along with the potential 
restrictions on migration impacting future flows of EU workers following Brexit, 
which the sector heavily relies on, constraints to labour supply are expected to 
dampen the sector’s growth prospects. 
• While UK population is likely to grow more slowly than previously expected, with 
fertility rates falling and the government aiming to reduce net-migration, population 
growth is still expected to lead to increased demand for construction of 
infrastructure and housing, supported by the government’s ambitious targets to 
build new homes. 
• Long-term major public infrastructure projects, such as HS2 and Crossrail 2, are 
also likely to contribute to output growth. 
Long-term growth in the construction sector is expected to be modest, at an average of 
0.8% p.a. from 2017 to 2027, whilst employment is forecast to grow at an average of 
0.2% p.a. over the same period, slightly slower than whole economy growth. This is 
partly driven by an expected slowdown in investment due to uncertainty around Brexit, as 
well as the skills shortage facing the sector (City & Guilds Group and The Work 
Foundation, 201856), which is amplified by the high concentration of EU migrants 
 
56 City & Guilds Group and The Work Foundation (2018). Constructing the future: How the skills needed for 
success in the workplace are changing. London: City & Guilds. Available from: 
http://www.theworkfoundation.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CG_Constructing-the-
future_A4_32pp_LR_no-crops.pdf  
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employed in the sector that may be affected following Brexit. In particular, the reports 
states the sector is struggling to attract and retain young workers and finds that skills 
demanded by the sector are becoming outdated due to technological advances. 
Increased demand will come from the need for more private housing, commercial 
buildings and infrastructure, spurred by national population growth, increased economic 
activity, and the government’s ambitious targets to build new homes.  
National population levels are forecast by the ONS to reach just under 70 million by mid-
2027. Population is anticipated to grow slower in the future than it has done in the past, 
which is likely to have a dampening effect on demand.  
Major railway and road-building projects initiated under previous administrations and 
continued by current and successive governments are expected to generate sustained 
demand for construction output. One example is the High Speed Two (HS2) Limited 
project, a major government-planned project that will likely continue to provide 
employment and business in construction during the project timespan; construction is 
expected to take place between 2019 and 2026. A similar example is the Crossrail 
project, for which work is almost complete; as the “biggest construction project in Europe” 
(Crossrail, 201557), this project alone has created 15,000 extra jobs (ibid.).  
Long-term global commitments to climate change and sustainability will continue to be 
key concerns, generating new opportunities and challenges for the construction sector. 
For example, environment policy in the built environment is anticipated to create new 
opportunities and areas of growth in the sector, as firms seek innovative processes and 
technologies to adapt to wider environmental concerns.  
New business opportunities will also generate new demand for construction goods. The 
focus in recent years on “smart construction” and “digital design” (HM Government, 2013, 
p.32) will grow as initiatives to create smart cities intensify. Smart cities are where 
“traditional networks and services are made more efficient with the use of digital and 
telecommunication technologies, for the benefit of its inhabitants and businesses” 
(European Commission, 201558). Replacing ageing energy infrastructure (Ove Arup & 
Partners Ltd, 2013, p.859) to meet the digital requirements, as well as creating and 
designing environments amenable for the implementation of ICT systems, are new types 
of demand that are expected to generate strong construction growth in the long-term. 
 
 
57 Crossrail Ltd. (2015). Europe's largest construction project, November. Available from: 
http://www.crossrail.co.uk/construction/. 
58 European Commission (2015). Smart Cities, Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/smart-
cities.  
59 ARUP (2013). The Smart City Market: Opportunities for the UK. Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills: London. 
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3.2.4. Trade, accommodation and transport 
Sub-sectors 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 
Transport and storage 
Accommodation and food activities 
 
Table 3.9: Industry profile – Trade, accommodation and transport 
  
GVA 
(£2016m) 
Share 
of UK 
GVA 
(%) 
Employment 
(000s) 
Share of 
total 
employment 
(%) 
GVA 
shares 
(%) 
Female 
employ
ment 
(%) 
Self-
employ
ment 
(%) 
2017 316,266 17.7 9,218 26.3 17.7 43.8 9.4 
2027 353,476 17.6 9,323 25.9 17.6 44.9 8.1 
 
Table 3.10: Trends in output and employment 2017-2027 – Trade, accommodation and transport 
2017-2027 
Replacement 
demand 
(000s) 
Change in 
employment 
(000s) 
Change in 
employment 
(%) 
GVA growth 
(% p.a.) 
Productivity 
growth (% 
p.a.) 
Trade, 
accomm. & 
transport 
2,957 105 
1.1 
1.1 
0.6 
UK average 11,581 962 2.7 1.1 0.9 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Notes:  
The six broad sectors are defined in the technical annexes and in the separate Technical Report. 
Total output of the six broad sectors differs from total GVA; the latter includes ownership of dwellings. 
Figure 3.9: Sector shares in Trade, accommodation and transport, 1997-2027 
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Key facts 
• The performance of this broad sector hinges on factors such as household 
disposable income and business activities. 
• Employment growth in the sector is expected to be mainly driven by jobs growth in 
retail, accommodation and catering. 
• The strongest output growth is likely to be observed in accommodation and air 
transport services, although there may be capacity constraints, especially in 
London. 
• Changing consumer behaviour, such as continued switching to purchasing goods 
online, is expected to increase demand in postal and courier activities, and 
transportation and distributional services. At the same time, this shift in consumer 
patterns is likely to dampen employment growth in retail, as high streets continue 
to suffer from the rise of online shopping, particularly as new technologies improve 
the ease and efficiencies in online browsing and delivery. 
• In addition, increased automation and improvements in technology are likely to 
reduce labour demand in some traditional roles, such as retail check-out staff, 
resulting in a slowdown in employment growth in the sector following decades of 
strong growth up to the recession. 
• Retail, accommodation and food services, as well as transportation services are 
likely to be partly dependent on the outlook for tourism growth. 
The performance of the trade, accommodation & transport sector is often dependent on 
the amount of activity in the wider economy. Output of trade, accommodation & transport 
is forecast to grow at a pace similar to the economy average (1.1% p.a.) over 2017-2027, 
whilst employment will grow a little slower than average at around 0.1% p.a.  
Many different factors will drive this long-term trend, because the sector is formed of 
many structurally different industries, all of which have unique outlooks. The air transport, 
accommodation and retail trade sectors are expected to grow fastest, whilst warehousing 
and wholesale activity, which are closely associated with firm activity and household 
income, are expected to grow closer to the sector average over the same horizon period. 
Although the growth of the air transport industry is expected to be faster than the sector 
average, it is anticipated to slow compared to historical trends for the industry. Air travel 
growth is driven partly by economic factors, such as oil prices, income and GDP growth, 
as well as wider societal considerations, such as carbon commitments and behavioural 
changes (DfT, 2017, p.1060). According to the Department for Transport, air travel per 
passenger is forecast to slow down to grow at approximately 1.2-1.5% p.a. compared to 
an annual rate averaging 3.8% since 1990, due to factors such as market maturity, lower 
long term economic forecasts, capacity constraints and a significant rise in carbon prices. 
 
60 Department for Transport, (2017). UK Aviation Forecasts, Department for Transport: London.  
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Growth would also be constrained by existing airport capacity, hence current 
considerations to undertake airport expansion projects. In particular, one focus will be on 
improving airport capacity in the South East, in order to maintain the country’s status as a 
“global hub for aviation” (Airports Commission, 2015, p.961). 
The expected future performance of the retail, accommodation and food industry will be 
an important driver of wider sectoral growth. Demand for this industry is closely tied to 
domestic income and spending. Household expenditure growth is forecast to be modest 
(1.7-2% p.a. over 2017-2027), as the economy recovers from the impact of the Brexit 
uncertainties it currently faces. At the same time, these sectors are heavily reliant on 
foreign workers, in particular from the EU, highlighting the scale of potential negative 
supply-side impacts the sectors could face if immigration from the EU is controlled more 
tightly following Brexit. 
A key trend emerging within consumption patterns is the growth of ecommerce – the 
purchase of goods online. This is particularly noticeable in the UK, which (in 2014) had 
the highest proportion of individuals who made their last purchase online in the previous 
twelve months, out of all EU countries (ONS, 201562). ONS E-commerce and ICT activity 
(2017) finds that there has been a sharp (16%) rise in e-commerce over 2011-2017. The 
trend of increased digitisation is likely to continue, increasing trade, accommodation & 
transport sectoral activity, given extra need for warehousing, logistical services and 
courier services.  
However, corresponding employment growth will be contingent on whether the labour 
supply will be able to adapt to the anticipated technological progress in the sector. As 
firms seek to adopt cost-saving measures, processes can become automated in the long-
term. Existing technologies include automated checkouts, and current investment and 
research into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for delivery and automated warehouse 
systems for processing orders may in the future substitute labour in some of the 
traditional tasks in this sector. 
  
 
61 Airports Commission (2015). Airports Commission: Final report. London: Airports Commission. Available 
from: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/440316/
airports-commission-final-report.pdf  
62 Office of National Statistics (ONS)(2017). E-commerce and ICT activity, UK: 2017 Available from: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/itandinternetindustry/bulletins/ecommerceandictactivity/2
017.  
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3.2.5. Business and other services 
Sub-sectors 
Information technology 
Financial and insurance activities 
Real estate activities 
Professional services 
Support service activities 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 
Other service activities 
 
Table 3.11: Industry profile – Business and other services 
  
GVA 
(£2016m) 
Share 
of UK 
GVA 
(%) 
Employment 
(000s) 
Total share 
of 
employment 
(%) 
GVA 
shares 
(%) 
Female 
employ
ment 
(%) 
Self-
employ
ment 
(%) 
2017 615,240 34.4 11,176 31.9 34.4 46.1 15.8 
2027 700,150 34.9 11,838 32.9 34.9 45.6 15.4 
 
Table 3.12: Trends in output and employment 2017-2027 – Business and other services 
2017-2027 
Replacement 
demand 
(000s) 
Change in 
employment 
(000s) 
Change in 
employment 
(%) 
GVA growth 
(% p.a.) 
Productivity 
growth (% 
p.a.) 
Business & 
other 
services 
3,776 662 5.9 1.3 0.7 
UK average 11,581 962 2.7 1.1 0.9 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Notes:  
The six broad sectors are defined in the technical annexes and in the separate Technical Report. 
Total output of the six broad sectors differs from total GVA; the latter includes ownership of dwellings. 
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Figure 3.10: Sector Shares in Business and other services, 1997-2027 
 
Key facts 
• The business and other services sector is forecast to see a moderation in its rate 
of growth in output and employment compared with the previous decade, although 
it is expected that it will still outpace growth in the wider economy as a whole. As 
the largest of the six broad sectors, it will make a considerable contribution to 
growth in absolute terms. 
• The comparative advantage of the UK, relatively strong investment in the sector, 
and technological progress are anticipated to be major factors driving long-term 
growth. 
• Although the country’s comparative advantage in professional and business 
services could come under pressure in the long run, these activities are likely to 
continue to attract investment into the UK over this period. 
• The sector is expected to see strong growth in labour demand in the long run; 
much of this demand is likely to be in high-skilled and low-skilled roles, continuing 
the trend of occupational polarisation. 
• The industries expected to make the largest contribution to output growth are 
financial services, professional, scientific and technical activities, and information 
technology. However, output growth in sectors such as Financial and insurance 
activities is expected to be driven by continued rapid growth in productivity, 
brought about by technological improvements, to the detriment of employment 
growth. 
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• Technological progress supported by strong capital investment within the 
information technology industry is likely to be a major factor in stimulating long-
term growth, even though it is likely to weaken employment growth in some 
traditional roles. 
Business and other services is now the major sector in the UK, accounting for over one-
third of total UK economic activity. Consistent with current trends, the sector is expected 
to outpace wider-economy growth. Output in the sector is forecast to grow by 1.3% p.a. 
between 2017 and 2027, with the number of jobs expected to grow by 0.6% p.a. over the 
same period. Overall, the comparative advantage of the UK, strong investment into the 
sector, and technology progress are anticipated to be major factors driving long-term 
growth in the sector. 
Several industries are likely to be the main contributors of growth within the broad 
aggregate sector. Consistent with current trends, financial services, professional, 
scientific and technical activities, and information and communication industries are 
forecast to experience strong growth over the forecast period.  
The expectation of sustained growth in these industries stems partly from the 
comparative advantage of the UK in the professional and business services industries. In 
a report analysing professional and business services, BIS highlighted several features 
behind UK’s competitiveness in these industries, including the geographic advantage of 
the UK being between two major markets, a university system which provides high-
quality graduates, and a supportive business environment (p.7, BIS; 201363). This is 
anticipated to first, attract new firms to locate into the country, bringing increased 
investment, activity and labour demand; and second, increase international demand for 
these services from the UK, because of the industries’ reputation and competitiveness. 
The impacts Brexit could have on the UK’s current comparative advantage are uncertain 
and could dampen growth in the short-term. 
New challenges may divert some of the growth in activity to countries closer to the 
developing markets and diminish the UK’s comparative advantage in the long term. 
Increasing compliance costs, rising demand from emerging economies and existing 
initiatives to establish “financial centres of the Far East” (ibid.), could divert some growth 
abroad. Nonetheless, faster than average growth is forecast in professional and business 
service industries. 
Another important factor driving long-term growth is investment. Trends in recent years 
suggest that private investment into technology companies within the UK is growing at a 
fast pace. While UK venture capital funding for tech start-ups has dropped 28% since 
2017, likely due to uncertainty around Brexit, it continues to outpace any other European 
 
63 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS)(2013). UK construction: An economic analysis of 
the sector. Department of Business, Innovation and Skills: London. 
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country (ComputerWeekly.com, 201864). According to PitchBook’s 3Q 2018 European 
Venture Report65, the UK and Ireland have garnered the majority of deal activity every 
quarter for the last nine years. Although investment growth is expected to stabilise in the 
long-term, the existing capital raised in this sector indicates that the industry within the 
UK can (and is consequently expected to continue to) attract large amounts of 
investment. This will be likely to attract further activity and drive innovation in the sector, 
particularly since the launch of the government’s Industrial strategy in November 2017, 
which promotes greater adoption of artificial intelligence. 
A related but distinct driver is productivity. Consistent with current trends, the rate of 
technology progress within certain sectors is forecast to increase, driving innovation and 
increased demand. For example, the emergence of financial technology (or “FinTech”, 
using software to provide financial services) underlines the impact technological 
innovation can have on traditional processes within high value industries. The ability to 
capture and incorporate technological developments in existing processes, therefore, will 
likely have a significant impact on the long-term growth prospects of the sector. 
Correspondingly, the growth prospects are expected to generate robust labour demand 
growth in the future. The contribution of technology in this sector is likely to skew labour 
demand towards higher-skilled roles, and the availability of high-skilled individuals will be 
an important factor in determining the ability of this industry to fulfil its growth potential. In 
parallel, there will also be notable growth in employment in services that are considered 
lower skill - personal services and supporting business, such as security and cleaning. 
3.2.6. Public administration, health and education (or non-marketed 
services)  
Sub-sectors 
Public administration and defence 
Education 
Health and social work 
 
Table 3.13: Industry profile – Public administration, health and education 
  
GVA 
(£2016m) 
Share 
of UK 
GVA 
(%) 
Employment 
(000s) 
Total share 
of 
employment 
(%) 
Female 
employ
ment 
(%) 
Self-
employ
ment 
(%) 
2017 317,601 17.7 8,793 25.1 71.0 7.2 
2027 360,438 18.0 9,212 25.6 72.1 12.3 
 
64 ComputerWeekly.com (2018). Venture capital funding for UK tech startups. Available from: 
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252455702/Venture-capital-funding-for-UK-tech-startups-drops-28-
in-a-year, January 2019. 
65 PitchBook (2018). European Venture Report 3Q 2018. Available from:  
https://files.pitchbook.com/website/files/pdf/PitchBook_3Q_2018_European_Venture_Report.pdf.  
62 
 
Table 3.14: Trends in output and employment 2017-2027 – Public administration, health and 
education 
2017-2027 
Replacement 
demand 
(000s) 
Change in 
employment 
(000s) 
Change in 
employment 
(%) 
GVA growth 
(% p.a.) 
Productivity 
growth (% p.a.) 
Public admin. 
health & 
education 
3,186 418 4.8 1.3 0.8 
UK average 11,581 962 2.7 1.1 0.9 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, MDM revision 13406. 
Notes:  
The six broad sectors are defined in the technical annexes and in the separate Technical Report. 
Total output of the six broad sectors differs from total GVA; the latter includes ownership of dwellings. 
 
Figure 3.11: Sector Shares in Public administration, health and education, 1997-2007 
 
 
Key facts 
• The public administration, health and education sector (or non-marketed services) 
is expected to see some of the strongest growth in both employment and GVA 
compared with the other broad sectors, forecast to grow by rates higher than the 
economy-wide average. 
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•  Activity66 in public administration, health and education are dependent on political 
decisions, as government policies determine demand for the sectors’ outputs and 
services. 
• Employment in public administration is expected to decline, as local councils 
continue to face tight controls on government funding. 
• Wider demographic trends, such as the ageing population, are expected to be a 
major driver of increased demand in the long run, especially in health, residential 
care and social work. 
• Teacher shortages67 in the education sector is likely to have a negative impact on 
employment growth in the short-term, but continued growth in international 
students is expected to support output growth in the sector. 
• The impact of Brexit on the public sector is particularly uncertain. The government 
could benefit from the removal of fiscal contributions to the EU budget, while at the 
same time face increased costs as certain benefits provided by the EU move back 
to being the responsibility of the UK government. 
Activity in public administration, health and education are dependent on political 
decisions, as government is a major component of this sector’s demand. Activity in public 
administration, education and health is expected to grow at an average of 1.5% p.a. over 
2017-2022, before slowing down over the period 2022-2027. 
Over the longer term, demographic trends are expected to induce increased government 
and consumer spending for some industries within this broad sector. The UK has an 
ageing population; the latest projections by the Office of National Statistics estimate that 
the proportion of individuals over 65 will approximately 3% points higher in 2027 than it 
was in 2017.68 Demand for public spending and health services are anticipated to 
correspondingly as a result, boosting wider activity in the sector. This is expected to be 
the overriding concern in the long-term, driving increases in output and employment. 
Employment in public administration, on the other hand, is expected to decline slightly in 
the short-term by -0.4% p.a. over 2017-2022, as local councils continue to face tight 
controls on government funding. This is expected to bounce back in the longer term, with 
employment in the sector expected to grow slightly by 0.2% p.a. over 2022-2027, as the 
government moves towards its aim of a budget surplus by the mid-2020s.  
The education sector is also expected to see different trends between 2017 and 2027. As 
the country continues to face teacher shortages in the short-term, employment in the 
sector is expected to fall by 0.3% p.a. over 2017-2022, before returning to minimal 
 
66 It is acknowledged that there are weaknesses of using gross value added (and other monetary 
indicators) to measure the output of public services. GVA is used here to be consistent with other sectors. 
67 Teacher recruitment and retention in England, House of Commons Library: 
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7222/CBP-7222.pdf; and Teaching and 
Leadership: Supply and Quality, The Education Policy Institute: https://epi.org.uk/publications-and-
research/the-teacher-labour-market-in-england/ 
68 Currently, approximately 18% of the total UK population is over 65. 
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growth by 2027. While employment growth is expected to be stagnant, output is expected 
to continue to grow by about 1.1% p.a. over 2017-2027, supported by growth in 
international students. According to the British Council (201869), while international 
student mobility is expected to slow over the next decade, there is still expected to be 
growth of 1.7% p.a. to 2027, driven by students from China and India, which are 
expected to account for 60% of the growth. 
 
69 British Council (2018). International student mobility to 2027: Local investment, global outcomes. 
Available from: https://ei.britishcouncil.org/educationintelligence/ei-feature-international-student-mobility-
2027-local-investment-global-outcome  
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4. Changing occupational structure and replacement 
demands 
Key messages 
Changes in occupational employment structure are driven by long-term trends, 
including changing sectoral employment patterns and technological and 
organisational trends influencing the patterns of occupational demand within sectors. 
The new results take account of information from the latest information from the LFS. 
These suggest that longer-term trends apparent before the worldwide recession of 
2008 have now been firmly re-established.  
Together, these data confirm that the occupational structure of employment is 
continuing to change in favour of white collar and higher skilled occupations, although 
there will still be many job opportunities for less skilled workers. 
The results suggest significant employment growth for higher-level occupations such 
as managers, and most professional and associate professional and technical jobs.  
Caring, leisure and other service occupations are also projected to see significant 
employment growth. 
Job losses are projected for administrative & secretarial occupations; skilled trade 
occupations; and process, plant & machine operatives.  
Elementary occupations are projected to experience mixed fortunes with some 
modest growth in jobs where tasks are not so easily subject to automation (such as 
waiting at tables), but job losses in other areas. 
In combination these patterns suggest a continuing polarisation of demand for skills, 
with some growth at both high and low skill levels and a hollowing out in the middle. 
There are considerable variations in the general patterns of occupational employment 
by gender and employment status, reflecting existing patterns of ‘gender segregation’.  
The need to replace those leaving the workforce for reasons of retirement and other 
factors will generate significant numbers of opportunities even in areas where 
employment is projected to fall. 
As well as the broad patterns of change at the 1-digit, major group and 2-digit sub-
major group levels the full results also include indicative projections at the 4-digit level 
of the Standard Occupational Classification (some 369 categories). 
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4.1. Introduction and general approach 
Skills in Working Futures are measured in two ways - Occupation and Qualification.70 
This section focuses on occupation. The jobs people undertake often require very 
different skill sets. The Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) reflects this, being 
based around a hierarchical system of classifying jobs dependent on formal qualifications 
and experience typically required.  
The results reflect the latest information available from the LFS and other sources. These 
provide information on historical employment patterns. These data are linked to the 
sectoral analysis described in Section 3 to develop projections of future employment 
prospects by occupation.  
The projections are based on categories defined using the SOC2010 occupational 
classification.71 The main focus is on the 25 sub-major occupation groups, but for 
presentational purposes much of the discussion here is at the broader major group level 
(the nine single digit major group level categories of SOC).72 More detailed projections 
down to the 4-digit level have also been developed. These are presented in a separate 
annex to this report.  
Projections of occupational employment looking forward to 2027 are presented, covering 
all industry sectors.73 The main focus in this section is on results at a UK level, but 
projections have also been developed for the four nations of the UK and the nine English 
regions. These are also presented in a separate annex to this report. 
Such data provide a useful indicator of changing patterns of the demand for skills. 
However, it is important to focus not just on projections of changing levels of 
employment by occupation, but also on replacement demands. Projections of change in 
the structure of employment provide only part of the picture of how the demand for skills 
is changing. Estimation of replacement needs recognises the significant outflows of those 
retiring from the existing workforce (or leaving for other reasons such as family 
formation). The results show that, despite projected declines in employment for many 
occupations, there will be significant demand for the skills concerned to replace those 
leaving the current workforce.  
The many and varied drivers of change in occupational employment structure are 
complex. Some of the most important factors are summarised in section 4.2. One key 
driver is structural change in the economy, which affects the sectoral patterns of 
 
70 There are of course other ways of defining and measuring skills, including various indicators of what are 
variously referred to as key, core and generic skills. Data are however much better established on 
occupation and qualification, so these remain the main focus of attention in the Working Futures 
projections. 
71 These are described in more detail in: Wilson, R. A., M. May-Gillings, S. Patel and H Bui, (2019). 
Working Futures 2017-2027: Technical report on sources and methods. Department for Education. 
72 Full detail of these classifications is provided in the technical annex. 
73 More detailed results by sectors are available in the detailed Excel workbooks available via the 
Department for Education. 
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employment. As noted in Section 3, a complex combination of economic and 
technological forces is driving the fortunes of different parts of the economy. Some are 
expected to see rapid employment decline, while others have much brighter prospects. 
Given that sectors have very different needs for particular occupations; this has a strong 
impact on occupational employment prospects. The other key driver is the way that 
technological and organisational change affects the way work is done within each sector.  
The remaining sections are structured as follows: 
• Section 4.2 outlines the key drivers of changes in occupational employment 
structure. 
• Section 4.3 provides a brief summary of recent historical developments in 
occupational employment structure, focusing on changes between 2017 and 2027. 
• Section 4.4 discusses how these patterns vary across gender and employment 
status.  
• Section 4.5 goes on to focus on replacement demands. 
• Section 4.6 presents more detailed occupational projections at the 2-digit level of 
SOC (the 25 sub-major groups). 
• Section 4.7 presents an analysis of the main components of change using shift-
share methods.  
• Section 4.8 presents a summary of detailed occupational changes within 
industries.  
These results focus on the UK as a whole. Results for the devolved administrations and 
English regions, as well as more detailed analyses presenting a summary of the 
implications for occupational employment change at the more detailed 4-digit 
occupational level are provided in separate technical annexes to this report. 
4.2. Drivers of occupational change 
Drivers of change: Skill requirements are a derived demand; they are dependent on the 
pattern of demand for goods and services in the economy (Kriechel, Rašovec and 
Wilson, 201674). The focus in this section is on occupational employment patterns, as 
opposed to qualifications or some other measure of skill. These demands are influenced 
by a range of factors, which vary over time and across sectors. The key factors can be 
broadly categorised into two groups: those that are external to the organisation and 
those which are primarily internal. These are reflected in the shift-share analysis used: 
industry effects can be regarded as primarily external; occupational effects are mainly 
driven by internal influences. 
 
74 Kriechel, B., Rašovec, T., and Wilson, R. A. (2016). ''Skills Forecasts."  Part B of the ETF, ILO and 
Cedefop Guide on Skills Foresights, Scenarios and Forecasts. CEDEFOP/ETF/ILO: Turin 
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External skills drivers: influence the pattern of goods and services produced and 
therefore the Sectoral structure of employment. These drivers include: technological 
change; globalisation; and public policy (including legislative and regulatory frameworks). 
These developments are taken into account by the multi-sectoral macroeconomic model 
and are summarised in Section 2. Some sectors benefit from such factors while others 
are affected negatively. Those sectors that benefit from such changes will see 
employment grow. Conversely, those that fail to adjust and respond will experience job 
losses. Occupations concentrated in the former sectors will gain employment in contrast 
to those concentrated in declining sectors (industry effects).  
Internal skills drivers: produce significant changes in the patterns of employment within 
particular industries, including major restructuring of the way work is organised 
(occupational effects). Skill requirements within organisations are driven by the 
business strategies they adopt. These reflect choices about what products or services to 
deliver and where and how to pitch that delivery. Some may focus on product 
differentiation in high value added, premium markets while others may choose a low 
specification product or service, where the emphasis is keeping price and costs down. 
The former generally require higher skills, including the use of specialised and distinctive 
competencies, compared with strategies that focus on low-level specifications. 
Organisations facing technological changes, or trying to move up-market, usually need to 
upgrade their skills. The introduction of new products and services, major changes in 
equipment and in working methods or workforce organisation often require the 
deployment of new skills. 
Both internal and external drivers are influenced by technology (especially ICT) and other 
general factors. A number of commentators have focused on the biased nature of 
technical change, which has tended to favour higher skills and to displace lower skilled 
jobs. For example, ICT has led to the displacement of many clerical and secretarial jobs 
previously concerned with information processing using paper technology (internal 
effect). 
On the other hand, information technology (IT) has opened up many new product 
markets where information services (e.g. Facebook, Google) can be provided which were 
previously not feasible (external effect). These new businesses often require jobs of a 
professional, associate professional and managerial nature. The application of IT in other 
areas such as such as robots in motor manufacturing has led to the loss of many jobs for 
skilled workers.  
Other factors have also been important. These include the drive for efficiency in response 
to global competition, increased emphasis on customer service and product quality and 
related changes in production methods and the management of human resources. The 
income elasticity of demand for different products and services, together with changes in 
tastes and preferences is altering the patterns of demand towards an emphasis on high 
value added, higher quality, high specification goods and services. 
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There is a major restructuring of production to meet these needs. Many of these products 
and services require expert knowledge as well as customer care, personal attention and 
face-to-face human interaction, (for example, leisure, hospitality, travel, personal care), 
increasing the need for such generic skills. 
Changing patterns of industrial specialisation (industry effects) have had profound 
implications for the demand for different occupations as well as playing a key role in 
determining differences across spatial areas. The decline of employment in primary and 
manufacturing industries has resulted in a dramatic reduction in the need for many skills 
associated with the production of the output of these industries. For example: the 
agricultural sector now requires many fewer labourers; the coal industry now employs 
only a handful of skilled miners; the manufacturing sector no longer requires the same 
number of skilled engineering and other types of specific craft skills that were the 
foundation of its success in the past; utilities and transport now require far fewer workers 
than previously.  
In contrast, the growth of the service sector has led to an increase in employment in 
many occupations. For example, the growth of non-market, public service, employment 
has (up until recently) led to substantial additional jobs for: professional, managerial and 
clerical workers in public administration; for doctors and nurses in health services; and for 
teachers in education services. Similarly, growth in marketed, private sector, services has 
resulted in many new jobs for: leisure and other personal service occupations (in hotels 
and other services); sales occupations in distribution; and for professional, associate 
professional, clerical and secretarial in business and financial services.  
Future influences on occupational change: The combination of globalisation and 
technological change often increases skill requirements as work organisation and the 
nature of competitive advantage become more complex. Increasingly, the source of 
competitive edge in products and in processes is information and knowledge content. 
The increased emphasis on higher-level skills and the associated decline in demand for 
unskilled workers has been attributed to the expansion of international trade (especially 
with developing economies) and the continuing process of technological change 
(particularly related to ICT). On balance, the evidence seems to suggest that the latter 
has become increasingly important, with changes within sectors being of most 
significance. This is reflected in the shift-share analysis presented here, which suggests 
that occupational shifts within sectors are growing in importance compared to previous 
decades (occupational effects). Nonetheless, it seems likely that both technology and 
growing trade will continue to raise the demand for higher-level skills and drive down the 
demand for lower level skills. 
The projected patterns of occupational change for the next decade are expected to mirror 
those of the recent past. The same basic forces are expected to operate. Changes in the 
industrial structure of employment in favour of the service sector (industry effects) will 
tend to favour white collar, non-manual occupations, while the continued loss of jobs in 
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manufacturing and primary industries will result in yet further job losses for many manual 
blue-collar jobs. 
The impacts of IT and other related organisational changes are likely to reduce further 
the demand for clerical and basic secretarial skills across all industries (occupational 
effects). Similarly, the introduction of new technologies in manufacturing will tend to 
displace many skilled workers. Conversely, the management and operation of the new 
technologies will require greater shares in employment for managerial, professional and 
associate professional occupations, including technicians of various kinds. 
4.3. Changes for broad occupational groups: History and 
projections 
4.3.1. Latest historical developments 
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 present historical information on employment trends for the nine 
SOC2010 major groups over the past two decades, as well as projections to 2027. The 
historical estimates are based on combining the estimates of employment by industry 
from the multi-sectoral model with the latest information from the LFS on changing 
occupational employment patterns within industries. The historical data prior to 2011 
have all been reclassified onto the new basis using convertors provided by ONS. 
The historical database is also based on information from Censuses of Population (up to 
and including 2011) although the main emphasis now is on information from the LFS. 
Comparison between the LFS and Census data suggest a broadly similar picture 
although there are a few significant differences between the Census and the current LFS 
estimates (and hence the Working Futures estimates).75 
The recent historical trends already reflect two distinctive factors when comparing the 
current results with those published in earlier Working Futures reports.76 Technical 
modifications to the system of classifying occupations resulted in some shifts in 
employment shares between occupational categories as SOC2010 was introduced. 
Secondly, there have been a number of shifts in the structure of employment in the 
economy by both sector and occupation as a consequence of the 2008 global financial 
crisis and subsequent recession. 
 
75 In particular the Census suggest a much smaller proportion of people employed in Science, Engineering 
and Technology Professions category. The reasons for these differences remain unclear so the current set 
of results relies on the official picture as presented by ONS in the published LFS data. 
76 The first set of Working Futures projections were published in 2004 and covered the period 2002-2012. 
Subsequent series covered 2004-2014, 2007-2017, 2010-2020 and 2014-2024. The last two adopted 
SOC2010 to classify occupations but the earlier series used SOC2000. 
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The revision to SOC altered the employment patterns across a number of occupations. 
This included:  
• managers, where the definition of managerial roles was tightened up between 
SOC200 and SOC 201077 
• nurses, who were moved from the associate professional occupational category to 
the professional one in reflection of the changing nature of the work involved 
(reflecting the move towards nursing becoming an all-graduate occupation).  
The 2008 recession impacted on some sectors much more than others (notably in 
construction and also Public administration, education and health services). This has had 
a direct effect on those occupations employed therein. There have also been some shifts 
in patterns within industries. The overall levels of employment also fell sharply following 
2008, which affected all occupations (see Figure 4.2). Subsequently there was a 
recovery in most parts of the economy, especially the private as opposed to public 
sector. Nevertheless, the broad underlying trends in occupational employment shares 
have continued more or less unabated, Figure 4.3 shows that, for most occupations, the 
trend over the period 2008-2017 is almost linear (Figure 4.3 focuses on shares of total 
employment at the 1-digit level of SOC). 
The key features have been: 
• rising employment levels and shares for higher level, white-collar groups such as: 
• managers, directors & senior officials; 
• professionals; and  
• associate professional & technical occupations; 
• rapid increases for caring, leisure related and other personal service occupations; 
• decline in employment for administrative & secretarial occupations; 
• declining employment levels and shares for most blue collar/manual occupations;  
• for elementary occupations, there was a slight decline in overall numbers over the 
decade 2007-2017, with a significant recovery in the second half of the decade. 
The overall decline in employment levels for elementary occupations also disguises quite 
large job losses in some areas offset by growth in others (sectors and specific jobs with 
the overall elementary occupations umbrella). 
These patterns remain broadly consistent with the idea of polarisation in the demand for 
skills. This hypothesis highlights the growth in demand for both high and low level skills 
with a hollowing out in the middle.  
 
77 Job titles with manager in the title are now only included in the managerial group if the job involves 
substantial managerial control over people or resources. 
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4.3.2. Projections to 2027 
Table 4.1 and Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present employment projections for the 9 major 
occupational groups. They cover the period from 2017-2027. These are also compared 
with developments over the previous decades. The pace of change in occupational 
structure to 2027 is expected to continue at about the same rate compared with the past 
two decades. This reflects a combination of continuing changes in sectoral employment 
structure, reinforced by skill-biased technical change (see Figure 4.1). The general trends 
are in favour of more highly skilled occupations, with some growth in less skilled 
employment in areas that are currently difficult to automate. They also indicate a 
reduction in the numbers of traditional clerical and skilled and semi-skilled manual jobs, 
(see Figure 4.2). 
Managers, Professional, and Associate professional & technical occupations are all 
expected to show significant increases in employment to 2027.  
Caring, leisure & other service occupations, and some parts of the Sales & customer 
service occupation group are projected to experience some positive employment 
prospects. These groups have exhibited employment growth since the early 1980s, 
reflecting positive shifts in sectoral employment structure in the sectors in which they are 
employed and the difficulties in replacing the non-routine manual and non-manual tasks 
which they undertake with machines.  
Modest job losses are projected for the Sales & customer service occupation group as 
a whole, especially for the less skilled sales occupations sub-category. 
Administrative & secretarial occupations have been one of the groups hardest hit by 
technological innovations in the office environment in recent years, albeit nowhere near 
as severe as first feared when the information and communications revolution first got 
underway in the late 1970s. These groups have seen significant job losses since the 
early 1990s, mainly as a consequence of the increasing use of IT systems to replace 
human effort. This trend is projected to accelerate over the next decade. Nevertheless, it 
is expected that this category will still employ well around 3 million people in 2027.  
Skilled trades occupations and Process, plant & machine operatives are expected to 
experience further job losses as a whole, continuing the pattern of long-term decline. For 
many of these traditionally manual / blue-collar occupations this is largely driven by the 
continuing decline in the manufacturing, primary and distribution and transport sectors. 
There are however, some exceptions (with growth for occupations such as chefs and 
drivers) as illustrated by the analysis at a more detailed level below. 
Some modest employment growth is expected for some parts of the Elementary 
occupations group, as many more industries, especially within the service sector, find a 
need for such occupations but this is offset by job losses elsewhere. This pattern has 
been argued to be part of a process of polarisation of the demand for skills, attributed to 
the difficulties of automating some relatively low skill jobs that require a human response. 
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This is especially important in some parts of the service sector. Figure 4.9 below 
illustrates how patterns of change vary by detailed 2-digit level occupations across 
industries. 
Tables 4.2 - 4.3 present the details of change, including how they vary by gender. 
Figures 4.3 - 4.7 also illustrate this, as well as differences by employment status. 
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Figure 4.1: Changes in occupational employment structure (000s), 2007-2027 
 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. 
IER report tables and charts.xlsm
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Figure 4.2: Occupational trends (000s), 1997-2027 
 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. 
IER report tables and charts.xlsm 
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Figure 4.3: Occupational trends (% shares), 1997-2027 
 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. 
IER report tables and charts.xlsm 
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Table 4.1: Employment in SOC2010 occupational categories – Major Groups 
Levels (000s) 2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 
Managers, directors and 
senior officials 2,776 3,043 3,566 3,798 4,005 
Professional occupations 5,426 5,842 6,873 7,275 7,695 
Associate professional and 
technical 4,192 4,245 4,884 5,123 5,310 
Administrative and secretarial 4,023 3,687 3,681 3,359 3,077 
Skilled trades occupations 3,584 3,361 3,433 3,269 3,126 
Caring, leisure and other 
service 2,646 2,890 3,345 3,550 3,811 
Sales and customer service 2,792 2,809 2,929 2,881 2,877 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 2,314 2,158 2,180 2,047 1,974 
Elementary occupations 4,037 3,766 3,956 3,948 3,947 
All occupations 31,790 31,800 34,848 35,250 35,821 
Shares (%) 2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 
Managers, directors and 
senior officials 8.7 9.6 10.2 10.8 11.2 
Professional occupations 17.1 18.4 19.7 20.6 21.5 
Associate professional and 
technical 13.2 13.4 14.0 14.5 14.8 
Administrative and secretarial 12.7 11.6 10.6 9.5 8.6 
Skilled trades occupations 11.3 10.6 9.9 9.3 8.7 
Caring, leisure and other 
service 8.3 9.1 9.6 10.1 10.6 
Sales and customer service 8.8 8.8 8.4 8.2 8.0 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 7.3 6.8 6.3 5.8 5.5 
Elementary occupations 12.7 11.8 11.4 11.2 11.0 
All occupations 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Change (000s) 2007-2012 
2012-
2017 
2017-
2022 
2022-
2027 
2017-
2027 
Managers, directors and 
senior officials 267 523 231 207 439 
Professional occupations 416 1,032 402 419 821 
Associate professional and 
technical 53 639 239 186 425 
Administrative and secretarial -337 -6 -322 -282 -604 
Skilled trades occupations -223 72 -164 -143 -307 
Caring, leisure and other 
service 244 456 204 261 466 
Sales and customer service 17 120 -48 -5 -52 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives -157 22 -133 -73 -206 
Elementary occupations -271 190 -8 -1 -9 
All occupations 10 3,048 402 571 973 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405.  
IER report tables and charts.xlsm  
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Table 4.2: Females, Occupational categories, SOC2010 – Major Groups 
Levels (000s) 2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 
Managers, directors and 
senior officials 836 1,012 1,279 1,431 1,569 
Professional occupations 2,691 2,880 3,487 3,811 4,155 
Associate professional and 
technical 1,708 1,773 2,135 2,329 2,493 
Administrative and secretarial 3,146 2,823 2,756 2,449 2,166 
Skilled trades occupations 365 339 361 355 345 
Caring, leisure and other 
service 2,123 2,347 2,708 2,864 3,061 
Sales and customer service 1,759 1,765 1,778 1,710 1,695 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 293 265 251 215 192 
Elementary occupations 2,082 1,855 1,861 1,804 1,732 
All occupations 15,004 15,060 16,616 16,967 17,407 
Shares (%) 2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 
Managers, directors and 
senior officials 5.6 6.7 7.7 8.4 9.0 
Professional occupations 17.9 19.1 21.0 22.5 23.9 
Associate professional and 
technical 11.4 11.8 12.8 13.7 14.3 
Administrative and secretarial 21.0 18.7 16.6 14.4 12.4 
Skilled trades occupations 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 
Caring, leisure and other 
service 14.1 15.6 16.3 16.9 17.6 
Sales and customer service 11.7 11.7 10.7 10.1 9.7 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.1 
Elementary occupations 13.9 12.3 11.2 10.6 10.0 
All occupations 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Change (000s) 2007-2012 
2012-
2017 
2017-
2022 
2022-
2027 
2017-
2027 
Managers, directors and 
senior officials 176 267 152 138 290 
Professional occupations 189 607 323 344 667 
Associate professional and 
technical 65 361 194 164 358 
Administrative and secretarial -323 -67 -307 -283 -590 
Skilled trades occupations -26 22 -6 -10 -16 
Caring, leisure and other 
service 224 361 156 197 353 
Sales and customer service 6 13 -68 -15 -84 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives -29 -14 -36 -23 -59 
Elementary occupations -227 5 -57 -72 -129 
All occupations 57 1,556 351 440 791 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. IER report tables and charts.xlsm  
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Table 4.3: Males, Occupational categories, SOC2010 – Major Groups 
Levels (000s) 2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 
Managers, directors and senior 
officials 1,940 2,031 2,287 2,367 2,436 
Professional occupations 2,735 2,962 3,386 3,464 3,540 
Associate professional and 
technical 2,484 2,472 2,750 2,795 2,817 
Administrative and secretarial 877 863 925 910 911 
Skilled trades occupations 3,218 3,022 3,071 2,914 2,781 
Caring, leisure and other service 523 542 637 685 750 
Sales and customer service 1,033 1,044 1,151 1,172 1,182 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 2,021 1,893 1,929 1,832 1,782 
Elementary occupations 1,955 1,911 2,095 2,144 2,215 
All occupations 16,786 16,740 18,232 18,283 18,414 
Shares (%) 2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 
Managers, directors and senior 
officials 11.6 12.1 12.5 12.9 13.2 
Professional occupations 16.3 17.7 18.6 18.9 19.2 
Associate professional and 
technical 14.8 14.8 15.1 15.3 15.3 
Administrative and secretarial 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.0 4.9 
Skilled trades occupations 19.2 18.1 16.8 15.9 15.1 
Caring, leisure and other service 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.7 4.1 
Sales and customer service 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.4 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 12.0 11.3 10.6 10.0 9.7 
Elementary occupations 11.6 11.4 11.5 11.7 12.0 
All occupations 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Change (000s) 2007-2012 
2012-
2017 
2017-
2022 
2022-
2027 
2017-
2027 
Managers, directors and senior 
officials 91 257 79 70 149 
Professional occupations 227 424 78 75 154 
Associate professional and 
technical -12 278 45 22 67 
Administrative and secretarial -14 61 -15 1 -13 
Skilled trades occupations -197 50 -157 -133 -291 
Caring, leisure and other service 20 95 48 64 113 
Sales and customer service 11 107 21 10 31 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives -128 36 -97 -50 -147 
Elementary occupations -45 185 49 71 120 
All occupations -47 1,492 51 131 182 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. 
IER report tables and charts.xlsm 
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Figure 4.4: Occupational change by gender, Total Employment (000s), 2017-2027 
 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. 
IER report tables and charts.xlsm 
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Figure 4.5: Occupational change by employment status, Males & Females (000s), 2017-2027 
 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. 
IER report tables and charts.xlsm 
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Figure 4.6: Occupational change by employment status, Males (000s), 2017-2027 
 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. 
IER report tables and charts.xlsm 
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Figure 4.7: Occupational change by employment status, Females (000s), 2017-2027 
 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. 
IER report tables and charts.xlsm 
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Table 4.4: Changing Composition of Employment by Occupation, 1997-2027 
Levels (000s) 
          2017-2027 
2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 
Net 
Change 
Replacement 
Demand 
Total 
Requirement 
Managers, directors and senior officials 2,776 3,043 3,566 3,798 4,005 439 1,380 1,819 
Professional occupations 5,426 5,842 6,873 7,275 7,695 821 2,362 3,183 
Associate professional and technical 4,192 4,245 4,884 5,123 5,310 425 1,599 2,024 
Administrative and secretarial 4,023 3,687 3,681 3,359 3,077 -604 1,152 549 
Skilled trades occupations 3,584 3,361 3,433 3,269 3,126 -307 929 623 
Caring, leisure and other service 2,646 2,890 3,345 3,550 3,811 466 1,335 1,801 
Sales and customer service 2,792 2,809 2,929 2,881 2,877 -52 907 855 
Process, plant and machine operatives 2,314 2,158 2,180 2,047 1,974 -206 657 452 
Elementary occupations 4,037 3,766 3,956 3,948 3,947 -9 1,258 1,249 
All occupations 31,790 31,800 34,848 35,250 35,821 973 11,581 12,554 
         
Shares (%) 
          2017-2027 
2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 
Net 
Change 
Replacement 
Demand 
Total 
Requirement 
Managers, directors and senior officials 8.7 9.6 10.2 10.8 11.2 12.3 38.7 51.0 
Professional occupations 17.1 18.4 19.7 20.6 21.5 11.9 34.4 46.3 
Associate professional and technical 13.2 13.4 14.0 14.5 14.8 8.7 32.7 41.4 
Administrative and secretarial 12.7 11.6 10.6 9.5 8.6 -16.4 31.3 14.9 
Skilled trades occupations 11.3 10.6 9.9 9.3 8.7 -8.9 27.1 18.1 
Caring, leisure and other service 8.3 9.1 9.6 10.1 10.6 13.9 39.9 53.8 
Sales and customer service 8.8 8.8 8.4 8.2 8.0 -1.8 31.0 29.2 
Process, plant and machine operatives 7.3 6.8 6.3 5.8 5.5 -9.4 30.2 20.7 
Elementary occupations 12.7 11.8 11.4 11.2 11.0 -0.2 31.8 31.6 
All occupations 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.8 33.2 36.0 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. IER report tables and charts.xlsm 
 85 
4.4. Occupational trends by gender / employment status 
4.4.1. Gender 
There are some significant differences in occupational employment prospects for males 
and females as shown in Figures 4.4 - 4.7. Despite policies to reduce employment 
discrimination by gender, occupational employment structure remains strongly 
segregated, with many occupations much more strongly represented by one gender. 
The largest employment increases for men are projected in managerial and professional 
occupations, (149,000 and 154,000 extra jobs between 2017 and 2027 respectively). 
There is also some growth projected for associate professional, caring / leisure, sales 
and some elementary occupations. The main job losses projected for men are amongst 
skilled trades and process, plant & machine operatives. 
For women the occupations providing the largest number of new jobs are also 
concentrated in the first three occupational categories, plus caring, leisure and other 
service occupations. Women are expected to see the most significant job losses 
projected for administrative & secretarial occupations (because they account for a 
disproportionate share of employment in these areas).  
4.4.2. Employment status 
Expected patterns by employment status (full-time and part-time employees or self-
employment) are summarised in Figures 4.4 - 4.7.78  Around 60% of all jobs in the UK in 
2027 will be full-time, while just under 30% will be part-time and the remaining self-
employed. There are significant differences in the pattern of change for different 
occupational and employment status categories. These reflect structural differences in 
terms of the demands from different sectors (changes in overall employment levels) and 
different trends in the patterns of gender and employment status mix within sectors. 
Because males and females are concentrated disproportionately in different jobs (both 
occupations and sectors), they are affected differently by the changing fortunes of 
different parts of the economy. For example, males in full time and self- employed jobs 
are most affected by the changing prospects in the construction sector.  Prospects for 
females, in part-time jobs are very sensitive to trends in clerical employment (where 
employment is declining) and caring jobs (where employment is rising). 
Amongst some occupations such as managers, directors & senior officials (SOC major 
group 1), and associate professionals (SOC 3), the main jobs growth is for full-time 
workers. Amongst professional occupations (SOC 2) a substantial increase in part-time 
working is also projected. Smaller increases are expected for part-time workers for the 
other two categories. The faster growth amongst professionals for part-time working is 
 
78 These categories are defined as in the LFS (self- reporting). Part-time working is defined as those 
typically working fewer than 30 hours per week. 
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probably related to the rising concentration of women in this occupational group and a 
preference for more flexible working patterns. 
Amongst administrative & secretarial occupations (SOC 4) there are sharp declines 
expected, primarily focused on females, both full and part-time. Some significant job 
losses are also expected for female part-time sales occupations (SOC 7) although for 
males some growth is expected. As men increasingly take up jobs in this kind of 
occupation, they are tending to take on part-time roles. Social trends towards a more 
even balance in childcare and related responsibilities may also be encouraging more 
men to take on such part-time jobs. 
For caring, leisure & other service occupations (SOC 6) the main growth is for part-time 
jobs, especially for women.  
For skilled trades occupations, and for process, plant & machine operatives, the job 
losses are concentrated amongst full-time jobs, especially for men. 
Self-employment numbers are not expected to change dramatically, but again, these 
patterns vary significantly within different sectors, with business and other services 
expected to account for a high proportion of growth.  
The patterns by gender are generally similar for most of the employment status 
categories, but the occupational segregation of females and males into certain jobs 
results in some notable differences. For example, a much sharper growth in employment 
is expected for women than for men in caring, leisure & other service occupations.  
Part time working is expected to increase amongst men in many occupations (most 
notably sales roles). Significant increases in male employment are projected for full-time 
workers in SOCs 1-3. The largest job losses for men are in SOCs 5 and 8. It is also 
notable that employment growth is expected for some male jobs in elementary 
occupations (mainly part-time), while for females there are predicted to be job losses. 
This reflects the different nature of the elementary jobs taken by men and women.  
4.5. Replacement demands  
4.5.1. Measuring replacement demands 
The projections summarised in Tables 4.1-4.3 and Figure 4.1 focus on the total numbers 
of people who are expected to be employed in particular occupations in the future. Such 
estimates provide a useful indication of areas of change, highlighting the likely 'gainers' 
and 'losers'. However, this may give a misleading impression of job opportunities and 
related training requirements. Even those occupations where employment is projected to 
decline may still offer good career prospects, with a significant number of job openings. 
This is because, as long as significant numbers are employed in such jobs, employers 
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will need to replace those workers who leave due to retirement, career moves, mortality 
or other reasons.  
Substantial changes in employment structure leading to job losses in a number of 
occupations are expected over the next decade. Nevertheless, there will be a need to 
recruit and train new entrants into these types of jobs to replace those retiring from the 
workforce or leaving for other reasons. Where employment is already projected to rise, 
such replacement demand elements will serve to reinforce this trend and lead to even 
greater requirements. 
At any particular time, these outflows will include people leaving the employed workforce 
to start a family, etc., as well as those permanently retiring because of old age. Over the 
longer term, some of the former may return to the workforce, offsetting the other outflows 
(although in the very long run everyone departs from the labour force). Together these 
outflows are referred to as “replacement demand” (See Section 3).  
The net change in employment levels is typically referred to as “expansion demand”, 
although in many cases this may be negative. A better term might be structural demand. 
The sum of expansion or structural demand and replacement demand is referred to as 
the net requirement. Further details of definitions and methods used to calculate the 
replacement demands and total requirements are given in Box 4.1. 
Replacement demand can easily outweigh any negative changes resulting from any 
projected employment decline. At a macro level, replacement demands typically 
represent around 2-4% per annum of the employed workforce. These rates can vary 
significantly at a more micro level, where (for example) a workforce with many people 
approaching statutory retirement age will usually imply much higher replacement needs 
than a younger one (all else being equal).79  
4.5.2. Estimates of replacement demands 
Table 4.4 provides a summary for the 9 major occupational groups. Further detail on the 
25 occupational sub-major groups is presented in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.8.  
The total requirement for workers is positive in all occupational groups. Replacement 
demand is substantial and easily outweighs any negative structural (expansion) demand 
(see Table 4.4). The rates of replacement needs vary from 27-40% over the 10-year 
period for the 1-digit categories (again see Table 4.4). Over the decade as a whole, there 
is projected to be a net requirement of over 12.5 million new job openings. Replacement 
demand accounts for 11.5 million of these. Retirements from the workforce because of 
old age are the principal component of the latter. For all occupations together, 
 
79 For example an occupational category such as managers or a particular sector such as some parts of 
manufacturing where much of the workforce has been in post for many years. 
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replacement demand over the period 2017-2027 is over 11 times larger than expansion 
demand. 
In many occupations, the “expansion” or structural demand is negative (corresponding to 
declining employment levels). These include: administrative & secretarial occupations; 
skilled trades; sales & customer service occupations; and process, plant & machine 
operatives. In all these cases, the negative structural demand (the projected employment 
decline) is expected to be offset by positive replacement demand (mainly related to 
retirements from the workforce). Expansion demand is positive in all the other broad 
occupational groups. In such cases, expected retirements and other replacement 
demand elements will add to positive expansion demand to create even higher net 
requirements for new entrants. Similar patterns can be observed at the more detailed 2-
digit level (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.8). The estimates of replacement needs are based 
on quite limited information, using the latest data available from the LFS (see Box 4.1 for 
details)80. They should be regarded as indicative rather than precise. Nevertheless, they 
provide a broad indication of the scale of such demands, compared to the structural 
changes projected. 
In principle, considerable variations in these patterns might be expected by sector and 
region, as well as by gender and employment status, reflecting in particular the different 
age structures of the different groups. In practice, the information available from the LFS 
does not make it easy to develop such customised estimates of age structures and flow 
rates.  
The fundamental message is that actors in the labour market need to focus not just on 
the projected changes in occupational employment levels but on replacement needs. As 
individuals retire from the workforce or leave jobs for other reasons, important education 
and training needs arise. Even in occupations where employment is forecast to decline, 
such needs must be met in order to support existing operations. This also means that 
there may be good job opportunities for new entrants in many such areas, even where 
overall employment levels may be falling. 
 
80 The estimated rates of outflow based on LFS data are significantly lower in this latest set of projections, 
possibly reflecting moves towards later retirement.    
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Box 4.1: Replacements demands: definitions and methods  
Methodology and caveats 
The projections described in this section define the so-called “expansion” or 
structural demand arising from growth (or decline) in occupational employment 
levels. This is the net change in employment between two points in time. This is 
only part of the demand that needs to be met if employers are to maintain their 
operations. In order to do this they also need to replace those members of their 
staff who leave. 
In principle, four components of replacement demands for occupations can be 
separately identified: 
• losses due to retirement from the workforce, which require positive 
replacement. These may be retirements for old age or more temporary 
withdrawals from the labour force for reasons such as family formation, etc., 
(the latter may be partly offset by flows back in to the labour force);  
• losses due to mortality; 
• net occupational mobility, which, when outward, positively adds to 
replacement demand; if inward, it reduces such replacement demand; 
• net geographical mobility, which, when outward, adds to replacement 
demand. 
Total replacement demand is defined as the sum of these four elements. Some of 
these are net flows. In some instances, it may be appropriate to consider just 
gross outflows. The estimates here use net flows. 
When total replacement demand as defined here is added to expansion demand, 
an estimate of expected net requirements for each occupation is obtained. This 
measure provides an indication of the number of newly qualified entrants likely to 
be required in each occupational group over a period of time. 
The data used to estimate both the age structure of the workforce and the various 
flows are based upon very limited information, mostly taken from the LFS. The 
replacement demand estimates should, therefore, be regarded as indicative rather 
than precise. 
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4.6. More detailed occupational projections (SOC sub-major 
groups) 
Table 4.5 and Figure 4.8 present a more detailed analysis for the 25 sub-major 
occupation groups (the 2-digit level of SOC2010).  
Managers, directors & senior officials: The corporate managers category has been a 
significant source of employment growth for many years. Despite attempts to tighten up 
the definition of managers with the introduction of the new SOC2010 system for 
classifying jobs this remains the case in the revised historical data. This pattern of growth 
is also expected to continue over the coming decade. The other category within this 
group is other managers & proprietors. This includes the owners and managers of many 
small businesses, especially in the service sector. This category has also experienced 
steady growth in the past decade. This is expected to continue over the coming decade, 
partly linked to the rebalancing of the economy towards the private sector. The growth is 
moderated by the restructuring of the distribution and retailing sector, including the shift 
towards the use of the internet, which is causing the closure of many small businesses as 
well as some larger retailers.82 
Professional occupations: All the sub-major groups included in this major group 
experienced employment growth between 2007 and 2017. This is projected to continue. 
The highest rate of growth for 2017-2027 is projected for Health professionals as the 
 
81 Wilson, R. A., M. May-Gillings, S. Patel and H Bui, (2019). Working Futures 2017-2027: Technical report 
on sources and methods. Department for Education. 
82 For a review of the impact of the internet in retail businesses see the report from the Centre for Retail 
Research, see http://www.retailresearch.org/retail2018.php 
Box 4.1 (continued): Replacements demands: definitions and methods 
Data on net migration by occupation are not readily available, so this is set equal 
to zero by assumption in all the tables. Net occupational mobility measures based 
on turnover of those who change occupations within a 12-month period are 
available from the LFS. These exclude those who remain in the same occupation. 
They also exclude those who may change jobs more than once in a 12-month 
period. They are therefore a lower bound estimate of total turnover. However, it 
has proved impossible to develop a consistent set of such estimates for all the 
detailed specific sectors and geographical areas in the Working Futures database 
using data from the LFS. This is due to the latter’s limited sample size. The 
estimates shown here and in the more detailed tables are therefore based just on 
estimated losses from retirements and mortality. 
The methods for preparing estimates of replacement demands are described in 
more detail in the separate Technical Report (Wilson et al. 201981). 
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health sector begins to recover from slowdown caused by austerity constraints. Science, 
research, engineering and technology professionals and Business, media and public 
service professionals are also expected to see significant growth. All these professional 
groups are projected to increase their share of overall employment.  
Associate professional & technical occupations: Substantial employment growth has 
been experienced for a number of these sub-major groups. Employment has grown most 
rapidly over the previous decade for associate professionals engaged in the culture, 
media and sports occupations and for health and social care associate professionals. 
The latter was affected by cuts in public spending, but this is not expected to slow down 
the longer-term trend. This group is projected to experience one of the most rapid rates 
of increase of all sub-major groups between 2017 and 2027. Business and public service 
associate professionals are also projected to see substantial growth in job numbers. 
Within this broad occupational category, growth was slowest over the past decade for 
science, engineering & technology associate professionals and was actually negative for 
protective service occupations, which saw a net decline over the decade as a whole. 
These patterns are projected to continue over the decade from 2017-2027. 
Administrative & secretarial occupations: The latest data suggests a continuation of 
the decline in employment for this group as a whole as ICT displaces many such jobs, 
especially amongst the secretarial and related occupations. Such job losses are 
projected to continue over the coming decade, if anything being even more concentrated 
on the latter group (which includes secretaries, typists and word processing operators, 
who are especially vulnerable to being displaced by advances in computer technology).  
Skilled trades occupations: The recession has accelerated the already significant loss 
of jobs in many skilled trades occupations. Job losses in manufacturing and, post 2008 in 
construction, have impacted negatively on skilled metal & electrical trades, textile, 
printing & other skilled trades and construction & building trades. Construction trades are 
not expected to recover over the coming decade due to the relatively poor prospects for 
the construction sector. There is a small increase expected for skilled agriculture and 
related trades, but this is not sufficient to prevent a significant overall decline for skilled 
trades as a whole. For textiles, printing and other skilled trades declining employment 
levels are expected to continue but at a slower pace. Indeed the results of the projections 
at the more detailed 4-digit level suggest that there are some occupations within this 
group (such as chefs) that have brighter employment prospects.  
Caring, leisure & other service occupations: Recent employment growth in these 
categories is expected to continue over the coming decade. Caring personal service 
occupations were one of the most rapidly growing occupational sub-major groups 
between 2007 and 2017. They are the fastest growing group of all over the projection 
period in terms of rate of growth over the period 2017-2027. Only customer service 
occupations outside the managerial, professional, and associate professional 
occupations are expected to see such growth over the coming decade. In absolute terms, 
the Caring personal service occupational group remain the most significant areas of job 
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growth, with an increase of almost half a million jobs projected. A key driver here is the 
rising demand for services from an ageing population. The majority of these jobs are 
expected to be taken by women. In contrast, the number of jobs in leisure, travel and 
related personal service occupations is expected to fall slightly. 
Sales & customer service occupations: This group is dominated numerically by 
occupations such as sales assistants and check-out operators in retail outlets who fall 
into the Sales Occupations sub-major group. Females account for the greater part of 
employment in this occupational sub group, with many working part-time. This category 
has seen job losses in recent years as the retail and distribution sector restructures itself. 
Increasing concentration of businesses, competition from the Internet and technological 
developments, such as automated checkouts, are expected to reduce the need for more 
traditional sales occupations mean that this pattern is expected to continue. In contrast, 
the demand for customer service (more specialist sales and customer care) occupations 
represent a much smaller but rapidly growing category, which is expected to continue to 
increase in importance over the coming decade. These jobs are probably less vulnerable 
to the effects of technological change. 
Process, plant & machine operatives: This group includes a variety of occupations, 
some operating fixed plant in factories (part of the manufacturing sector) while others 
drive mobile plant as well as passenger and goods vehicles (mostly in the distribution 
and transport sectors). Employment declined quite rapidly for the former category 
(process, plant & machine operators) over the last decade, linked to the loss of jobs in 
manufacturing. However, there were modest job gains for the transport & mobile machine 
drivers category. Over the coming decade, further substantial job losses are expected 
amongst process, plant & machine operators, whilst there is expected to be a very 
modest increase in the numbers of jobs for the transport & mobile machine drivers 
category. 
Elementary occupations: The final occupational group contains elementary occupations 
that are not classifiable elsewhere. These are jobs that require little or no prior training. 
Employment levels across this group of occupations have been in long-term trend decline 
for many years, but there are some offsetting trends. The service sector, in particular, 
has generated a number of extra jobs in this area. The growth of employment in call 
centres, and fast food outlets, etc, has helped to offset the long-term trend decline in 
employment for elementary occupations in other areas (although some of these jobs may 
fall within the more skilled customer service occupations category). Overall, small 
increases in job numbers are expected, but especially in the service category (SOC 9.2).  
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Table 4.5: Expansion and Replacement demand by occupation, 2017-2027 
Levels (000s, unless specified) 2017 2027 Net change 
Replacement 
demand level 
Total 
requirement  
Replacement 
demand rate (%) 
 11 Corporate managers and directors 2,526 2,875 349 955 1,303 3.3% 
 12 Other managers and proprietors 1,040 1,130 90 426 516 3.5% 
 21 Science, research, engineering and technology professionals 1,754 1,914 159 463 623 2.4% 
 22 Health professionals 1,543 1,773 230 606 836 3.4% 
 23 Teaching and educational professionals 1,721 1,933 212 632 845 3.2% 
 24 Business, media and public service professionals 1,856 2,075 219 660 879 3.1% 
 31 Science, engineering and technology associate professionals 671 680 9 186 195 2.5% 
 32 Health and social care associate professionals 530 613 83 222 305 3.6% 
 33 Protective service occupations 386 375 -11 88 77 2.1% 
 34 Culture, media and sports occupations 840 892 52 279 331 2.9% 
 35 Business and public service associate professionals 2,457 2,749 292 825 1,117 2.9% 
 41 Administrative occupations 2,932 2,688 -244 960 717 2.9% 
 42 Secretarial and related occupations 749 389 -360 192 -168 2.3% 
 51 Skilled agricultural and related trades 355 360 5 130 135 3.2% 
 52 Skilled metal, electrical and electronic trades 1,228 1,044 -184 290 106 2.1% 
 53 Skilled construction and building trades 1,069 1,064 -5 308 303 2.6% 
 54 Textiles, printing and other skilled trades 781 658 -123 202 79 2.3% 
 61 Caring personal service occupations 2,578 3,057 478 1,075 1,553 3.5% 
 62 Leisure, travel and related personal service occupations 767 754 -12 261 248 3.0% 
 71 Sales occupations 2,232 2,078 -154 673 519 2.7% 
 72 Customer service occupations 697 799 102 234 336 2.9% 
 81 Process, plant and machine operatives 910 709 -201 207 5 2.1% 
 82 Transport and mobile machine drivers and operatives 1,270 1,265 -4 451 446 3.1% 
 91 Elementary trades and related occupations 555 531 -24 147 123 2.4% 
 92 Elementary administration and service occupations 3,401 3,416 15 1,110 1,125 2.9% 
All occupations 34,848 35,821 973 11,581 12,554 2.9% 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. Notes: Numbers may not sum due to rounding.  
Occupational and Geographical mobility are assumed to be zero in these estimates. (IER report tables and charts.xlsm) 
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Figure 4.8: Net Requirements by SOC2000 Sub-major Group, 2017-2027  
 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. IER report tables and charts.xlsm  
Notes: Figures for total requirements exclude replacement demands arising from occupational mobility 
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4.7. Components of occupational change 
 
The occupational projections and observed historical change can be analysed using shift-
share techniques. This provides a description of how the changes can be broken down 
into three main components: a scale effect, an industrial mix effect and an occupational 
effect, (see Box 4.2 for details). The effects rarely all point in the same direction. The 
scale effect is uniformly positive over both the historical period 2007-2017 and for the 
 
83 The shift share results are sensitive to the level of aggregation at which the analysis is conducted so the 
results here are disaggregated into the more detailed 22 industries, in contrast to the 6 broad sectors used 
elsewhere in the report. 
Box 4.2: Shift-share analysis of occupational change83 
The scale effect measures the impact of the overall expansion (or decline) of 
employment levels in the economy, assuming this applies strictly proportionally to all 
industries, and occupations. 
The industrial mix effect measures the impact of the changing patterns of final 
demands on the industrial structure of employment, whilst holding constant the 
occupational composition within the industries. It is measured as the difference 
between the growth or decline in employment in the sector concerned and the scale 
effect. 
The occupational effect measures the impact of organisational and technological 
changes on the occupational structure of employment within the industries. This is 
computed as the difference between the total change and the sum of the scale and 
industry effects. 
The shift-share analysis is carried out at a detailed industry level, for the 25 SOC sub-
major occupational groups, for males and females separately. The industry and 
occupational effects, by definition sum to zero when added up across all occupations. 
The results depend upon the level of aggregation of both industry and occupation 
categories used. In Tables 4.6 and 4.7, the results of the shift-share analysis for the 
historical period 2007-2017 and for the projection period 2017-2027 are based on the 
2-digit level of SOC and the 22 industry categories. These tables show the projected 
net employment changes across each of the 25 sub-major occupations in terms of 
both absolute levels and percentages. These net changes are decomposed into the 
three component effects. 
Note that in the accompanying Working Futures workbooks the shift-share analysis 
and results will vary depending on the level of sectoral aggregation used in each 
workbook. 
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projected period 2017-2027. The scale effect reflects the overall employment increases 
projected across all categories. Over the decade 2007-2017, employment rose to 2008 
before falling back and then recovering. The scale effect measures the overall change 
over the whole period. The other two effects both exhibit differing signs across the 
various occupational groups, in each case summing across all occupations to zero.  
The dominant explanation of change for most occupations for the period 2007-2017 was 
attributable to occupational effects, the impact of changing industrial employment 
structure is significant but is general modest in comparison (see Table 4.6). The scale 
effect over the decade 2007-2017 as a whole was very important, despite the impact of 
the recession following 2008. All else being equal, the scale effect resulted in an increase 
of just under 10% in each occupational employment level over that decade.  
In many occupations, the occupational effect was of a much greater significance, 
resulting in both large positive and negative changes. For many white-collar, (non-
manual) occupations, it was a positive influence, although notably not for administrative, 
clerical, and secretarial occupations. For the latter the continuing impact of information 
and communications technology (ICT) has led to significant job losses as previously 
labour intensive but repetitive work in this area has increasingly been automated. 
Negative occupational effects were also observed for many blue-collar, (manual) workers 
as ICT and other technological developments have resulted in machines taking over 
much work previously done by craftsmen and machine operatives. 
Over the period 2007-2017 the industry mix effect was important for a small number of 
occupations. Some of these are where these effects are negative (for those occupations 
linked to the fortunes of declining sectors such as manufacturing). In other cases, they 
are positive, linked most closely to growing parts of the service sector, most notably 
health and social care.  
For the forecast period 2017-2027 the scale and occupational effects are again dominant 
(see Table 4.7). The scale effect results in an increase of just under 3% in employment 
levels for each occupation over the 2017-2027 period (all else being equal). Although 
there are not quite such extreme values as in 2007-2017, the overall changes in 
magnitude for the occupational effect in the projection period are generally much more 
significant than the industrial effects. 
In absolute terms, the industry mix effects are insignificant except in a small number of 
occupations, such as plant and machine operatives (where it is negative) and caring 
personal service occupations (where it is positive). The former is linked to the decline in 
manufacturing employment. The latter is rooted in the growth of employment 
opportunities in some parts of the service sector for jobs involving care for the elderly.  
The occupational effect is strongly positive for most professional and associate 
professional groups and especially in the case of the caring personal service 
occupations. In the period 2007-2017 there was a strong industry effect for this last 
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occupational group as the scale of social care activities grew. In the forecast, this 
continues to reinforce the occupational effect.  
Occupational effects impose a strong negative impact for some other occupations, 
including administrative occupations, secretarial & related occupations, skilled metal & 
electrical trades, textile, printing and other skilled trades, and process, sales occupations 
and process, plant & machine operatives. In all of these sub-major groups, significant 
changes in organisation and technology within the employing industries are expected to 
have a marked negative impact on employment levels. 
The nature of the industry effects are generally consistent with the results for the 
previous decade. However, they are generally much less significant than observed in 
previous decades, when the decline of employment in the primary and manufacturing 
industries and the shift to services was much more pronounced.  
The key drivers of occupational employment change over the decade 2017-2027 are 
therefore expected to be more closely related to changing ways of working within 
industries and the way in which technological change, especially IT, impacts on the need 
for different skills. This is in contrast to earlier decades, when it has been the changing 
sectoral structure of employment that was the prime driver. 
For the moment, more skilled non-manual occupations are less vulnerable to the effects 
of automation, but with the increasing sophistication of the development of expert 
systems, even these types of jobs seem likely to become increasingly vulnerable to 
automation beyond 2027 (Nedelkoska and Quintini, 201884). 
 
 
. 
 
84 Nedelkoska, L. and Quintini, G. (2018). "Automation, skills use and training", OECD Social, Employment 
and Migration Working Papers, No. 202, OECD Publishing: Paris. Available from: 
https://doi.org/10.1787/2e2f4eea-en.  
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Figure 4.9: Detailed changes by occupation (000s), 2007-2017, 2017-2027 
 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. IER report tables and charts.xlsm 
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Table 4.6: Total occupational employment, UK: All industry sectors, 2007-2017 
       Components of change 
  
Base year  
2007 
Target year  
2017 
Change  
2007-2017 
Scale effect 
Occupation 
effect 
Industry mix 
effect 
SOC2010 Sub-Major Groups 000s 
% 
share 
000s 
% 
share 
000s %    000s %    000s %    000s %    
 11 Corporate managers and directors 1,960 6.2 2,526 7.2 566 28.9 189 9.6 416 21.2 -38 -2.0 
 12 Other managers and proprietors 816 2.6 1,040 3.0 225 27.5 78 9.6 129 15.9 17 2.1 
 21 Science, research, engineering 
and technology professionals 1,309 4.1 1,754 5.0 445 34.0 126 9.6 294 22.5 25 1.9 
 22 Health professionals 1,234 3.9 1,543 4.4 309 25.1 119 9.6 106 8.6 85 6.9 
 23 Teaching and educational 
professionals 1,419 4.5 1,721 4.9 302 21.3 136 9.6 137 9.6 29 2.0 
 24 Business, media and public 
service professionals 1,464 4.6 1,856 5.3 391 26.7 141 9.6 172 11.8 78 5.4 
 31 Science, engineering and 
technology associate professionals 610 1.9 671 1.9 62 10.1 59 9.6 4 0.7 -1 -0.2 
 32 Health and social care associate 
professionals 418 1.3 530 1.5 112 26.7 40 9.6 42 10.1 29 7.0 
 33 Protective service occupations 400 1.3 386 1.1 -14 -3.5 39 9.6 4 1.0 -57 -14.2 
 34 Culture, media and sports 
occupations 705 2.2 840 2.4 134 19.1 68 9.6 51 7.2 16 2.2 
 35 Business and public service 
associate professionals 2,059 6.5 2,457 7.1 399 19.4 198 9.6 215 10.4 -14 -0.7 
 41 Administrative occupations 3,030 9.5 2,932 8.4 -98 -3.2 291 9.6 -328 -10.8 -62 -2.0 
 42 Secretarial and related 
occupations 993 3.1 749 2.1 -244 
-
24.6 96 9.6 -394 -39.7 54 5.5 
 51 Skilled agricultural and related 
trades 327 1.0 355 1.0 28 8.7 31 9.6 -14 -4.3 11 3.4 
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Table 4.6 (continued): Total occupational employment, UK: All industry sectors, 2007-2017  
       Components of change 
  
Base year  
2007 
Target year  
2017 
Change  
2007-2017 
Scale effect 
Occupation 
effect 
Industry mix 
effect 
SOC2010 Sub-Major Groups 000s 
% 
share 
000s 
% 
share 
000s %    000s %    000s %    000s %    
 52 Skilled metal, electrical and 
electronic trades 1,279 4.0 1,228 3.5 -51 -4.0 123 9.6 -91 -7.1 -83 -6.5 
 53 Skilled construction and building 
trades 1,134 3.6 1,069 3.1 -65 -5.7 109 9.6 -79 -6.9 -95 -8.4 
 54 Textiles, printing and other skilled 
trades 844 2.7 781 2.2 -63 -7.5 81 9.6 -133 -15.8 -11 -1.3 
 61 Caring personal service 
occupations 1,960 6.2 2,578 7.4 618 31.5 189 9.6 284 14.5 145 7.4 
 62 Leisure, travel and related 
personal service occupations 685 2.2 767 2.2 81 11.9 66 9.6 20 2.9 -5 -0.7 
 71 Sales occupations 2,267 7.1 2,232 6.4 -34 -1.5 218 9.6 -99 -4.4 -154 -6.8 
 72 Customer service occupations 526 1.7 697 2.0 171 32.6 51 9.6 134 25.6 -14 -2.6 
 81 Process, plant and machine 
operatives 1,063 3.3 910 2.6 -153 
-
14.4 102 9.6 -147 -13.8 -108 -10.1 
 82 Transport and mobile machine 
drivers and operatives 1,251 3.9 1,270 3.6 18 1.5 120 9.6 -119 -9.5 17 1.4 
 91 Elementary trades and related 
occupations 553 1.7 555 1.6 2 0.4 53 9.6 -35 -6.3 -16 -2.9 
 92 Elementary administration and 
service occupations 3,484 11.0 3,401 9.8 -83 -2.4 335 9.6 -570 -16.4 152 4.4 
All occupations 31,790 100.0 34,848 100.0 3,058 9.6             
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. IER report tables and charts.xlsm 
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Table 4.7: Total occupational employment, UK: All industry sectors, 2017-2027 
         Components of change 
  
Base year 
2017 
Target year  
2027 
Change  
2017-2027 
Scale 
effect 
Occupation 
effect 
Industry mix 
effect 
SOC2010 Sub-Major Groups 000s 
% 
share 
000s 
% 
share 
000s %    000s %    000s %    000s %    
 11 Corporate managers and directors 2,526 7.2 2,875 8.0 349 13.8 71 2.8 295 11.7 -17 -0.7 
 12 Other managers and proprietors 1,040 3.0 1,130 3.2 90 8.6 29 2.8 54 5.2 7 0.6 
 21 Science, research, engineering 
and technology professionals 1,754 5.0 1,914 5.3 159 9.1 49 2.8 104 5.9 7 0.4 
 22 Health professionals 1,543 4.4 1,773 5.0 230 14.9 43 2.8 112 7.3 75 4.9 
 23 Teaching and educational 
professionals 1,721 4.9 1,933 5.4 212 12.3 48 2.8 194 11.3 -30 -1.7 
 24 Business, media and public 
service professionals 1,856 5.3 2,075 5.8 219 11.8 52 2.8 139 7.5 29 1.5 
 31 Science, engineering and 
technology associate professionals 671 1.9 680 1.9 9 1.3 19 2.8 -6 -0.9 -4 -0.6 
 32 Health and social care associate 
professionals 530 1.5 613 1.7 83 15.6 15 2.8 42 8.0 26 4.8 
 33 Protective service occupations 386 1.1 375 1.0 -11 -2.8 11 2.8 -16 -4.1 -6 -1.6 
 34 Culture, media and sports 
occupations 840 2.4 892 2.5 52 6.2 23 2.8 6 0.7 23 2.7 
 35 Business and public service 
associate professionals 2,457 7.1 2,749 7.7 292 11.9 69 2.8 234 9.5 -11 -0.5 
 41 Administrative occupations 2,932 8.4 2,688 7.5 -244 -8.3 82 2.8 -317 -10.8 -9 -0.3 
 42 Secretarial and related 
occupations 749 2.1 389 1.1 -360 
-
48.1 21 2.8 -391 -52.2 10 1.3 
 51 Skilled agricultural and related 
trades 355 1.0 360 1.0 5 1.5 10 2.8 10 2.9 -15 -4.1 
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Table 4.7 (continued): Total occupational employment, UK: All industry sectors, 2017-2027 
         Components of change 
  
Base year 
2017 
Target year  
2027 
Change  
2017-2027 
Scale 
effect 
Occupation 
effect 
Industry mix 
effect 
SOC2010 Sub-Major Groups 000s 
% 
share 
000s 
% 
share 
000s %    000s %    000s %    000s %    
 52 Skilled metal, electrical and 
electronic trades 1,228 3.5 1,044 2.9 -184 
-
15.0 34 2.8 -169 -13.8 -49 -4.0 
 53 Skilled construction and building 
trades 1,069 3.1 1,064 3.0 -5 -0.5 30 2.8 -19 -1.8 -16 -1.5 
 54 Textiles, printing and other skilled 
trades 781 2.2 658 1.8 -123 
-
15.7 22 2.8 -132 -16.9 -12 -1.6 
 61 Caring personal service 
occupations 2,578 7.4 3,057 8.5 478 18.5 72 2.8 310 12.0 96 3.7 
 62 Leisure, travel and related 
personal service occupations 767 2.2 754 2.1 -12 -1.6 21 2.8 -41 -5.4 7 1.0 
 71 Sales occupations 2,232 6.4 2,078 5.8 -154 -6.9 62 2.8 -214 -9.6 -3 -0.1 
 72 Customer service occupations 697 2.0 799 2.2 102 14.6 19 2.8 81 11.7 1 0.1 
 81 Process, plant and machine 
operatives 910 2.6 709 2.0 -201 
-
22.1 25 2.8 -165 -18.2 -62 -6.8 
 82 Transport and mobile machine 
drivers and operatives 1,270 3.6 1,265 3.5 -4 -0.3 35 2.8 14 1.1 -54 -4.2 
 91 Elementary trades and related 
occupations 555 1.6 531 1.5 -24 -4.4 15 2.8 -20 -3.7 -19 -3.5 
 92 Elementary administration and 
service occupations 3,401 9.8 3,416 9.5 15 0.4 95 2.8 -106 -3.1 26 0.8 
All occupations 34,848 100.0 35,821 100.0 973 2.8             
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND - revision 13405. IER report tables and charts.xlsm 
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4.8. Detailed occupational changes within industries  
Occupational employment structure varies considerably across industries, as does how it 
is expected to change over time. Figure 4.10 presents an overview of both history 
(employment levels in 2017) and projections (expected changes 2017 to 2027), focusing 
on the 22 Working Futures industries and 25 2-digit SOC2010 sub-major groups (see 
previous figure for key to occupational categories).  
Those industries and occupations expected to grow or decline most rapidly are 
highlighted by shading of the row and column headers. The shading in row and column 
headers indicates sectors in which employment is projected to grow or decline by 10% or 
more between 2017 and 2027. In this set of projections, no industries are projected to 
grow by 10% or more.  Just two, Mining and quarrying and the Rest of manufacturing, 
are projected to see declines of 10% or more.  
The first of these industries does not employ large numbers of people. This is indicated 
by the lack of shading of any of the cells in that row. Within the body of the figure, cells 
that include 100,000 or more people employed are lightly shaded. These will be areas 
where there are significant replacement demands.  
In contrast, the Rest of manufacturing sector does still employ significant numbers.  
These are concentrated in particular occupations such as corporate managers, 
professional occupations, associate professional, admin and clerical skilled trades and 
operatives    
Similarly, the following occupational categories are projected to grow rapidly, by 10 % or 
more over the decade: 
• 11 Corporate managers and directors; 
• 22 Health professionals; 
• 23 Teaching and educational professionals; 
• 24 Business, media and public service professionals; 
• 32 Health and social care associate professionals; 
• 35 Business and public service associate professionals; 
• 61 Caring personal service occupations; and  
• 72 Customer service occupations. 
Those occupations that are expected to decline by 10 % or more are also indicated by 
patterned shading of column headers. These comprise the following: 
• 42 Secretarial and related occupations; 
• 52 Skilled metal, electrical and electronic trades; 
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• 54 Textiles, printing and other skilled trades; and 
• 81 Process, plant and machine operatives. 
The cells with the most rapid changes (+ or – 20% or more), are indicated by a + or – 
symbol. Where such symbols occur in a shaded cell, the changes are most significant in 
terms of numbers involved. 
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Figure 4.10: Occupational change across the 22 Industries, 2017-2027 
 
Source: IER estimates, MDM C182IND – revision 13405. Heatmap.xlsx 
   SOC 2010 Sub-Major Groups
11 12 21 22 23 24 31 32 33 34 35 41 42 51 52 53 54 61 62 71 72 81 82 91 92
Agriculture + + + + + - - - +
Mining and quarrying - - - - - - -
Food drink and tobacco + - - -
Engineering + - -
Rest of manufacturing + - - - -
Electricity and gas - -
Water and sewerage + + + + - + +
Construction + + + + - +
Wholesale and retail trade + + + - +
Transport and storage + + + - + - +
Accommodation and food + + + - + + -
Media - - + -
Information technology + + + - + + + +
Finance and insurance - -
Real estate + - + +
Professional services + + - +
Support services + + - + -
Public admin. and defence + - + - + -
Education - - - - - - -
Health and social work + - + - -
Arts and entertainment + + + + + + + - + +
Other services + + + - + -
level of employment in 2017 and/or 2027 is 100,000 or greater.
+ growth in employment between 2017 and 2027 is forecast to be 20% or greater.
- growth in employment between 2017 and 2027 is forecast to be -20% or less.
growth in employment in the sector or the occupation between 2017 and 2027 is forecast to be 10% or greater.
growth in employment in the sector or the occupation between 2017 and 2027 is forecast to be -10% or less.
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5. Implications for qualifications 
5.1. Introduction and general approach 
Formal qualifications held by individuals provide an alternative measure of skill to their 
occupation. Qualifications are awarded to accredit learning and skills acquired during 
education and training. In some respects, qualifications are better at measuring the 
supply of skills (numbers of people holding certain credentials) than the demand for skills. 
It is not so easy to measure the demand for qualifications by employers, as there is 
typically a broad range of qualifications held by the workforce in any particular job. 
Better-qualified people (level 4 and above) have a higher probability of obtaining and 
retaining a job than someone less well qualified. They are also more likely to be active in 
the labour market than less-qualified people, except when they are young and still 
acquiring qualifications. 
Demand is proxied in the present results by those in employment, although it is 
recognised that observed employment levels are the consequence of both demand and 
supply influences. The strong trends towards many more people being better qualified in 
recent years has seen the shares of those in employment holding higher level 
qualifications rise steadily while the share of those with no or few formal qualifications 
has fallen sharply. 
Key messages 
The holding of formal qualifications is a key way in which skills are defined and 
measured in Working Futures. 
Skill supply, as measured by the number of people categorised by the highest formal 
qualification they hold, is rising rapidly as more young people in particular stay in 
education longer and acquire more higher level qualifications.  
The proportion of the labour force who are unqualified is expected to represent only a 
small minority by 2027. 
The demand for skills, as measured by the numbers employed in higher level 
occupations, and the numbers employed holding higher level qualifications, is also 
projected to rise.  
The average level of qualifications held is rising in all occupations. 
How much this is due to increases in demand as opposed to the supply side changes 
remains a point of contention, but there is some evidence of rising demand as well as 
supply. 
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Qualifications are defined here with reference to the Regulated Qualifications Framework 
(RQF). This framework defines formal qualifications by their level (i.e. level of difficulty) 
and size (how much time the average learner would take to complete the qualification). 
Level is the main dimension of interest in the present context. Figure 5.1 sets out the 
broad features. The framework has 8 main levels plus no formal qualifications. Further 
details are given in Bosworth (2015a, b and c111), as well as Bosworth and Leach 
(2015112). 
In this section, a distinction is made between employed residents, technically referred to 
as “heads”, and employment in the workplace “jobs”. The prime focus is on numbers 
employed and the highest qualification held. A variety of different definitions of 
employment and related indicators are used in Working Futures (see section 2.6.2, Box 
2.4). The starting point for the analysis of the supply of and demand for qualifications is 
the total number of people aged 16+ in possession of different qualifications (residence 
basis, heads). Not everyone is economically active, and of those that are economically 
active some are unemployed. Subtracting the latter from the total number economically 
active gives a measure of the number of employed residents (heads). A further 
complication is that some people have more than one job. Moreover, they may be 
employed in a workplace in a geographical area different from where they are resident. 
The latter is recognised in the use of an alternative measure of employment - workplace 
jobs - which is the main indicator used in Sections 2-4. 
  
 
111 Bosworth, D. (2015a). UK Qualifications Projections – Time Series Model: Technical Report, 2013. 
Report for UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Institute for Employment 
Research, University of Warwick: Coventry. 
Bosworth, D. (2015b). National Qualifications Projections – Apportionment Model: Technical Report. Report 
for UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Institute for Employment Research, 
University of Warwick: Coventry. 
Bosworth, D., (2015c) Regional Qualifications Projections – Apportionment Model: Technical Report, 
Report for UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Institute for Employment 
Research, University of Warwick: Coventry. 
112 Bosworth, D., and Leach, A. (2015). UK Skill Levels and International Competitiveness. Report for UK 
Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Warwick Institute for Employment Research, 
University of Warwick: Coventry. 
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Figure 5.1: Levels within Regulated Qualifications Framework (RQF) 
Level RQF Qualifications 
examples 
NQF Qualifications examples Framework for HE 
examples 
Entry • Entry level VQs: 
• Entry level awards, 
certificates and diplomas 
• Foundation Learning Tier 
pathways 
• Functional Skills at Entry 
level 
• Entry level certificates 
• Skills for Life at Entry level 
 
1 • Level 1 VQs: 
• BTEC awards, certificates 
and diplomas at level 1 
• Functional Skills level 1 
• OCR Nationals 
• Foundation Learning Tier 
pathways 
• GCSEs graded D-G 
• NVQs at level 1 
• Key Skills level 1 
• Skills for Life 
• Foundation Diploma 
 
2 • Level 2 VQs: 
• BTEC awards, certificates 
and diplomas at level 2 
• Functional Skills level 2 
• GCSEs graded A*-C 
• NVQs at level 2 
• Level 2 VQs 
• Key Skills level 2 
• Skills for Life 
• Higher Diploma 
 
3 • Level 3 VQs: 
• BTEC awards, certificates 
and diplomas at level 3 
• BTEC Nationals 
• OCR Nationals 
• AS/A levels 
• Advanced Extension Awards 
• International Baccalaureate 
• Key Skills level 3 
• NVQs at level 3 
• Cambridge International Awards 
• Advanced and Progression 
Diploma 
 
4 • Level 4 VQs: 
• BTEC Professional 
Diplomas, Certificates and 
Awards 
• NVQs at level 4 
• Key Skills level 4 
• Certificates of higher education 
• Certificates of 
higher education 
5 • Original NQF Level 4*  
• Level 5 VQs:  
• HNCs and HNDs 
• BTEC Professional 
Diplomas, Certificates and 
Awards 
• Higher national diplomas 
• Other higher diplomas 
• NVQs at level 4 
• Diplomas of 
higher education 
and further 
education, 
foundation 
degrees and 
higher national 
diplomas 
6 • Level 6 VQs: 
• BTEC Advanced 
Professional Diplomas, 
Certificates and Awards 
• National Diploma in Professional 
Production Skills 
• NVQs at level 4* 
• Bachelor 
degrees, 
graduate 
certificates and 
diplomas 
7 • Original NQF Level 5* 
• Level 7 VQs: 
• Advanced professional 
awards, certificates and 
diplomas 
• Postgraduate certificates and 
diplomas 
• BTEC advanced professional 
awards, certificates and diplomas 
• Fellowships and fellowship 
diplomas 
• Diploma in Translation 
• NVQs at level 5* 
• Masters degrees, 
postgraduate 
certificates and 
diplomas 
8 • Level 8 VQs: 
• Award, certificate and 
diploma in strategic 
direction 
• NVQs at level 5 • Doctorates 
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For each gender/RQF category, there are two accounting identities linking the following 
indicators: 
• Total number economically active = Employment (residence/heads) plus (ILO) 
unemployment  
• Economic activity rate = Total number economically active / Total number in the 
population 
The database used for the supply model (LFS/GAD) focuses on resident employment 
(heads). The main Working Futures database (ABI/BRES /ONS) focuses on workplace 
employment (jobs).  
5.1.1. Modelling the demand for and supply of qualifications 
A UK level model developed and refined by Bosworth (2015a113), a Four Nations level 
model (Bosworth 2015b114) and a Regional level model for England (Bosworth, 
2015c115), which are used to produce projections of the total number of people qualified 
at broad RQF level, as well as the numbers of those economically active. A further 
Activity Rate model has been added during the present round of work to link the activity 
rates more closely between the regional, four nations and the UK, as well as with the CE 
more aggregate measures of the active population. 
This deals with the supply side. By making assumptions about unemployment patterns by 
qualification, this is then translated into implications for employment. These results have 
been extended to cover the individual countries and English regions within the UK using 
a spatial qualification model.116 
The supply side results are compared with a demand side by analysing trends in 
employment patterns within occupations. Detailed patterns by occupation, cross 
classified by sector and region are considered. The projections are based on 
 
113 Bosworth, D. (2015a). UK Qualifications Projections – Time Series Model: Technical Report, 2013. 
Report for UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Institute for Employment 
Research, University of Warwick: Coventry. 
114 Bosworth, D. (2015b). National Qualifications Projections – Apportionment Model: Technical Report. 
Report for UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Institute for Employment 
Research, University of Warwick: Coventry. 
115 Bosworth, D., (2015c) Regional Qualifications Projections – Apportionment Model: Technical Report, 
Report for UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Institute for Employment 
Research, University of Warwick: Coventry. 
116 The general approach adopted in analysing and modelling this aspect of the labour market is eclectic, 
involving a range of different data sets and models. Together the various inter-related models and modules 
cover various aspects of the supply of and demand for formal qualifications, at national and more detailed 
spatial levels. It builds upon earlier work, including the time series models developed over a number of 
years, leading to Bosworth (2015a, b and c).  Adding in a qualifications dimension to the analysis of 
employment trends raises a number of technical and conceptual issues (which are discussed in more detail 
in separate technical reports (e.g: Bosworth and Wilson, 2011). These problems are addressed in a variety 
of ways, depending upon the availability of data and the prime objectives of each particular element. 
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extrapolating patterns of qualification intensities by occupation for those employed within 
these various categories.  
The occupational employment structure of each industry, and how this is changing over 
time, is one of the key drivers for the numbers of formally qualified people employed. The 
key source of information on qualification patterns is the LFS, although various other data 
are also exploited. The LFS, while large, does not provide a sufficiently large sample to 
enable the full Working Futures database to be expanded to cover the qualification 
dimension using the original data. A full database has been created by assuming 
common patterns apply at more detailed levels and using RAS techniques to fill the 
gaps.117 
These more detailed results are then constrained to provide a picture consistent with the 
overall supply results from the national model.118 The estimates of employment by RQF 
level are constrained using RAS119 iterative methods to:  
• reconcile the aggregate sum of qualification requirements by qualification level 
with the numbers available as indicated by the national model and related analysis 
of economic activity rates; and  
Section 5.2 presents a brief overview of key historical and projected trends in the supply 
of people by highest qualification held. Section 5.3 presents the corresponding picture for 
the demand side (as measured by employment); Section 5.4 makes a comparison 
between the two; Section 5.5 concludes. 
 
117 RAS is an iterative technique used to fill gaps in a two dimensional data array given row and column 
totals. It is extended here to cover multidimensional arrays. 
118 When adding qualifications to all the other dimensions in the Working Futures database (gender, 
employment status, sector, occupation spatial area), it is impossible to ensure complete consistency across 
all dimensions. The data available from the LFS, which form the basis for most of the qualification 
estimates, are inadequate to fully populate such a database. In many cases no data are available. In even 
more cases the data that are available are based on insufficiently large sample numbers to produce robust 
estimates. The results presented here present, as far as is possible, a consistent picture across all the 
main dimensions. They should be regarded as indicative. 
119 RAS is an iterative procedure which is used to generate a data array constrained to match certain row 
and column targets. 
120 See Wilson et al. (2015); for further details also see Bosworth and Wilson (2011). 
• reconcile the separate industry or regional totals with the UK totals. 
This provides consistency across the full set of Working Futures projections. The results 
from the spatial analysis are used to produce the initial estimates of qualification shares 
at individual country and English regional level. These are then constrained to match the 
overall UK totals using a RAS process. These values are then used as control totals to 
constrain a detailed analysis of changing qualification patterns within occupations. The 
same qualification patterns for resident (heads) are assumed to apply to the workplace 
jobs employment estimates. More complete details of data sources and methods are 
given in the separate Technical Report.120  
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5.2. Supply trends 
The numbers of people obtaining formal qualifications, especially at the highest level, 
have risen steadily over the past half century. The share of people in the population of 
working age and the economically active labour force who possess formal qualifications 
has risen commensurately. The numbers and the shares of those with no or low 
qualifications have shrunk. Information from the LFS can be used to see how qualification 
profiles have been changing over time. Figure 5.2 shows estimates of the proportions of 
those in the economically active workforce holding different levels of qualification (by 
highest qualification held).  
Very similar trends can be observed for the total population (active and inactive), for 
those in employment (Figure 5.3), and for both males and females.  
There are of course significant differences in the levels and trends by age. In particular, 
younger people tend to be much more likely to possess or acquire qualifications than 
older people. However, the main focus here is on totals for both genders and across all 
ages. Both Table 5.2 and 5.3 present data on a residence/heads basis, and focus on 
results for the whole of the UK, for those aged 16+.121 
Figure 5.2: Changing patterns of qualification within the labour force (16+, % of total) 
 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates. 
data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “FiguresWF7” 
 
 
121 The LFS only collects information on qualifications for those in employment for those aged over 69 (and 
only then in recent years). Most of the analysis therefore focuses on this aged between 16 and 64.   
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Figure 5.3: Changing qualification pattern of employment (workplace / jobs, % of total) 
 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates. 
Note: The estimates shown are based on LFS shares applied to Working Futures data on employment 
levels (jobs)  
data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “FiguresWF7” 
 
Table 5.1 presents the estimated numbers in the total population aged 16+ holding 
different levels of formal qualifications, including projections based on the time series 
models described in Bosworth (2015a, b and c122). 
Table 5.2 presents corresponding information for the economically active labour force. 
The shares in each qualification category have been applied to the population or labour 
force numbers from the MDM estimates and projections as described in Section 2 to 
obtain a consistent picture of the supply of skills.  
Together with the numbers economically active, the population numbers represent a 
measure of supply by qualification level. Of course, in practice, they reflect both demand 
and supply influences. The key drivers of supply in recent years have been demographic 
change (the changing structure of the population by age and gender), combined with 
increases in educational participation (the latter encouraged by government policy to 
 
122 Bosworth, D. (2015a). UK Qualifications Projections – Time Series Model: Technical Report, 2013. 
Report for UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Institute for Employment 
Research, University of Warwick: Coventry. 
Bosworth, D. (2015b). National Qualifications Projections – Apportionment Model: Technical Report. Report 
for UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Institute for Employment Research, 
University of Warwick: Coventry. 
Bosworth, D., (2015c) Regional Qualifications Projections – Apportionment Model: Technical Report, 
Report for UK Commission for Employment and Skills: Wath on Dearne. Institute for Employment 
Research, University of Warwick: Coventry. 
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boost skill levels, including raising the minimum age that people are expected to remain 
in education and training).  
Table 5.1: Total numbers by qualification (total population 16+, 000s) 
Supply 2007 2017 2027 
RQF Level 
RQF 0 7,264 3,830 2,296 
RQF 1 8,439 7,212 4,370 
RQF2 10,148 10,652 10,291 
RQF3 9,123 10,427 10,729 
RQF4, 5 & 6 10,555 14,590 20,614 
RQF 7 & 8 4,113 6,823 8,333 
Total 46,642 53,535 56,632 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates. 
data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “New WF II style Summary tabsWF7” 
 
Table 5.2: Economically active population by qualification level (16+, 000s) 
Supply 2007 2017 2027 
RQF Level 
RQF 0 2,638 1,553 812 
RQF 1 5,387 4,317 2,937 
RQF2 6,666 6,536 5,673 
RQF3 6,076 6,674 6,138 
RQF4, 5 & 6 7,758 10,189 13,465 
RQF 7 & 8 2,337 4,130 5,631 
Total 30,862 33,400 34,656 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates. 
data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “New WF II style Summary tabsWF7 
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Table 5.3: Unemployed by qualification level (16+, 000s) 
Supply 2007 2017 2027 
RQF Level 
RQF 0 286 160 91 
RQF 1 403 455 243 
RQF2 396 524 476 
RQF3 266 383 364 
RQF4, 5 & 6 190 352 533 
RQF 7 & 8 51 65 180 
Total 1,593 1,939 1,887 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates. 
data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “New WF II style Summary tabsWF7” 
 
In the past decade, there have been very large increases in both numbers and shares of 
the population and the economically active labour force qualified at higher levels (RQF 
4+), and reductions in the numbers and shares qualified to RQF level 1 or below. Over 
the last decade the number and proportions qualified to RQF levels 2 and 3 have risen 
slightly. These patterns represent a continuation of previous longer-term trends. 
This has resulted in a large increase in the numbers emerging on to the labour market 
with formal qualifications at higher levels. The proportion of young people with formal 
qualifications is much higher than for older people.  
Some feared that the recession, as well as the increasing direct costs123 associated with 
participation in higher levels of education, would impact negatively on decisions of many 
young people to invest in higher and further education, (although others have argued that 
the poor state of the labour market would encourage young people to stay on in higher 
and further education).  
In order to draw out the implications for projected total employment, assumptions are 
made about the distribution of unemployment by level of qualification. All else equal, the 
better qualified tend to have lower unemployment rates but their shares of total 
unemployment have been rising as their share of the labour force increases. All groups 
saw unemployment rates rise as the recession struck but then fell as the labour market 
improved. The hierarchy of unemployment rates has been maintained and this is 
assumed to continue as shown in Tables 5.3 – 5.5 that illustrate the implications in terms 
of levels, rates and shares of total unemployment respectively. Unemployment rates 
 
123 It should be noted that different tuition fee systems for higher education apply across the UK nations. 
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remain persistently high for a core of people, unwilling or unable to acquire formal 
qualifications. 
Table 5.4: Unemployment rates by qualification level (%) 
Supply 2007 2017 2027 
RQF Level    
RQF 0 10.8 10.3 11.2 
RQF 1 7.5 8.1 8.3 
RQF2 5.9 6.5 8.4 
RQF3 4.4 4.9 5.9 
RQF4, 5 & 6 2.4 3.7 4.0 
RQF 7 & 8 2.2 2.6 3.2 
Total 5.2 5.2 5.4 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates. 
data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “New WF II style Summary tabsWF7” 
 
Table 5.5: Share of total unemployment by qualification level (16+, 000s) 
Supply 2007 2017 2027 
RQF Level    
RQF 0 18.0 8.2 4.8 
RQF 1 25.3 23.5 12.9 
RQF2 24.9 27.0 25.2 
RQF3 16.7 19.7 19.3 
RQF4, 5 & 6 11.9 18.2 28.2 
RQF 7 & 8 3.2 3.4 9.5 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates. 
data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “New WF II style Summary tabsWF7 
Table 5.6 presents estimates of employment (also on a residence/heads basis) implied 
by these unemployment assumptions for 2027. They show the implied pattern of supply 
“in employment”. This reflects the growing shares of better-qualified people compared 
with the less well qualified in total unemployment, but a continuing lower unemployment 
rate for the better qualified. 
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Finally, Table 5.7 translates this to a workplace/jobs basis. This is based on assuming 
that the patterns (shares of employment by RQF level) on the residence/heads basis can 
be applied to the workplace/jobs estimates that are used elsewhere in the report.124 
These estimates are then used to constrain all the other employment figures. In 
particular, the projections of changing qualification profiles within occupations, in 
aggregate, and separately by sector and by region, are all constrained to match these 
overall totals.  
Table 5.6: Employment by qualification level (residence / heads, 16+, 000s) 
Supply 2007 2017 2027 
RQF Level 
RQF 0 2,352 1,393 722 
RQF 1 4,983  3,967 2,694 
RQF2 6,270 6,109 5,196 
RQF3 5,810 6,344 5,774 
RQF4, 5 & 6 7,568 9,813 12,932 
RQF 7 & 8 2,286 4,024 5,451 
Total 29,269 31,650 32,769 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates. 
data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “New WF II style Summary tabsWF7” 
Table 5.7: Employment by qualification level (workplace / jobs, 000s) 
Supply 2007 2017 2027 
RQF Level 
RQF 0 2,569 1,538 789 
RQF 1 5,447 4,381 2,947 
RQF2 6,856 6,755 5,699 
RQF3 6,338 7,010 6,340 
RQF4, 5 & 6 8,279 10,866 14,207 
RQF 7 & 8 2,498 4,454 5,985 
Total 31,987 35,004 35,966 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates. 
Notes: Includes HM Forces. Some Tables elsewhere in the report exclude HM Forces. 
data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “New WF II style Summary tabsWF7” 
 
124 Analysis of the LFS suggest that double jobbing qualification patterns are not the exactly the same for 
heads and jobs but the discrepancies would not make a huge difference here. 
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5.3. Demand for formal qualifications 
The numbers in employment by level of qualification can be regarded as an indicator of 
demand. Strictly speaking, employment levels are the result of a combination of both 
supply and demand factors; employment would only represent demand if there were 
excess supply. Separating demand and supply influences is not straightforward. Recent 
trends have seen a sharp rise in the formal qualifications held by those in employment. 
However, it is clear from the earlier discussion that, in part at least, this simply reflects the 
large increases on the supply side. Figure 5.4 provides an overview of the changing 
qualification profile of the workforce to 2027. By 2027, around 55.2% of people in 
employment are expected to be qualified at level 4125  and above, whilst the proportion of 
people with level 1 or no formal qualifications at all is expected to fall to 10.6%.  
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show that qualification patterns vary considerably across 
occupations. Generally speaking, occupations such as professionals and associate 
professionals, (and to a lesser extent managers), tend to be much better qualified than 
less skilled occupations, but average qualification levels are rising for most occupations. 
How much the latter is due to increasing demand requirements as opposed to 
“qualifications inflation” (as supply has risen) remains a bone of contention.126 
The shift in occupational structure in favour of the occupational major groups 1-3 (as 
discussed in Section 4) have been a key factor in increasing the numbers of graduates in 
employment. However, qualification profiles (the shares of employment qualified at 
different levels) have changed in almost all occupations in favour of higher-level 
qualifications (RQF4+). They also exhibit sharp reductions in the employment shares of 
those less well qualified (RQF1 and below).  
Some occupations have much higher proportions of well-qualified employees (RQF4+) 
than others do. For many of these occupations these proportions are close to 100%, so 
the scope for further growth is limited to the overall growth in employment levels in the 
occupation concerned. For others, where the shares are well below 100%, the scope for 
increasing shares is greater. Some occupations have quite a high concentration of 
employees with no or low (RQF1) qualifications.  
Qualifications profiles also vary significantly across sectors (see Figure 5.6). Largely, this 
reflects their occupational structure. Sectors such as health, education and public 
administration employ large numbers of people in higher-level occupations and, as a 
consequence, large numbers of people qualified at RQF level 4+. In contrast, some other 
sectors, such as other parts of the service sector, employ large numbers in occupations 
that tend to be less well qualified. 
 
125 For more information on RQF4 and other qualification levels, see https://www.gov.uk/what-different-
qualification-levels-mean/list-of-qualification-levels.   
126 See for example the debate between Brown and Hasketh (2004) and Purcell et al. (2005). Results by 
Elias and Purcell, (2011) suggest that rates of return to investment in Higher Education were still rising for 
some but declining for those in the bottom decile. 
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Overall qualification patterns within sectors depend on the mix of occupations they 
employ. In most cases, the patterns of change mirror those shown in the more aggregate 
picture across all occupations and sectors. 
There are also variations across spatial areas. Figure 5.7 provides an overview. The 
differences are not as marked as for sectors. London (and to a lesser extent Scotland 
and Wales) stands out, employing the largest proportion of those qualified at RQF level 
4+. These differences reflect London’s sectoral and occupational structure, with strong 
concentration of employment in education, public administration, banking and finance 
and head office functions. In the case of Scotland and Wales there are similar factors at 
work, as well as the fact that Scotland has a rather different education system to the 
remainder of the UK.  
Table 5.8: Changing qualification pattern of employment (workplace / jobs, % of total) 
Supply 2007 2017 2027 
RQF Level 
RQF 0 8.0 4.4 2.2 
RQF 1 17.0 12.5 8.2 
RQF2 21.4 19.3 15.8 
RQF3 19.8 20.0 17.6 
RQF4, 5 & 6 25.9 31.0 39.5 
RQF 7 & 8 7.8 12.7 16.6 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates of workplace 
jobs. 
data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “New WF II style Summary tabsWF7” 
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Figure 5.4: Qualification profile of workforce, 2017-2027  
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Figure 5.5: Qualification pattern of employment by occupation (%), 2017 
 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates (data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “FiguresWF7” 
Notes: The figure compares the shares of employment by qualification level in each occupation in 2017 and 2027 (% of total workplace / jobs). In general, the 
position is that there is increasing qualification intensity by occupation over time.
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Figure 5.6: Changing qualification pattern of employment by sector (%), 2017-2027 
 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates (data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “FiguresWF7”) 
Notes: The figure compares the shares of employment by qualification level in each broad sector in 2017 and 2027 (% of total workplace / jobs). In general, the 
position is that there is increasing qualification intensity over time.  
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 Figure 5.7: Spatial variations in employment patterns by qualification, 2017-2027 
 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates (data\StockflowData\UK Model Linked to CE Data.xlsx “FiguresWF7”).  
Notes: The figure compares the shares of employment by qualification level in each country /region in 2017 and 2027 (% of total workplace / jobs). In general, the 
position is that there is increasing qualification intensity over time. 
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5.4. Reconciliation, imbalances and mismatches 
The projections of the supply of people by highest qualification held (population numbers 
and those economically active) and the projections of the patterns of employment by 
qualification level within industries and occupations are carried out independently. There 
is no guarantee these will match.  
In order to ensure consistency, a reconciliation is imposed by making certain 
assumptions about unemployment rates by highest qualifications held, and then 
reallocating people to jobs until all those available are employed. This involves raising the 
qualifications intensity of all jobs if initial supply exceeds demand and reducing it if the 
converse is true. An iterative process is used to achieve this, maintaining the original 
patterns of employment by industry, occupation, gender, employment status and region. 
The assumptions regarding unemployment are set out in Tables 5.3 –5.4 above. 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the impact of this adjustment process for 2027. For each sub major 
occupational group, and for the total of all occupations, two bars are shown. The top bar 
shows the pattern of qualifications based on extrapolating past trends in historical 
patterns of employment. The second bar shows how this has to be altered to reflect the 
numbers projected to be available in the labour market (i.e. those economically active in 
employment).   
For most occupations, the qualification intensity (especially those holding qualifications at 
RQF 4+) has to be raised to bring demand into balance with supply. Those occupations 
in which the workforce is already highly qualified (such as professionals) have less room 
for further increases. Inevitably, this rise in qualifications intensity has been happening 
more in those occupations that have not previously employed higher-level qualifications, 
since this is where there is more scope for increase. This is not necessarily indicative of 
excess supply of such qualifications. The nature of jobs may be changing to make higher 
qualifications more necessary.101  
 
101 Education and health professions are good examples of where the entry requirements have seen a 
steady rise as the technical demands of jobs for teachers and nurses have risen.  
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Figure 5.8: Reconciling demand and supply in 2027 – increasing qualification intensity 
 
Source: IER estimates based on LFS data, constrained to match Working Futures estimates unconstrained 
qualification chart.xlsx 
Notes: The figure compares the shares of employment by qualification level in each occupation in the 
constrained and unconstrained estimates. In general, the position is that there is increasing qualification 
intensity by occupation in the results where demand is constrained to match the available supply. 
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5.5. Concluding remarks 
The supply of skills is set to continue to grow as more people acquire higher-level 
qualifications. The overall qualification profile of the workforce will improve significantly 
over the next decade. The proportion and numbers of people qualified at the highest 
levels (RQF4+) will rise substantially. In contrast, the proportion and number of those in 
the workforce with qualifications at RQF level 1 or below will fall. 
Qualification levels amongst the employed workforce are also projected to rise 
significantly, in line with these trends. This reflects changing patterns of requirements in 
many jobs. 
The relative significance of demand and supply influences is not easy to assess. The 
latest evidence suggests that rates of return to higher qualifications have shown some 
signs of decline, although they still indicate significant positive benefits from investing in 
courses of study at higher education and further education levels. 
Patterns of unemployment rates by RQF level are assumed to maintain the same 
hierarchy (i.e. the less well-qualified are significantly more likely to be unemployed) 
although the better qualified will take an increasing share of total unemployment 
(commensurate with their increasing share of the labour force). 
Qualification profiles vary significantly across both sectors and spatial areas. These 
differences are primarily driven by variations in their employment patterns by occupation 
(and also by sector in the case of spatial areas).  
Nearly all sectors and spatial areas are projected to see significant improvements in 
average qualification levels, with increased proportions and numbers employed at RQF 
level 4+ and reductions at RQF levels 0 and 1. 
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Glossary 
BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India and China 
CE – Cambridge Econometrics 
ICT – Information and Communication technologies 
IER – Institute for Employment Research, University of Warwick 
ILO – International Labour Organization 
Expansion demand – increase (or decrease) in employment levels between two years 
LMI for All – A Department for Education  project which makes labour market information 
(LMI) data freely available for careers guidance and advice  
Labour Force – employed residents plus ILO unemployment 
MDM – CE’s detailed multi-sectoral dynamic macroeconomic model (MDM-E3). 
MDM C182 (revision 13406) – CE projections conducted in November 2018  
NQF – National Qualification Framework 
Qualifications – standardised awards to accredit learning and skills acquired during 
education and training 
RQF – Regulated Qualifications Framework 
Replacement demand – job openings created by those leaving the labour force. 
Sector – 6 broad industries used: Primary sector & utilities; Manufacturing; Construction; 
Trade, accomm. & transport; Business & other services; Public administration, health and 
education (also referred to as Non-marketed services). 
Shift-share – an analysis of changes in occupation into three main components: a scale 
effect, an industrial mix effect and an occupational effect 
SIC – Standard Industry Classification 
SOC – Standard Industry Classification 
Terminology for quarters, etc. – 2012Q1 = first quarter of 2012, etc. 
Unemployment, ILO – people who are out of work, want a job, have actively sought work 
in the previous four weeks and are available to start work within the next fortnight 
Unemployed, Claimant – measures people claiming Job Seeker’s Allowance benefits 
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Workforce – the total number of workforce jobs is obtained by summing workplace 
employment (employee jobs and self-employment jobs), HM Forces, government-
supported trainees and claimant unemployment. 
Working Futures 2017-2027 – the latest in a long series of quantitative assessments of 
UK employment prospects over a ten-year horizon. 
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Other outputs available from Working Futures include:  
 
Working Futures 2017-2027 Main report and associated technical reports. Full details on 
sources and methods are to be found in the technical report. 
 
The full length evidence report and associated Annexes contain:  
• More detailed results for both sectors and occupations in the UK; 
• Results for the various devolved administrations with the UK and the English 
regions; 
• Comparisons with previous projections;  
• Methodological details relating to the projections, including the macroeconomic 
model, methods used to derive implications for the demand for and supply of skills 
and the spatial analysis.  
• Excel workbooks containing analysis for the UK, nations and English regions (to 
be published in due course). 
 
For further details and to access the Working Futures 2017-2027 reports see 
www.gov.uk/government/publications and for previous Working Futures reports see 
warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ier/research/wf/.  
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